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Love is a crucially important notion in morals. Moral 
philosophy, then, should give attention to this notion, and some of 
that attention should be concerned with how people might develop 
or improve as lovers. However, when the author tried to think 
through some rather obvious suggestions relating to love and 
becoming a lover, it became clear that much moral theory gives love 
short shrift. Assumptions inherent in rationalistic moral theory 
prevent most moral philosophers from letting love be the central 
concept in their work. 
This dissertation has two aims: to suggest four things which 
may contribute to moral progress by helping individuals love better, 
and to defend such suggestions against standard moral theory. 
Positively, the study suggests: overcoming narcissism enables a 
person to love: the basic element of love, clear and compassionate 
attention to individuals, can be practiced; a vision of love, given 
through narrative, can direct the moral pilgrim; and healthy 
communities can help would-be lovers. Negatively, the study argues: 
some of these positive suggestions would be classed as a non-central 
adjunct to moral philosophy by most rational.istic moral philosophers; 
this (mis)classification of these suggestions reveals that standard 
moral philosophy is deficient; these deficiencies flow from the wrong 
use of the "myth of autonomous reason;" and rationalistic moral 
theories are rooted in an untenable picture of human nature as 
essentially rational. Further, questions surrounding the concepts of 
pluralism of goods and relativism are discussed in one chapter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I responded to the question from my barber, who insisted that 
I keep my answer extremely brief. The main idea of my dissertation 
is that people really can get better. He was satisfied, and said this 
improved his opinion of philosophy. 
It may be hoped that this book will find some readers who ask 
for more detail. The body of the text, of course, conveys at least 
some of those details, as many as my thought, time, and energy 
allowed. Between these extremes--the sentence which pleased the 
barber and the whole book, which I hope pleases the reader--lies a 
shorter description, the introduction. 
. This study hopes to show that moral progress is possible, in 
particular, that progress in love is possible. Four theses are 
advanced to support this main idea. First, narcissism hinders love, 
therefore progress against narcissism is a means of growth in love. 
Second, the root of love is accurate and compassionate attention, 
which we can gain by practice, even though it is hard. Third, as 
moral pilgrims we pursue visions of love, so the stories by which we 
gain such visions are tools in learning to love. Fourth, healthy 
communities can help would-be lovers along the way. These themes 
are taken up, respectively, in chapters I, II, VI, and VIII. 
The positive claims of the book do not fit well with much, 
perhaps most, ethical theory. Chapters III, IV and V examine 
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this problem. Chapter III tries to recognize objections to the sort of 
moral philosophy exemplified in the first two chapters, trace those 
objections to basic assumptions of rationalistic moral theory, and call 
those assumptions into question. Chapter IV examines Immanuel 
Kant's moral theory, as a representative of rationalistic theory, shows 
that it is rooted in a myth (the "myth of autonomous reason") and a 
certain view of human nature, and rejects the myth (at least as 
applied to ethics) and the view of human nature. Chapter V 
examines a modern application of rationalistic theory in anc-ther 
field--Lawrence Kohlberg's moral development psychology--and 
shows how its rationalistic assumptions render it an example of "how 
not to think about moral progress." 
Does my assertion, in chapter VI, that we need a vision of love 
to grow as lovers, entail that I disbelieve i.n the incommensurability 
of goods, a topic in some recent philosophic literature? This 
possibility is explored in chapter VII. (The answer is complicated. 
No, the views of chapter VI do not entail a rejection of 
incommensurability. On the other hand, I do not believe goods are 
ultimately incommensurable. On still another hand, the ultimate 
unity of good shows up only imperfectly in a penultimate world.) 
Obviously, the book is not merely a philosophical exercise for 
the author. Progress in love is not just a mode of moral progress 
(though there are others); it is the most important one. The subtext 
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of importance--standard ethical theory gives its attention to things of 
lesser importance, while giving little attention to love--runs 
throughout the book. It is to be hoped, however, that the author has 
not substituted conviction for a substantive philosophical 
investigation. 
Two theses: 
CHAPTER I 
TIIB ABILITY TO SEE: TWO TIIBSES 
OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
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1. Narcissism is morally deadly; it can so deaden the soul as to 
make moral progress impossible. 
2. Thesis #1, and many other statements of its sort, ought to be 
considered proper expressions of ethical theory. 
The neophyte philosopher in modern times who wishes to 
think and write about morality faces a daunting problem. Some 
things which need to be said seem unsayable from within the 
framework of ideas accepted by many philosophers. One can look 
long and far before finding an approach to ethics which allows 
certain things to be said philosophically. 
What could be meant by such a charge? Philosophy is a 
notoriously many-sided discipline, in which basic assumptions are 
often challenged. How could any philosophical position, if well 
presented, fail to be heard? As will become clear, I am not 
suggesting that the positions argued in this book have not been aired 
at all; much of what is written here has antecedents in other 
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philosophers' work. Nevertheless, the main contentions of this study 
appear, when compared to much modern moral philosophy, to be 
"strange talk," i.e. not so much denying what others write, but talking 
about a different topic entirely. 
Rather than defend this assertion, this chapter will instead 
offer an example of moral philosophy, saying something which needs 
to be said. I will discuss narcissism, saying what I mean by it, 
showing why it is morally deadly, asking how someone could become 
aware of it, and suggesting what might be done about it. If this 
chapter's project is successful, my claim will have been 
demonstrated, for the reader will be able to see how different the 
project is from much philosophical writing on moral topics. Later, I 
will address an opinion which some of my readers, especially those 
who are trained in philosophy, may have about my discussion of 
narcissism. Specifically, philosophers may object that it should be 
classed as a piece of moralism, not moral philosophy. I will suggest 
that this opinion is misguided and unnecessary. 
Philosophy really ought to be more interested in the first thesis 
(and, of course, many others like it) than in the second. Given the 
state of modem ethical theory, thesis 2 must be made explicit so 
that thesis 1 might be granted philosophic respectability. Still, not 
many will accept thesis 2 unless the discussion of thesis 1 is 
convincing. 
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Narcjssjsm and the Death of Love 
"In the spring, at the time when kings go off to war, David sent 
Joab out with the king's men. . . " Thus begins the succession 
narrative of Solomon, found in the Bible, begun in 2 Samuel 
(chapters 11-23) and concluded in 1 Kings (chapters 1,2). This 
magnificent piece of historiography tells how the hastily contructed 
Israelite empire, put together entirely within David's lifetime, passed 
not to his many older sons. but to Solomon. For the purposes of this 
chapter, we direct our attention to that most famous part of the 
narrative, the story of David and Bathsheba. 
David, no longer the young warrior of other Bible stories but 
the firmly established king of Israel, did not go out to war with his 
general Joab. Secure in his power, he remained in the capital, 
Jerusalem, to administer his growing dominions and (we may 
suppose) to enjoy a settled life. While there he saw a young woman 
bathing and desired her. Ancient despots usually had their way in 
such matters; though David discovered th~ beautiful Bathsheba was 
married, he took her anyway. She soon reported that she carried his 
child. To cover the matter David summoned her .husband, a military 
man named Uriah, to Jerusalem. But Uriah would not take advantage 
of his "leave" for conjugal purposes as long as Joab and the army 
were in the field. So David sent Uriah back to the front carrying his 
death sentence, a secret command to Joab to expose Uriah to enemy 
attack. Uriah died and David married the grieving widow. Problem 
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solved; but as the succession historian briefly notes: "The thing David 
had done displeased the LORD." (2 Samuel 11:27) 
Surely David knew that he had sinned. Or did he? Readers of 
the text, separated from the action, can list his crimes, including 
adultery, murder, abuse of governmental authority, conspiracy, 
duplicity, etc. But can you imagine David's mind on the day he 
married Bathsheba? I can suppose him to consider himself as acting 
wisely in a tight spot. Yes, the initial affair was a mistake and he 
knew better. The king in a theocratic state like Israel was supposed 
to be a moral exemplar; if his deed became known his moral 
authority would be lessened, though probably not enough to weaken 
his political power. So the matter had to be hushed up, either by 
Uriah thinking the child his own or--given Uriah's expression of 
military loyalty--by Uriah's death. David might well have thought he 
had done well enough to protect the honor of the throne and Uriah as 
a state hero. 
"But what David had done displeased the LORD." In the second 
act of the drama, the prophet Nathan arrived in court to tell the king 
a story. It seemed that a wealthy man in Israel, blessed with ample 
flocks and herds, lived next to a poor man with only one sheep. A 
friend arrived to feast with the rich man. But instead of butchering 
from his own herd, the man had stolen his neighbor's lone sheep and 
offered that to his guest. Obviously, an injustice had occured, but 
what should be done? What did the king say to the story? Nathan 
asked. Indignant at such misuse of power, David said that the man 
really ought to die, that he would be required to restore to his 
neighbor four times what he had taken. And Nathan replied, "You 
are the man!" (2 Samuel 12:7) If, as I have supposed, David had 
rationalized his actions, the rationalization was now smashed. David 
said, "I have sinned against the LORD." (2 Samuel 12:13, cf. Psalm 
51) 
I have retold the story in this way, including my suppositions 
about David's state of mind, so that the story will illustrate the 
following point. In spite of his many crimes in this affair, David at 
least had the virtue that when confronted with his sins he was 
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willing to see them as the evils they were. He was willing to admit to 
the world, but most importantly to himself, that his actions were just 
as unjust as those of the rich man in Nathan's story. He faced up to a 
difference between the way he was and the way he knew he ought 
to be. 
Narcissism is marked by the unwillingness or inability to do as 
David. A narcissist rationalizes his behavior and being, both to other 
people and to himself. The narcissist values himself for "making it," 
for living up to his standards. So the narcissist cannot admit that he 
has not lived up to his standards without tearing at his self-esteem, 
even when (as is frequently the case) the narcissist's standards are 
unrealistic. Of course, most confrontations between what a person is 
and what he thinks he should be are not public affairs like the 
confrontation between Nathan and David. Most opportunities for 
insight and self-evaluation are internal to a person's life, as are our 
narcissistic or non-narcissistic reactions to them. 
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Note that the upshot of this discussion is that our internal 
reactions to certain internal events are morally significant. A person 
may feel threatened by apparent conflicts between what she is and 
what she thinks she should be. Feeling threatened, she may not 
acknowledge that she has been anything less than perfect. Both the 
feeling of threat and the resulting repression may be unconscious.I 
They are, nevertheless, matters of morality. 
1 With this sentence I go from the realm of morality to that of psychological 
theory, a move which warrants extended side comment. 
. First, a leading interest of this book, which will resurface repeatedly, is the 
mterpl~Y. ?f psychology and morality. For example, in chapter five I explore 
and cnt1c1ze moral development research. I think that both the moral 
philosopher and the psychologist do well to pay attention to the other's work. 
Second, ideas from theoretical psychology have so entered our everyday 
language that we need to make special effons to be aware of them and the 
ways they shape our thinking about morality. "Both the feeling of threat and 
the resulting repression may be unconscious.• Note that both 'repression' and 
'unconscious' are stock items of psychological theory. Even if I suspect, as I 
do, that people repress many of their feelings and that much of their mental 
activity is unconscious, I should recognize that these ideas are hypothetical 
constructs. 
Third, psychological theories often can be read as attempted explanations of 
how people come to think and feel the way they do. One can reject a proposed 
explanation or theory and still agree that people think and feel in the ways 
described. For instance, this chapter will present a psychoanalytic etiology of 
narcissism; the reader could regard the proposed etiology as unfounded and 
still accept the fact of narcissism. Specifically, some people are unable or 
unwilling to face their moral shortcomings. I do not, in fact, want to endorse 
psychoanalysis, though' I suspect it gives insight (another theoretically 
tinged word) into how we produce narcissists. 
Fourth, the usefulness of psychological theory for the moralist consists 
partially in its ability to let us admit things we might not like. Narcissism is 
ugly and unrealistic; I don't like the thought that I am narcissistic. But an 
explanatory theory which shows that my narcissism is part of the natural 
order of things allows me to admit its existence in me as something less than a 
totally arbitrary stroke of evil. 
10 
Ample psychological literature discusses the narcissistic 
personality disorder (Adler 430), with examples of extremely self-
centered, deceptive, and manipulative characters providing the grist 
for the analytic mill. Perhaps the first and most imponant thing to 
do in regard to these people is to protect others from them. It is 
easy to see that the narcissistic personality disorder disrupts moral 
progress--except that one hesitates to call these people "immoral"; 
they are sick. I want to talk not about extreme cases but less 
virulent infections of this moral disease which are found readily in 
everyday life, in the lives of ordinary people. These people, living 
what Stephen M. Johnson calls the "narcissistic style," often cause as 
much pain to themselves as to others. (Johnson 3) 
Johnson tells of "Martin," a client who had been severely 
abused as a very young child. (Johnson 201-203) Rejected by his 
parents at an age when parents seem almost godlike to a child, 
Martin felt he was worthless unless he could earn the approval and 
respect of other people. As an adult, Martin sought fulfillment 
through success and achievement in business. A driven and 
intelligent man, Martin "succeeded"; he had the career, the house, 
everything. He reached every goal he set--and was desperately 
unhappy. He had internalized the message of his abusive parents 
that he was worthless. No amount of achievement could heal the 
injury he had suffered. Martin is typical of the garden variety 
narcissists I am concerned with, people of whom Johnson says: 
I l 
T.hey a~e too .busy proving their worth--or more properly, 
dispr?vmg their worthlessness--to feel the love, appreciation, 
and JOY of human connectedness which their good works could 
potentially stimulate in themselves and others. These people 
are not character disordered. They are people tortured by 
narcissistic injury and crippled by developmental arrests in 
functioning which rob them of the richness of life they deserve. 
(Johnson 3) 
Psychoanalytic theory traces various personality disorders to 
unresolved issues in early development of an individual. (Johnson 
27-32) In the case of the narcissistic personality disorder, analytic 
theory looks at a period a few months after a person has learned to 
walk. M.S. Mahler has labeled this period the "rapprochement with 
reality," roughly the period from 15 to 24 months of age. The child 
has been through the manic, joyful stage of having acquired walking 
skills, when she explored everything and seemed invincible; no 
number of falls could keep her from bouncing back up and trying 
again. But now new, more challenging realities force their way into 
her world -- seperateness, vulnerability, and limitation. The child 
must come to grips with the facts that mother is not just an extension 
of herself, that the world holds dangers as well as wonders, and that 
there are some things she cannot do no matter bow many times or 
how hard she tries. In healthy development, a child learns these 
lessons bit by bit and gradually overcomes her natural defenses 
against these unpleasant truths. But if the child is not "optimally 
frustrated,"--repeatedly, gently, with gradually increasing severity 
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exposed to seperateness, vulnerability, and limitation--she may get 
"stuck" in a pattern of infantile consciousness. 
According to analytic theory, three defenses typically appear in 
the patterns of the narcissistic mind. The adult may retain the 
grandiosity of the new walker. "I am nothing unless I am perfect." 
Or he may idealize some mother-substitute, giving the substitute the 
godlike qualities mother used to have. "I can be nothing without the 
perfect other to direct and guide and make my life meaningful." Or. 
in a slightly more advanced stage, he may split himself and alternate 
between being the all-conquering walker and the worthless baby 
who cannot do anything right, a feeling internalized when the child 
experiences limitation in a crushing way. 
Fixation in primitive defenses produces a "false self." Certainly. 
the false self is the narcissist; it is real in that sense. But a realistic 
sense of self can only be gained by gradual neutralization of a 
person's grandiosity and idealization. So long as the narcissist lives 
in the emotional world of a toddler, he is bound to hurt and be hurt. 
The adult narcissist has his normal intellectual and productive 
capacities; he can "get on" and contribute in the world fairly 
effectively. But his production is likely to be of the driven kind, like 
Martin's, and it will not repair the damage done to that inner child 
for whom separation, vulnerability and limitation are unfinished and 
frightening business. 
How does the narcissistic style prevent moral progress? 
Consider a case like "Phil," again given by Johnson. (Johnson 129-
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131) Phil grew up in a home with an alcoholic, abusive father and a 
mother who failed to protect him from the father. He was humiliated 
and shamed repeatedly throughout his childhood. For Phil, the 
narcissistic dictum. "I am nothing unless I am perfect," meant that he 
was nothing. He came to therapy at thirty-eight suffering from 
severe depression, alcoholism, and chronic pain. Phil's alcoholism 
and feelings of worthlessness united in alcoholic binge episodes, 
during which he would disappear for days at a time. Like Martin's, 
Phil's false self was grandiose; unlike Martin, Phil generally felt the 
demands of the false self as a crushing, impossible burden. Johnson 
calls problems like those Phil presented when he entered therapy 
the "symptomatic self." Narcissists may alternate between the 
"successful" false self and the depressed, isolated symptomatic self 
for most of their lives. In spite of his depression and feelings of 
worthlessness and guilt, Phil had managed a long term marriage and 
employment. 
Phil was, I suggest, a relatively ordinary person; though his life 
brought him little joy and much unhappiness, he met the minimal 
requirements of the social contract. It is important to see that unlike 
the full-blown narcissistic personality disorder or the cool, calm 
sociopath, Phil wanted to be a "good" person and regretted the pain 
he caused others. If anything, he was too self-recriminating, 
especially after binges. And yet, because of his narcissism, Phil 
caused heartache and pain for himself. his family, and others around 
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him. Phil could not get better in a moral sense unless he got better 
in a psychological sense. 
Consider an imaginary case, which illustrates disturbing 
statistics, of a date rapist. Don's girlfriend, Sara, feels humiliated and 
furious. Attracted to him first by his good looks and sense of humor, 
Sara came to admire Don's political views and intelligence; she still 
does. They enjoyed mutual friends and some good times together. 
But last night, after seeing the latest Woody Allen film, she had 
invited him to her apartment for a drink and to talk. Don wanted to 
talk, but not about the movie, it seemed. He pressed Sara for 
physical intimacy; she said no. And he took her clothes off and raped 
her. 
If we couid ask Don, though, he would say that they made love. 
He had to push her a little bit, of course, but she wanted it. Women 
are like that sometimes. Rape? Don would deny it vehemently. He 
must; it would destroy his picture of himself to admit the label 
"rapist." He would insist that he does not hate or want to hurt his 
girlfriend--isn't that what rapists are like? Indeed, he feels closer to 
his girlfriend (now lover) than ever. He would not be surprised if 
they end up married. 
If Don and Sara were not imaginary, I would not be surprised if 
they married either. it happens often. But I would fear for their 
relationship. As long as Don is unable to see the pain he caused her, 
he will continue to use Sara. He will not grow in love until he 
recognizes her as an autonomous person. 
1 5 
Don is imaginary but date rape is not. How can we understand 
the phenomenon, repeatedly confirmed in studies, in which 
significant percentages of university women report having been 
raped by close acquaintances while virtually no university males 
admit being rapists? The women perceive rape where the men 
imagine love-making. (Clearly, there is no attempt here to be neutral 
between the perceptions of the women and the misperceptions of the 
men. In this case, the women know what's going on while the men 
do not.) Sexism, deeply embedded in our culture, must be part of 
any explanation of date rape. I doubt, though, that this societal 
reality adequately explains the sincere responses from university 
men in date rape studies. In many cases the university men are 
living from a narcissistic false self. Like Don, they cannot admit that 
they have raped; their sense of self demands that they not be 
criminal. They rationalize not because they fear legal responsibility, 
but because they fear the internalized message of the parent to the 
toddler, "You are not good enough."2 Like Don, if they do not 
overcome the pressure to rationalize they may continue to use 
women as objects without ever seeing that that is what they are 
doing. 
Narcissism comes in milder forms than the examples I've 
mentioned might suggest. Johnson writes of "Chuck." a normally 
~ These remar~s ignore the .Pr?bability that sexism in our culture is massively 
mterconnected with male narcissism. I would not argue against anyone who 
wan~ed. to .make that connec~on. I would insist, though, that an individual's 
narc1s.s1sm is not .the same thtD:g as. societal sexism. Date rape is not adequately 
explained by saying many umvers1ty men are sexists. 
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high-functioning, capable person with a fairly realistic sense of self. 
(Johnson173-189) Chuck grew up in a wealthy, upper-class family. 
His father and older brother, though nurturing and supportive in 
some ways, communicated a clear demand that Chuck live up to 
family standards of achievement, distinction and social grace. The 
youngest child in the family, Chuck was allowed a little more 
freedom than his siblings, but he still grew up worried whether he 
could live up to the family image. Chuck spent a number of years 
trying to prove his worth with successes in business or dating 
physically attractive but emotionally hard and financially 
independent women. Neither sort of success satisfied his need to feel 
worthwhile. 
Johnson relates how, in a comparatively short course of 
therapy, Chuck gained insight into his narcissistic false self. He 
learned to feel fears which he had long suppressed, which Johnson 
connects, in accord with analytic theory, to Chuck's interior child, still 
stuck in defenses against vulnerability. Then Chuck took a vacation 
among family in the midwest in which his newly developed self-
acceptance and openness to feelings contrasted sharply with the tight 
self-control of his brother and sister-in-law. Chuck was able to 
spend time with his nieces and nephews simply playing. He told his 
rigid brother that he loved him, but that he was no longer willing to 
devote his life to business success. He took a long drive with his 82-
year-old grandmother; she reminisced and they talked about life and 
death and reaffirmed their love for each other. He looked up old 
friends, talked and had fun. 
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We should say that by becoming aware of and to some degree 
emerging out of his narcissism, Chuck did more than make 
therapeutic progress. He made moral progress. By learning to accept 
himself, not for measuring up but for being himself, Chuck found it 
easier to be honest about his opinions and feelings when speaking 
with others. He was able to love them better. 
Here is a summary of what has been said to this point. 
Narcissism prevents moral progress in a number of ways; especially, 
narcissism keeps us from learning to be lovers. Sometimes, as in the 
case of a date rapist, the grandiosity of the false self gets connected 
with some rule of morality, internalized as (for example), "If I am a 
rapist I am a really bad person." The resulting need to deny that one 
has broken the rule leads to rationalization and the ability 
repeatedly to break the rule while approving it. M. Scott Peck gives 
a grotesque example of this in "The Case of Bobby and His Parents" in 
People of the Lie. (Peck 47-59) Bobby's parents had two sons, the 
younger of whom, Bobby, was hospitalized for depression. The older 
son, Stuart, had committed suicide with a small gauge rifle. For 
Christmas, the parents made a present of that very rifle to Bobby. 
They did not see anything wrong with this. 
'Did you think how that present might seem to Bobby?' I 
asked. 
'What do you mean?' 
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'I mean that' giving him his brother's suicide weapon was like 
telling him to go out and kill himself too.' 
'We didn't tell him anything of the sort.' 
'Of course not. But did you think that it might possibly seem 
that way to Bobby?' 
'No we didn't think about that. We're not educated people 
like y~u. We haven't been to c~llege. and learn ~ll kinds of 
fancy ways of thinking. We're 3ust simple working people. We 
can't be expected to think of all these things.' (Peck 57) 
To the extent that narcissism keeps me unconscious of the 
ways I hurt other people, it stops my moral progress. 
For other narcissists, like Martin and Chuck's brother, the needs 
of the false self consume a person's time and energy. In our culture, 
I f maten.ally rewarded for their drivenness, but these peop e o ten are 
they have little to give emotionally. Learning to love takes, and is 
worth, time and energy. Since learning to love takes time and 
energy, it will not do, as some of us are tempted to do, to make "Thou 
shalt love" into a rule which a rational person may simply fulfill at 
will. That just adds another requirement to the image of the false 
self. 
To the extent that narcissism keeps me from learning to love, it 
stops my moral progress. 
Sometimes, as for Johnson's "Phil," the grandiose false self is 
crushed repeatedly, leading to intense depression. We easily see, in 
his case, the moral implications of his suffering because his binges 
brought anguish to his wife and others. We should observe, though, 
that the pain he caused himself was a moral issue, leaving aside the 
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interests of others. "I, too, am a human being"; far too often, we take 
the virtue of self-love for granted. 
To the extent that narcissism keeps me from loving and caring 
for myself, it stops my moral progress. 
So far attention has been concentrated on individual examples 
of narcissism. The narcissistic style can also infect groups, from 
small ones like families and clubs to huge corporations and nation-
states. I do not want to speculate about the etiology of group 
narcissism, questioning whether it originates in group processes or 
whether it comes from the joining of the narcissism of the 
individuals in the group. It seems clear, though, that many groups 
are marked by narcissistic qualities, especially denial of knowledge 
that would threaten the group self-image. 
For example, Martha (not her real name) came to my office 
with great hesitation. Martha had not been to a church for a long 
time, not since her ~eens. She felt out of place, and wondered if a 
church could have any place in her spiritual pilgrimage. 
Martha grew up in a traditional family in the Midwest with 
strong values of family love, community responsibility, church 
attendance, and conservative sexual mores. She had happy 
memories of her childhood, memories marred by what happened 
after. At fifteen, she became pregnant and her parents threw her 
out. With no one to turn to in her church or community, she drifted 
to a major city where she supported herself and her child through 
prostitution. Somehow Martha overcame all this. When she came to 
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me she had a husband, a house and a conventional lifestyle. Now 
that survival was no longer the primary issue in her life, Martha 
sensed a need for spiritual growth, thus her visit to a pastor's office. 
But memories of rejection filled her with apprehension. Religious 
people in her past had hurt and deserted her. How could they have 
done it? How could people who talked about love and loyalty prove 
so vindictive and judgmental? 
Indeed, how could they? Were Martha's parents and the 
people in the church conscious hypocrites? Probably not. Having 
observed other, similar situations, I suggested that her parents acted 
out of a combination of embarrassment (what would they tell their 
friends?), anger (how could she do this to them?), and misguided 
righteousness (she had broken the rules and set a bad example). 
They rationalized forcing Martha from the house by thinking that she 
had chosen her course and they were only respecting her decision 
(she wanted to be an adult; let her live as one). The church folk did 
not press Martha's parents too closely for an explanation of Martha's 
"runaway" from home because they were embarrassed too. 
Martha conceded all this; she had concluded long before that 
her parents actually thought they had treated her properly. 
I 
Martha's parents and church were not conscious of the gap, which 
certainly seemed obvious to Martha, between the values they 
h d d h · · t d Martha Th1's group valued itself preac e an t eir actions owar • 
as being righteous; if Martha broke their rule-bound definition of 
righteousness, she broke the group's self-image. Within this group 
self-image they could not tolerate her continued presence. They 
rationalized their behavior or simply repressed the 
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acknowledgement that it was evil. The narcissistic group thinks and 
acts much like the narcissistic individual. 
Group narcissism can be on a "small" scale, as in a single 
congregation, or on a massive, institutional scale, like that of many 
white South Africans. These people consider themselves democrats 
and defenders of freedom. How, then, can they deny political rights 
to the black majority? Once again, one may doubt that they are 
conscious hypocrites. Instead, they believe that blacks are inferior 
or that most blacks are happy with the status quo or that blacks can 
be given their due within the system of homelands citizenship. To 
admit that white rule is raw unjustifiable oppression would be 
intolerable, so they avoid the admission. 
Group narcissism is marked by commitment to an unrealistic 
group identity, "the lie." The lie may be spoken publicly or assumed 
silently. Anyone in the group who exposes the lie or acts in violation 
of the group self-image may be ostracized by the group. 
Consider the American experience of the Vietnam War in the 
1960's. President Kennedy defined South Vietnam as a democracy, 
worthy of American support. Under the Johnson administration, 
hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers were committed to the war 
against North Vietnam and the "Vietcong," supposedly a small 
revolutionary communist faction in the South Vietnamese population. 
President Johnson's main political interests lay in the combination of 
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social programs he called the great society, programs under attack 
from his political opponents. In order to build the great society and 
prosecute the war at the some time in the face of this opposition, 
Johnson repeatedly denied the costs, human and material, which 
military people said the war required. Again and again 
administration spokesmen, sometimes even military officers, assured 
the public that "the corner has been turned" and "the end is in sight." 
In the last two years of the Johnson administration the lies 
multiplied. People who questioned the lies--were we really 
defending a just government in South Vietnam? Was the communist 
insurgency really about to collapse? Was the weekly "body count" of 
enemy casualties at all realistic?--were attacked by administration 
spokesmen as being disloyal to "our boys in Vietnam." 
If the false group self-image had been confined to the White 
House, Vietnam would not have caused the painful divisions in 
American society that it did. Many Americans--in the beginning, 
nearly all Americans--thought of their country as democratic and 
just, a supporter of justice and freedom all over the world. We were 
in Vietnam for good reasons; we were defending a democratic ally 
against the threat of international communism. Later, when millions 
came to question the administration line, society was disrupted at a 
basic level. Ostracism of the dissidents was expressed in the familiar 
bumper-sticker slogan: "America, love it or leave it." These slowly 
healing divisions are still present in our society, despite many 
political calls to "put Vietnam behind us." 
If narcissism, both in individual and group life, is morally 
deadly, what can be done about it? 
23 
Individually, how can I become aware of the places in my life 
where narcissistic rationalization prevents me from seeing the 
changes I need to make? I may see clearly in one matter and yet be 
self-deceived in another. How do I discover my moral blind spots? 
Corporately, how can we identify the places where our group self-
image moves us to repress knowledge which would undermine it? 
One dare not claim a definitive answer to this problem. But a 
suggestion may be found in the David story. Change became possible 
for him in the comparison between a clear matter (Nathan's story) 
and his own. Of course, David had the advantage on us; a prophet 
came to confront him. But "prophets" of other sorts come to us and 
give us opportunities to see the world differently. Think of the 
picture (virtually all my readers have seen it), a black and white 
news photograph, which helped end US involvement in the Vietnam 
war. A naked little girl runs, screaming at the camera, others fleeing 
the napalm with her, terror on their faces. For many Americans that 
photograph, and other images like it seen on television, served as a 
prophetic confrontation. The official rationalization, that we were 
defending democracy in South Vietnam, was confronted by the vision 
of a little girl with her back on fire and the rationalization lost. 
(General Westmoreland complained that the picture was a fake, that 
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the girl probably had been burned in a hibachi accident. The need to 
avoid/repress/not see can be overwhelming.) 
The world probably provides us with such confrontations quite 
often; at least. that is my guess. But if our need not to know is great 
enough, like General Westmoreland we will cling to the flimsiest 
rationalizations--and believe them. If, like Martin, we are high 
achievers, we can live in our false selves for long periods. For most 
of us, though, our false selves crack at least some of the time; like 
Phil, we then feel the awful weight of our worthlessness. Either way, 
the energy put into protecting our unrealistic self-image robs us of 
joy and keeps us from learning to love. 
We need to somehow reduce our need not to know. Thus it is 
that therapists must often help narcissistic patients to accept and 
believe in themselves for nothing more than the persons they are. 
Behind the false self is the lie we have internalized, "I am nothing 
unless " No matter how someone finishes the sentence, it is not 
true. 
"I am somebody, but I can get better." Moral progress is 
possible when an individual values herself and yet also has ideals to 
admire and be stretched by. The person "on the way" is free to see 
the gap between her goal and her performance and let that 
knowledge motivate her. 
An interesting debate can occur at this point. Someone could 
suggest that narcissistic denial stems from pain the individual feels 
when the false self is threatened. If people felt no pain--call it 
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shame or guilt--they would not have to repress knowledge.3 Perhaps 
narcissism would disappear if we could banish self-destructive 
emotions like shame and guilt. This is a utopian proposal, since it 
would require that all children be parented in radically different 
ways than they are. But utopian proposals have their value not in 
practicality but in their vision. We could at least work toward the 
abolition of guilt and shame. 
Another voice could respond that it is just that discomfort 
which we feel when we see our moral failure which motivates us to 
change. This side could agree that people often suffer from neurotic 
guilt or destructive shame and still hold that guilt or shame felt for 
the right reasons is a good thing. The shameless person may be none 
other than the sociopath. 
In this debate I tend to side with those who argue that some 
guilt is good guilt, ~at we ought to be ashamed of some things. I 
think, though, that guilt has value only if it motivates change; guilt 
has no value of its own, as if somehow feeling bad were a payment 
for wrongdoing. Whichever side is right, often the way forward lies 
in strengthening a person's sense of worth in face of the threat posed 
by the pain of shame or guilt. 
3 Cf. John Kekes, "Shame and Moral Progress." Kekes calls the pain someone 
feels when she sees the gap between what she is and what she thinks she 
should be "shame" and sees it as destructive of self image. He agrees that moral 
progress requires self examination and the willingness to see that we fall 
short of our ideals. But he thinks that we can react to this failure in positive 
ways, i.e. without shame. (Kekes 291-295) 
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Prevention is better than cure. We ought to let our children 
know that they can feel the feelings they have and express them and 
we will still accept them. They don't have to be perfect. They don't 
have to fix life for mother and father. Most of all. they are worth 
being loved just the way they are. 
At the time in my life when I first wrote this chapter, I had the 
privilege of spending many mornings at home with my five-year-old 
adopted son. I managed to get some study done because he watched 
"Sesame Street" and "Mr. Rogers" almost every day. I developed 
admiring gratitude for the ministry of Fred Rogers to children. When 
I heard a certain song start, I stopped what I was doing, picked up 
Jamie and mouthed the words: 
"It's you I like; 
It's not the things you wear. 
It's not the way you do your hair 
But it's you I like. 
It's you I like; 
Every part of you. . ·" 
I don't know the whole song. We always collapsed in laughter 
before it ended. 
Undoubtedly, other clues or cues could be given to the would-
be lover, showing how to become aware of and overcome narcissistic 
blindness. But for now, enough has been said. Since moral growth is 
both possible and worthwhile, I want to do away with my 
unwillingness to see, for it prevents growth. There may be pain 
involved in seeing my failure, but I need not flee it. 
}!thical Theory and Real Life 
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Put bluntly, the issue is this: who are moral philosophers and 
what do they do? What should we expect something written by a 
philosopher about ethical matters to be like? I want to say that the 
first part of this paper is an example of moral philosophy, even 
though it is unlike and has different ambitions than many things 
written by ethical theorists. I say this even if, against my strong 
hope, my work in the first half of this paper turns out to be bad 
philosophy, that is, bad in the sense that in it I am plainly wrong 
about narcissism. 
What should moral philosophy do? Three broad responses to 
this query can be discerned in modem philosophy. First, in the 
standard theory approach, the philosopher searches for a normative 
or justificatory theory which a) gives a sympathetic explanation and 
confirmation of widely held moral judgements and. b) can be used to 
decide current problem cases, where serious persons disagree about 
the right thing to do. The main living varieties of normative ethical 
theories are utilitarianism and (modified) Kantianism, though college 
ethics classes also acquaint students with hedonism, the theory of 
natural law, divine command theory, and others. 
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The constructors and repairers of standard ethical theories 
often think of themselves as scientists in the field of ethics. They are 
laying bare the underlying theory which makes sense of billions of 
fundamentally sound, but theoretically inchoate, moral judgements 
made by everyday people. Correct theory is then able to help 
everyday people in their quandaries. But it does not work that way; 
everyday people do not seem to get much help from theories. And 
why should they? Why should someone who, it is admitted, almost 
always "gets it right" without a theory suddenly turn to the theorist 
for help in the pinch? By analogy, we go to doctors when we are 
sick, but also when we are well so that we won't get sick. Do 
normative theorists even imagine that they have something to offer 
the ordinary person who is not in a quandary situation? 
Second, in the meta-ethics answer (to the question, what 
should moral philosophy do?), the moral philosopher steps back from 
various projects of moralizing and moral theorizing and philosophizes 
about them. What are the common assumptions of nonnative 
theories? What happens when people argue rationally about ethical 
dilemmas? How do moral concept words like good or just function in 
comparison to other kinds of speech, e.g. scientific speech? These, 
and other like questions, define the field for the meta-ethics 
philosopher. 
Historically, perhaps the most important meta-ethical approach 
to moral philosophy has been emotivism, the doctrine that normative 
ethical speech is not about anything; it just fulfills an expressive 
function. This and other forms of non-cognitive4 meta-ethical 
theories have been sufficiently promulgated in places of higher 
education that one can find the basic ideas expressed by non-
philosophers. 
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(I a~ not suggesting that college ethics classes, in which 
students read Ayer, Stevenson or some other non-cognitivist 
philosopher, produce a society enamored with non-cognitive meta-
ethical theory. Rather, it is the other way around. I imagine that the 
ethical relativism of our society powerfully predisposes us to such 
philosophy.) 
The standard ethical theorist and the meta-ethics theorist 
probably would have in common that both would label the first part 
of this paper as "moralism." In it the author unabashedly says "we 
need" and "we ought"; he makes a moral appeal. 
Standard theorists will object that the author makes his appeal 
without grounding it in any normative theory. Peter Singer and Tom 
Regan make moral appeals, but at least they do the necessary 
theoretical work to back it up. A non-cognitivist meta-ethical 
theorist will object that the author ought to show some awareness 
that the judgements he makes are culturally derived. As written, 
they sound like honest-to-God facts. 
4 A big question in meta-ethics concerns claims to moral knowledge. "Non-
cognitivitism" holds that moral "knowledge" is of a radically different sort 
than scientific knowledge. We use fact stating language to say something 
about the world which may be true or false. We use moral language to say 
something about a separate area of inquiry, where questions of truth or falsity 
don't apply. 
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Well, narcissism is morally deadly. We don't need a moral 
theory to know that, and any good moral theory ought to make sense 
of it. And if (I cannot imagine how) this chapter were wrong about 
narcissism, it would be wrong because some other position was right. 
There are moral facts after all. 
The third response (to the question, what should moral 
philosophy do?) is more a hodgepodge than an identifiable position.5 
Some thinkers have become dissatisfied with the state of moral 
philosophy, especially standard rationalistic theory, in recent years. 
They are united in being anti-theorists, but little else. Some write 
simply to question the helpfulness of current standard theories. 
Some question the value or possibility of any ethical theory. Some 
say moral philosophy can be done without theory. Some want to 
reframe the field of ethical theory by re-examining virtues. 
In questioning the moves made by standard theory, some of 
these philosophers have made attractive suggestions. Here are three. 
1) Rather than devise a theory for a nonspecific rational person, a 
theory which necessarily must address the minimum requirements 
of morality since it applies to everyone, moral philosophy ought to 
pay attention to real people in real situations. 2) Rather than engage 
in discussions of abstract words like "good" and "just" (discussions 
which inevitably degenerate into debates over non-cognitivism), 
moral philosophy ought to ask about concrete moral terms like 
5 For a short survey of literature, see Stanley Clarke and Ev~ Simpso~, 
"Rationalistic Moral Theory Pro and Con: A Guide to Recent Literature. 
3 l 
"generous" and "considerate," an inquiry which may reveal that we 
do have knowledge of morals. 3) Rather than define ethics by 
reference to action, moral philosophy ought to include motivations 
(conscious and unconscious), desires, hopes, and ideals--in short, all 
matters of character and virtue--as its field of inquiry. 
These suggestions stem from one basic assumption, that there 
really is a world of morality about which the moral philosopher 
ought to be concerned. Compare: when philosophers of science 
discuss their theories, a trenchant critique is sometimes made against 
a position, that it has nothing to do with the way real scientists work. 
Supposedly, it is the practice of real scientists which provokes the 
questions and theories of philosophers of science. Philosophy does 
not assume the task of directing science; rather, the goal is to 
understand science. I do not suggest that moral philosophy will 
parallel philosophy of science in all respects (I still have not 
completely given up the dream that the ethical theorist might make 
helpful comments to ordinary people), but at least they are alike in 
that the first task is to understand a human activity which goes on 
independently of philosophy. 
Of course, the "human activity" we call morality cannot be 
sharply differentiated from other activities. We make a category 
mistake if we try to add morality to a list of activities like sleeping, 
dieting, working, or philosophizing. 6 Moral concerns spread 
themselves through all of life. 
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Socrates is often quoted approvingly as giving a definition of 
morality: ". . .and on what subject should even a man of slight 
intelligence be more serious? --namely, what kind of life one should 
live ... " (Gorgias 500c). It's a good definition, but we should 
remember that we are talking about real people with real options; 
Socrates and Callicles argued over whether one should be a 
rhetorician or a philosopher. Socrates, of course, wanted to apply the 
question in an abstract way to any rational person anywhere, but 
this just shows that wrong moves have a long lineage. 
If ethical theorists pay attention to the real ground of moral 
life they will find ample material for wonderment and careful 
thought. For example, I think that psychological matters and 
questions of ideals play enormous roles in morality. Thus, I have 
written about narcissism, interested in how it plays out in the 
idealistic question, "How can I be a lover?" 
6 Speculation: this category mistake makes much mischief in moral 
philosophy. Specifically, it may account for philosophers' attraction to 
"acting" as the prime category for ethical reflection. "Acting" fits into list of 
activities better than "morality" does. 
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Theological Afterword 
Historically, religious ethical theorists have asked the same 
questions as unbelieving theorists. In the Christian tradition, Thomas 
Aquinas spoke for most Christian moral philosophers when he taught 
the theory of natural law, according to which the right thing is the 
reasonable thing. Christian philosophers in modern times have 
looked for a rationalistic justificatory theory like everyone else, but 
with the added intention of justifying certain moral judgements (e.g. 
the highest duty is to love God) in which unbelieving philosophers 
had no interest. 
I see no reason why Christian thinkers should be tied to the 
goal of standard theory. (I do not think a Christian could consistently 
be a non-cognitivist, so I will not address that possibility.) Why 
should we think that the search for rational moral rules consitutes 
the only approach to moral philosophy? Christianity is not, as some 
Church Fathers taught, a new law. Modern studies of New Testament 
theology make it clear that for most of the early Christian movement 
ethical matters were pneumatological; believers were guided by the 
Spirit and the fellowship, not by formal rules. 7 
Pastoral experience suggests that treating ethics as rules can 
have disastrous results in congregational life. Think again of 
Martha's home church. Group narcissism is undoubtedly a 
1 Of course, this statement oversimplifies matters. Cf. Herman N. Ridderbos, 
Paul: An Outline of His Theology. especially the sections entitled, "The New 
Life" and "The New Obedience." (Ridderbos 205-325) 
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complicated affair, but preaching morality as law can only compound 
the problem. 
Instead of thinking that Christian dogma sets us the theoretical 
task of rationally justifying the great commandments (Love God; love 
your neighbor.), we ought to think of the commandments as the ideal 
for which we strive. Instead of a law, dogma presents us with 
affirmations on which to build an understanding of the moral life; 
every person has divinely given, irremovable worth; there is a Hero 
who modeled a good life; and there is a Spirit present to aid in the 
never-finished process of character transformation. 
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CHAPTER II 
LEARNING TO SEE: 'IENDING 
THE SEEDS OF LOVE 
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1. Can people learn to love? 
2. If so, how? 
This chapter is written in the conviction that people can learn 
(if that is the right word) to love each other. I will presume to 
suggest how we might go about it. More precisely, I will agree with 
certain philosophers that a large part of love is accurate vision, try to 
give examples of what accurate vision involves, and suggest ways we 
can achieve it. 
Consider as a way to jump into our topic, reasons why people 
might think that we do not learn love. Here are three which 
introduce points I want to make. First, someone might object that 
learning to love implies that lovers (at least some of them) make 
progress; they become better lovers as time goes on. But this 
contradicts experience, our objector says. Lovers love best at the 
beginning, when first under the spell of the beloved. Later, the 
harsh realities--or harsh banalities--of life sap the strength of love 
and leave the lovers in an exhausted or bored routine. 
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How naive and unphilosophical! The reader may smile; surely 
we do not need to answer an objector who confuses romance with all 
love. But this objection helpfully raises the issue of the various kinds 
of love. If I propose to talk of love, and how it is learned, what is my 
subject? Erotic love, friendship, love of God, or something else? I 
will return to this subject, and try to make clear the target of this 
book, in the section below, "Love and Loves." 
Second, some philosophers might object that a claim that one 
can learn love requires an account of how. They would say such a 
claim stands or falls with the explanation. But a satisfying account 
might be hard to find. 
Take, for example, Plato's doctrine in the Symposium. There, 
Socrates relates how Diotoma taught him the course of the candidate 
lover. First, she said, the would-be lover ought to fall in love with 
the beauty of one body. Then he "mounts the heavenly ladder" by 
learning to love the beauty of two, then multiple, bodies. From 
bodily beauty the lover moves to loving the beauty of institutions 
and laws; from institutions he rises to the beauty of learning; from 
learning in general to the special knowledge which pertains to "the 
beautiful itself''; and finally the lover comes to know what beauty 
really is. 
This story carries enormous philosophical baggage, the whole of 
Platonic idealism. Plato thought that love was basically desire, desire 
for something the lover did not have and yet admired: beauty. Since 
beauty is a form in which things participate to a greater or lesser 
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degree, progress in love consists in learning to admire and desire the 
beauty of higher and better things. "And if, my dear Socrates, 
Diotima went on, man's life is ever worth the living, it is when he has 
attained this vision of the very soul of beauty." (Symposium, 21ld) 
Will Plato's story do as a justifying explanation for the claim 
that we can learn love? Not for anyone who does not accept his 
metaphysical and epistemological doctrines. To non-idealists, the 
idea of climbing the ladder of love sounds ridiculous, a fairy tale 
unconnected to real life. 
Other courses of education for would-be lovers might fall 
victim to similar critiques. (I suspect that any explanation of how to 
learn love will be shot through with metaphysical assumptions. If 
you reject the metaphysics, you can attack the explanation. This is 
certainly true of what will be said in this chapter.) Perhaps we will 
find no satisfying explanation to justify the claim that we can learn 
love. Does this second objection then defeat the contention that we 
can? 
It does not. The objection, if we take it as a refutation of the 
proposition "Human beings learn to love," argues in this fashion. "We 
have no explanation of how people learn to love, . therefore they do 
not learn to love." The conclusion of this argument simply does not 
follow from the premise. We might as well argue that since we have 
no explanation of how immaterial minds can affect material bodies, 
Cartesian dualism is false. Each argument needs an extra premise, 
something like "No proposition can be true if we do not have an 
explanation of how it is true." No one would want to defend such a 
premise. 
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But this logical point does not reckon with the power of 
curiosity. Cartesian dualism has not been proved false, but few if 
any philosophers believe it. At a very deep level, we want 
explanations for beliefs. If we cannot get them, even after serious 
search, we tend to reject the beliefs. (Of course, this tendency is not 
absolute.) So, though the contention that we can learn love does not 
strictly depend on explaining how, this chapter will give most of its 
attention to such an explanation. In a sense, the present chapter is 
yet another footnote to Plato, this time an attempt to give a better 
account of the school of love. 
Later, in the sixth chapter, we will examine admiration for and 
pursuit of good; Diotima's doctrine does have something right, though 
we need not adopt Platonic idealism as our vision of the good. Plato 
was right, too, that desire is part of love. But love is not at bottom 
desire; its basic component is accurate vision. 
In order to love well--really, to love at all--1 must see myself 
and others with some degree of accuracy. If narcissistic defenses 
cloud my vision, so that I see myself as worthy only if I am perfect 
or as unworthy without the perfect other to guide me, then my false 
self comes between me and anyone I might love. False selves can 
only offer ersatz love. Further, if I don't see others accurately, I can 
hardly love them. Instead, I love fantasy objects, a love which is 
just as artificial as the love offered by false selves. 
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A third kind of objector to the thesis that we can learn love 
speaks up at this point. This objector could agree with virtually 
everything said in chapter one about narcissism. The wounded child 
in us and the narcissistic defenses we throw up to cover our wounds 
hinder or prevent us from loving. We can try, through therapy or 
preventive parenting, to remove these boulders in the road of love. 
But that is a different thing, this objector claims, from learning to 
love. 
Do we learn to be narcissists? Of course not, the objector says. 
The wounds of childhood happen to us; they come from without like 
forces of nature. According to psychoanalytic theory, narcissistic 
defenses are simply natural, though dysfunctional, responses to our 
wounds. Narcissism is an inability to love, similar to some people's 
inability to sing on key or others' inability to recognize spatial 
relationships in two-dimensional drawings. 
This third objector might agree that love is basically accurate 
perception. But, he claims, the ability to see well in this moral sense 
is as much a natural gift as the ability to see drawings or flowers or 
spinning baseballs well. Put another way, this objection says that 
moral vision can only be understood as part of a complex, mysterious 
something called "character." We do not learn our character. 
External events, unconscious needs and fears, chance meetings, 
forgotten words from authority figures, and countless factors 
produce a person's character. Moral vision, the objector concludes, is 
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more like a given--by happenstance one can see better, another less 
well--than like a skill which might be learned. 
On the whole, I agree with this objector. I accept the picture of 
the human soul given us by modern psychology, in which the 
conscious and rational activities of our minds lie like a sheet of water 
on a bog; on the surface are waves and much else that interest us, 
but far more complicated structures exist in the mirky mud which 
the wind sometimes stirs to the top. However, this does not 
contradict the claim that people can learn to see themselves and 
others accurately and thus gain the basic component of love. The 
objection only shows that learning to see is hard, and harder for 
some of us than for others, not that it does not happen. However 
complicated and various the forces which make up my character, my 
practice of life must be included among them. (By "practice of life" 
understand the things a person does, both externally in the public 
world and internally in her mental world; implicit is a rejection of 
behaviorist definitions of action.) I have no easy control over what I 
see morally or other aspects of my character, but by my practice of 
life I have some control, and that is reason enough to launch into the 
work of learning to love. Put no premium here on the word "learn"; 
another verb might be better. It is important to recognize, though, 
that some .Y.ru:!!.--an action word--will describe my target, the activity 
of gaining the ability to love. 
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Seejn g Otherness 
An example first. 
The principle character in Alexei Panshin's science fiction novel 
Rite of Passage, Mia Havero, an intelligent thirteen year old girl, 
lives in a huge spaceship made in a hollowed out asteroid. On a dare, 
Mia agreed to join some friends on an "adventure," to go through one 
of the airlocks to the outside of the ship. To do this, Mia and a friend, 
Jimmy Dentremont, kept a technician named Mitchell busy with a 
project (firing ceramic name pins) while the other conspirators took 
unauthorized possession of three space suits. 
Once outside the ship, Mia and a third friend were quickly 
overcome by vertigo; only with difficulty did Mia and Jimmy pull the 
retching Riggy back through the airlock. Disaster was averted, but 
Mia and Jimmy were apprehended while returning the suits. 
The aftermath I don't care to go into detail about. Mr. Mitchell 
was quite genuinely hurt to think he had been used. I could 
tell that he was hurt when he handed each of us our pins, both 
of which turned out very nicely indeed. 
That was at a meeting in Daddy's office ... 
I could see that Mr. Mitchell had been hurt, but I didn't really 
understand why. It was spelled out for us. I had been looking 
at it from my point of view, that he was in our way and might 
have stopped us if we had just tried to ask for the suits. I 
hadn't seen things from his angle at all. That we had used him 
the way you use a handkerchief. I've always thought more in 
terms of things than of people, and I'm sometimes slow to put 
myself in somebodys else's shoes. When I did, I wasn't happy 
about what I'd done--which I think was Daddy's intention. 
(Panshin 142-143) 
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Later, in accordance with the Ship's rigid policy, Mia undergoes 
"trial." This rite of passage requires all children to spend a month on 
their own on a colony planet shortly after their fourteenth birthday. 
Some die or otherwise fail to signal for pick up at the end of thirty 
days, thus weeding out stupid or unlucky candidates for Ship 
citizenship as well as providing a check against population growth on 
the Ship. (Memories of overpopulation and scarcity wars on 21st 
century Earth, which eventually destroyed the planet, dominate the 
utilitarian and democratic Ship political ethos.) Those who survive 
are returned to the Ship as adults. In the course of their trial, Mia 
and Jimmy encounter various perils which include people being shot. 
'I've always wondered what it would be like to be a spear 
carrier in somebody else's story. A spear carrier is somebody 
who stands in the hall when Caesar passes, comes to attention 
and thumps his spear. A spear carrier is the anonymous 
character cut down by the hero as he advances to save the 
menaced heroine. A spear carrier is a character put in a story 
to be used like a piece of disposable tissue. In a story, spear 
carriers never suddenly assert themselves by throwing their 
spears aside and saying, 'I resign. I don't want to be used.' 
They are there to be used, either for atmosphere or as minor 
obstacles in the path of the hero. The trouble is that each of us 
is his own hero, existing in a world of spear carriers. We take 
no joy in being used and discarded. I was finding then, that 
wet, chilly, unhappy night, that I took no joy in seeing other 
people used and discarded.' 
(Panshin 222) 
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Mia's coming of age story records her moral development. 
Told in the first person by an ingenuous teenager. the morals of the 
story (a phrase with two senses, both intended) lie on its surface. 
Her experiences enable her to include more and more outsiders in 
her world of people who matter. In the end she fiercely announces 
her conclusion, "If you want to accept life, you have to accept the 
whole bloody universe. The universe is filled with people, and there 
is not a single solitary spear carrier among them." (Panshin 252) 
Mia learned ... what? Did she learn a Kantian proposition, 
"Every person is an end in himself," or a folk platitude, "Walk a mile 
in my shoes before you judge me"? No. Even this fairly 
straightforward story shows more than it tells. Mia learned to see 
differently. At one point she saw Mr. Mitchell as an obstacle; later, 
as a person with feelings. Before trial, in her eyes colonists were 
"Mudeaters": smelly, backward, provincial free birthers. Afterward, 
she saw them as individuals; some as sensitive and generous, others 
as loutish thugs. 
Love requires that we see people as they are. As long as we 
see people as things--spear carriers, pieces of tissue, mudeaters--we 
cannot love them. Things are objects in my world. But every person 
is the subject in his own world. In order to love, I must come to see 
this, that what appears to be an object in my world is really a center 
of subjectivity on her own. Love requires that I see the otherness of 
others. 
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Here is another example, set forth by Diogenes Allen to 
illustrate what he calls "the experience of perfect love." He finds it in 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "The Rhyme of the Ancient Mariner." 
(Allen 8-11) 
In Coleridge's poem, an old man practically forces himself on a 
party of wedding guests; he must make a confession to them. 
Eventually one stays behind to hear his tale. 
The ancient mariner confesses a strange crime. While 
surrounded by fog and ice in the South Atlantic, he and his 
crewmates were cheered by the emergence from the fog of an 
albatross, which seemed to join itself to the crew. A break in the 
weather and clear sailing followed the bird's appearance. In spite of 
this, the mariner shot the albatross with a crossbow. After some 
quibbling, his shipmates praised his deed. 
Then the ship was becalmed while sailing north into the Pacific. 
Now the mariner's shipmates cursed him for killing the albatross and 
bringing them bad luck. They hung the dead carcass around his neck 
as punishment. 
The waters around the ship teemed with sea creatures, "slimy 
things" and "water snakes," objects of disgust and .horror. "The very 
deep did rot: 0 Christ!ffhat ever this should be!/Yea, slimy things 
did crawl with legs/Upon the slimy sea." (Coleridge 242, lines 123-
126) 
Thirst and strange evils visited the becalmed ship. A ghost 
ship sailed by, and all the crew died except the ancient mariner. 
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Alone on a still ship with dead bodies about. bedecked with the 
albatross, the mariner tried to pray but could not. "My heart as dry 
as dust." 
After seven days enduring the stares of dead men, a night 
came in which the mariner observed the sea creatures by moon light. 
Something in him changed. 
Within the shadow of the ship 
I watched their rich attire: 
Blue, glossy green, and velvet black, 
They coiled and swam; and every track 
Was a flash of golden fire. 
0 happy living things! no tongue 
Their beauty might declare: 
A spring of love gushed from my heart, 
And I blessed them unaware: 
Sure my kind saint took pity on me, 
And I blessed them unaware. 
(Coleridge 246, lines 277-288) 
With this change, the mariner's deliverance began. The 
albatross fell from his neck and he could pray. He continued to do 
penance, though, in the form of periodic depressions, which he could 
only overcome by telling his story to someone else. 
Allen uses the mariner's change of heart to illustrate the 
"experience of perfect love." 
However strange this tale may be and hvwever trivial the act 
of killing a bird may seem, Coleridge has shown us what 
enables us to have an experience of perfect love. Fundamental 
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~o the experienc~ of perfect love is the loss of self-concern. It 
~s to stop worrying about how useful things may be to us, and 
instead to pay attention to them as separate centers of reality. 
Usually we are aware only of ourselves as centers of reality 
a?d. forget that each of us is but one reality among billions and 
?Ilhons of others. We experience others not as centers of value 
m themselves, but as beings in orbit around ourselves. . . . 
W_hen ~e ancient mariner suddenly felt grateful for the slimy 
t~tngs m the sea, even though they were of no particular use to 
him, the dead albatross fell from his neck of its own accord 
The ship suddenly left the becalmed waters and was · 
transpo~ed t~ safety. The mariner had found his redemption 
by finding his way out of a self-defined world into a world of 
other realities. (Allen 10-11) 
But this is a commonplace, someone mig.ht say. Of course we 
ought to pay attention to other people and even, as Allen suggests, to 
animals. Why all these words? What is the point? 
The point is that Coleridge's mariner is everyman and 
everywoman. Even more clearly than in Mia Havero's story, the old 
sailor's moral progress consists in coming to see differently rather 
than accepting some general truth. He does produce a general truth, 
reduced to a couplet, "He prayeth well, who loveth well/Both man 
and bird and beast." (Coleridge 254, lines 612-613) But the mariner 
could not have learned love from such a platitude, however true. He 
learned love--or came to love or was given the ability to love--by, as 
Allen says, becoming aware of centers of reality outside himself. 
This awareness came from experience, not from a proposition. 
Iris Murdoch makes a similar point. If the Freudian picture of 
human beings is at all correct, then coming to see anything outside 
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ourselves as centers of reality will be difficult indeed. "Objectivity 
and unselfishness are not natural to human beings." (The Sovereignty 
of Good 51) That we ought to pay attention to others is a 
commonplace; the ability to do so is a rare skill. The "ought" by itself 
does not produce the ability; indeed, for some narcissists the ought 
only increases their need to polish their false self. If we want to be 
lovers, we need, like the ancient mariner, to find our way, as Allen 
put it, "out of a self-defined world into a world of other realities." 
In my teenage years I a had a girlfriend who lived in a town 
more than an hour's drive away. This distance prevented us from 
seeing each other as much as I would have liked. Fortunately, we 
attended churches of the same denomination, which brought us 
together whenever the youth groups of the area had joint outings. 
I fancied myself to be romantically attached to this girl. (Was I 
"in love"? I don't know. Teenage minds hold complex, unrealistic, 
and constantly changing charts of the territory of love. My friend 
probably held different positions on my internal "love chart" at 
different times. She was important to me.) I remember looking 
forward eagerly to one youth group gathering in particular. We 
would be in a forest camp setting for a weekend;. I anticipated time 
and place for private walking and conversation. 
I remember, in the midst of my musing, a strange and new 
thought. She is not me. Perhaps my ideas for the weekend would 
not match my friend's. Suddenly her feelings and ideas mattered, 
not because they might thwart or complicate my plans, but because 
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they were real. My girlfriend was just as much a center of desires 
and plans as I was. In Allen's terms, I had discovered that my friend 
was "another reality.'~ For a short while, in a flash of insight, I saw 
my girlfriend in a different way, not as a thing in my life but as a 
center of subjectivity on her own. Even then I realized that what 
was true of my friend must be true of everybody. I did not see them 
as real; I only knew in an abstract way that each person had an 
"inside" as I and my girlfriend did. 
My flash of insight did not last. I soon reverted to viewing 
people as objects, the furniture of my world. As an adult--as a 
pastor and a philosopher--! see most people most of the time as 
things, despite practiced efforts to pay attention to them. 
I do not tell this story in order to make confession or to paint 
myself as a particularly selfish person. My story simply provides 
another example of someone living in a self-defined world. We all 
begin in self-defined worlds, and some of us never leave them. 
(Murdoch: ". . .modern psychology has provided us with what might 
be call a doctrine of original sin ... " The Sovereignty of Good 51) I 
suspect that for many who do momentarily break free of their 
egocentricity, it comes as a shock, as my vision of my girlfriend 
surprised me. Further, I suspect that for virtually all of us the 
insights we are given, in which the alien reality of another person 
breaks in on us, fade. The reader may consult her own experience. 
How hard it is to see a person accurately, not as an object of desire, 
reproach, avoidance, or utility! Murdoch emphasizes the almost 
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Sisyphean character of the attempt to become good. "The difficulty is 
to keep the attention fixed upon the real situation and to prevent it 
from returning surreptitiously to the self with consolations of self-
pity, resentment, fantasy and despair." (The Sovereignty of Good 
91) 
A Murdoch novel, The Black Prince, brilliantly illustrates this . 
theme of the difficulty of accurate vision. The action, related in first 
person by Bradley Pearson, a frustrated novelist in his sixties, 
happens in the few weeks before the death of Bradley's friend, 
Arnold Baffin. As he tells his tale, Pearson muses ·on philosophical 
problems: what is good art? How does it tell truth? What is the 
nature of love? Murdoch allows Pearson to espouse many of her 
ideas given in The Sovereignty of Good. For example, in a brief aside 
to "P. Loxias," his mysterious editor, Pearson says: 
1-The natural tendency of the human soul is towards the 
protection of the ego. (Black Prince 152) 
2-I dare say human wickedness is sometimes the product ~f .a 
sort of conscious leeringly evil intent. . .. But more usually 1t :s 
the product of a semi-deliberat~ inattention, a sort of swoonmg 
relationship to time. (Black Prince 156-57) 
3-Most artists, through sheer idleness, weariness, inability to 
attend, drift again and again and again. . .This is o~ course ~ 
moral problem, since all art is the struggle to be, 1~ .a p~rt1cular 
sort of way, virtuous. There is an analogous trans1s~1on m the 
everyday proceedings of the moral agent. (Black Prince 157) 
4-. . .how can one change the quality of consciousness? Around 
'will' it flows like water round a stone. Could constant prayer 
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avail? Such prayer would have to be the continuous insertion 
into each of these multifarious units of one recurring pellet of 
anti-egoistic concern. (This has, of course, nothing to do with 
'God.') (Black Prince 157-158) 
To each of these quotes compare Murdoch's positions in The 
Sovereignty of Good. 1. The ego and its defences prevent us from 
seeing moral reality. (Sovereignty 51) 2. In morals, the orientation 
of attention is more important than willing. (Sovereignty 55) 3. The 
enemy of excellence in both morality and art is personal fantasy. 
(Sovereignty 59) And, "By the time the moment of choice has 
arrived the quality of attention has probably determined the nature 
of the act." (Sovereignty 67) 4. Non-theistic prayer--that is, attention 
focused on the good--might be a tool for moral improvement. 
(Sovereignty 55-56) More examples could be adduced; Murdoch has 
given Bradley Pearson many of her own insights into art and 
morality. Surely, the reader thinks, here is Murdoch's picture of a 
good character, one who makes some progress in the school of love. 
As one reads the story, though, doubts begin to creep in. 
Pearson's friend Arnold Baffin is a popular novelist. Pearson, though 
he has been commercially unsuccessful, claims to be unthreatened by 
Arnold's success, especially since he judge~ Arnold's works as artistic 
failures. But Pearson repeatedly reminds his readers of this. Why? 
At the beginning of the story, Pearson's ex-wife, Christian, 
returns to London from America. Pearson says he left her because 
she clung too close and choked off his creativity. He angrily demands 
that she not visit him. He wants nothing to do with her, he says. 
Why does he deny what seems obvious, that he thinks about her 
often? 
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Pearson believes in artistic inspiration. He has published little, 
because he wants only to put out great work. He wants to boil his 
thinking down, nearly to aphorisms. Great literature says only 
enough. He feels, in an unmistakeable and mysterious way, that his 
breakthrough lies just ahead. Then he falls in love with Julian Baffin, 
Arnold's daughter, though he is thirty-eight years her senior. (He 
lies to Julian, reducing his age by twelve years.) Surely this love is 
the force that will carry him through to greatness! The reader 
wonders whether Pearson really understands love and art, or 
whether he is just self-deceived. 
Pearson's sister, Priscilla, an unlovely, unloved, and severely 
depressed woman, comes to him, fleeing her broken marriage. 
Pearson claims to understand her pain, but acts in every way as if he 
wishes she would disappear. She complicates his life. Since the story 
is written some years after the events recorded, the reader wonders 
if Pearson really saw his sister as clearly at the time as he describes 
her in his book. 
While at a romantic hideaway with Julian, Pearson learns by 
phone that Priscilla has committed suicide. Rather than return to 
London, he reasons that having left his sister in her depression, he 
might as well carry through his tryst with Julian; he will break the 
rules of duty for the sake of his love. He returns to the cottage and 
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makes love to Julian. Does he really see Julian? What will she think 
of him when she finds out that Priscilla died that day? 
Arnold Baffin arrives to interrupt the lovers' sleep, demanding 
that Julian come home. She refuses at first, but after considering his 
message (Arnold tells her about Priscilla, and Pearson's true age), she 
leaves Pearson. Pearson returns to London, only to find the complete 
works of Arnold Baffin, which he had ordered earlier in the story, on 
his doorstep. He tears the books to shreads. 
Twice in his tale, Pearson relates how he was called to the 
Baffin house to help because Arnold and his wife, Rachel, were 
fighting. After his first intervention, early in the book, Pearson 
claims that he and Rachel very nearly became lovers. The second 
time, late in the story, Rachel phones him to come again, even though 
she disapproved of his involvement with Julian. Shortly after he 
enters the Baffin house, the police also arrive and arrest him for the 
murder of Arnold Baffin, whose body lies battered in the living room. 
In an postscript, Pearson gives us his version of his trial and 
conviction. Not wanting to accuse anyone else, he changed his story 
repeatedly. When he told "the truth," that Rachel had killed her 
husband accidentally in an argument, no one believed him. He 
writes as one serenely happy, in the quiet seclusion of the prison, his 
cloister. He offers his whole tale as a "celebration of love," a comedy. 
Though now cut off from Julian, his love for her will never fade. 
Unfortunately, my summary of the plot doesn't do justice to 
Murdoch's deft touch. I have too greatly emphasized the 
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inconsistencies in Bradley Pearson's story; someone who has not read 
The Black Prince could conclude that Pearson was obviously self-
deluded. Do not think that. Most of the time, Bradley Pearson 
sounds lucid, observant, and good. Through his eyes we see each 
character as flawed but admirable. He seems to be really trying to 
pay attention to people. 
The book concludes with postcripts by other important 
characters, written at the invitation of P. Loxias, who might be a 
literary agent, a fellow convict Pearson met in prison, or even "the 
invention of a minor novelist." These postscripts paint four rudely 
different pictures of Pearson (posthumously, since he has died in 
prison) than the one we get from his narrative. The postscript views 
of the other characters do not agree perfectly with each other. At no 
point does Murdoch make it clear who killed Arnold Baffin or, more 
importantly, whether Bradley Pearson was a warped, self-obsessed, 
sad failure or a laconic, penetratingly observant, and loving artist. 
Readers must judge for themselves. 
I speculate that Murdoch intended this result. Achieving clear 
moral vision requires more than a thorough reading of The 
Sovereignty of Good and the ability to repeat its doctrines. Murdoch 
writes sympathetically of theological and philosophical views which 
hold that "goodness is the almost impossible countering of a powerful 
egocentric mechanism ... " (The Sovereignty of Good 54) Bradley 
Pearson may be intended as a case in point. 
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Nevertheless, both Allen and Murdoch think we can make 
progress. We can begin, Allen says, with those short-lived flashes of 
insight, like my vision of my teenage girlfriend, when we see people 
justly. 
Allen reminds us of Dante's experience with Beatrice. For 
several days after seeing her, Dante felt so full of love he could 
forgive anyone. Of course, this feeling went away, as did my 
appreciation of the otherness of my girlfriend. 
But Dante did something unusual with this experience. For 
him, the experience showed him the goal of his life: to seek to 
remain always the way he had been for the short time when 
inspired by Beatrice's beauty .... 
All of us have had moments, like Dante, when falling in love, 
we seem to float on air .... For a while, we simply seem to be 
able to love anyone--to love our neighbor--without any effort 
at all. 
These momentary occasions can be simply that. But they can 
also giv~ us a glimpse of what it would be to love our neighbor 
all the time. To that extent such moments can be like little 
seeds, which if planted and nurtured, can grow and affect our 
character. (Allen 28-29) 
I think Allen says a bit too much when he claims all of us have 
had moments like Dante. The psychological histories of some 
individuals seem to indicate that they have never "attached." or 
made any significant emotional bond to anyone. ("Narcissistic 
Personality Disorder" 315-317, Answorth and Bowlby 333-340) 
These extreme cases do not invalidate Allen's point. Most of us, in 
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starting out to become lovers, have already been graced with insights 
into the otherness of others. Like Mia Havero, the ancient mariner, 
and the teenager I was, we have already been given some seeds of 
love. 
Openings to accurate vision may come in a variety of guises. 
Besides insights into other people (Mia Havero) or seeing the 
otherness of sea creatures. (the ancient mariner), Allen and Murdoch 
suggest several. 
-Traumatic experiences, death and other losses, often provoke 
only self pity. But sometimes, Allen suggests, they strip away our 
duplicity and pettiness so that we can see. (Allen 30) 
-Artistic insight can lift us out of our selves to see the world 
accurately. (Allen 31, Murdoch The Soveriegnty of Good 64-65: "The 
appreciation of beauty in art or nature is not only (for all its 
difficulties) the easiest available spiritual exercise; it is also a 
completely adequate entry into (and not just analogy of) the good 
life, since it is the checking of selfishness in the interest of the real.") 
-Religious ritual, Allen says, can also help. It portrays 
ultimacies and thus calls us from ourselves to the huge real world 
outside us. (Allen 31) Murdoch would warn that such rituals may 
also tempt us with consolatory myth. 
-Influenced by Simone Weil (Weil 44-52), Allen points to 
school studies--technical work--as a tool to direct our attention to 
what is not ourselves. (Allen 31-32) Murdoch finds, and agrees 
with, a similar view in Plato. Plato thought mathematics was the 
most important technical study, but Murdoch thinks learning a 
language would do too. 
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If I am learning, for instance, Russian, I am confronted by an 
~uth?~tative structure which commands my respect. The task 
is ~1fftcult and the go'.11 is distant and perhaps never entirely 
att~mable: ~y work is a progressive revelation of something 
which exists mde~endently of me. Attention is rewarded by a 
knowledge of reality. Love of Russian leads me away from 
mysel~ towards something alien to me, something which my 
consciousness cannot take over, swallow up, deny or make 
unreal. (The Sovereignty of Good 89) 
-In different ways, Simone Weil and Murdoch point to prayer 
as another seed of love. In her "Spiritual Autobiography," Weil says 
that in saying the Our Father with absolutely pure attention she was 
repeatedly freed from the constraints of individual perspective and 
point of view. Christ himself was present with her. (Weil 17-18) 
Murdoch, as noted above, thinks that prayer need not be orthodox 
according to any religion to be a real help in moving attention away 
from self. Religious believers expect to receive help when they pray. 
Though she does not believe in God, Murdoch grants that believers 
do receive help (sometimes, when their prayer is not just self-
consoling fantasy, but a true attention directed outward). In 
attending to God, believers receive grace, the unlooked-for ability to 
attend better. Nonbelievers may have the same benefit by attending 
to the good. (The Sovereignty of Good 55, 83) 
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-One may find a seed of love in the beauty of the world of 
nature. To stop and really see this plant or animal or waterfall keeps 
me from imagining the whole universe as centered on me. Murdoch 
links this experience of nature with the attention required by great 
art. (The Soveriegnty of Good 85) I conjecture that biologists, 
botanists, and ecologists have a special opening to goodness here, in 
that they can combine thl"'ir technical study with an appreciation of 
nature's beauty. Non-scientists may speculate that scientific interest 
might hinder appreciation of a tree's beauty, but my friends in the 
scientific community report no difficulty in that direction. Knowing 
about the thing does not prevent them from feeling wonder. 
Readers should think of these suggested seeds of love as just 
that, suggestions. You may never experience some of them as 
openings to accurate vision. You may find other ways to overcome 
the vision warping pull of the self. 
I have only a few comments on how to nurture seeds of love. 
First, expect them. Be ready for them; learn from them. Remember, 
and give some time to contemplation of, times when you have seen 
the otherness of things. 
Second, look for truth rather than gratification or utility in 
studies, prayer, art, or ritual. Sometimes we experience the seeds of 
love as thrown at us, pure gifts. They surprise us. Other times we 
can put ourselves in the way by working at a technical study, giving 
ourselves to great art or literature, praying, attentively listening to 
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someone, or simply going outside and looking. In any case, the main 
thing is just that, to look, and when we have some insight into the 
otherness of things or people, to keep looking. 
Third, be humble and grateful for every seed of love. To the 
extent that I see any individual reality rightly, I am reminded that I 
am only one center of subjectivity among multiplied billions. The 
universe is a very big thing, full of wonders! Humility goes with 
amazement. 
Fourth, determine to try to really attend to people. Try. Like 
Simone Weil's daily effort to say the Our Father without her attention 
wandering, learning to pay attention involves struggle, discipline. I 
am convinced the effort is worth while, but proof can only be found 
in a person's own experience. 
Love and Loves 
Accuracy is not enough. 
I may have unavoidably commingled two distinct, though 
closely related, ideas in the section just finished. I tried, by example 
and suggestion, to explain the concept of accurate vision, wherein we 
see truth, the otherness of others. The second idea, which clings to 
the first, is the requirement that we see people compassionately. I 
believe that clear vision must ultimately always include compassion, 
else it will not be clear. But this second element of love deserves a 
separate discussion. 
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David Hume, in Section IX of An Inquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals, affirms that in every human being resides 
"some spark of friendship for humankind." This bit of benevolence 
may be too weak to show in a man's actions, but it must be there. 
When we make moral judgments (as in calling someone depraved or 
vicious) we appeal to a universal sentiment. "And though this 
affection of humanity may not generally be esteemed so strong as 
vanity or ambition, yet being common to all men, it can alone be the 
foundation of morals or of any general system of blame or praise." 
(Hume 228-229) 
Hume is partially wrong in this. Some people, as indicated 
above, suffer complete freedom from benevolence. Further, some 
people who have experienced affection or benevolence toward others 
can so completely bury it in self-seeking (e.g. by overmastering 
pursuit of career) as to kill it. That is, as I believe in moral progress, 
I also believe in degeneration, to the point of moral death. 
But Hume is right about the importance of fellow feeling. 
When we see the otherness of people, we need to see them with 
compassion. Diogenes Allen: "To love perfectly is not simply so see 
that all else is independent of oneself and so ought to be loved as it 
is. Perfect love of a living thing is the recognition that it has an 
inside. To love it is to recognize what it is like to be that object. 
From the outside it looks gloriously radiant; inside, it is fragile and 
suffering." (Allen 12) "Attention," writes Iris Murdoch, is "a just and 
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loving gaze directed upon an individual reality." (The Sovereignty of 
Good 34, my emphasis) 
Love, then, requires imagination. As a cynic could remind me, 
a person can never "really" cross the chasm between himself and 
someone else. He cannot stop being himself, the cynic would say, for 
even a moment; he has no knowledge of what it would be like to be 
someone else. And the cynic would pour scorn on the idea of fellow-
f eeling for the ocean's "slimy things." Against this cynic (admittedly 
a charicature only), I take the imagination to be a real moral power. 
True, one person is not another; but he can imagine what it would be 
like to be the other. 
Observe what I will call a simple fact. We can, and sometimes 
do, ask ourselves, "What must it be like to be her?" Imaginatively, 
we enter into the life of someone else. As a result, we are able to 
judge a person's actions and thoughts more justly. We are able to 
feel and act in ways better for the person and ourselves. From the 
fact that I cannot be someone else, the cynic argues that I can not 
feel her vulnerability. This conclusion not only does not follow from 
the premise (ignoring, as it does, the power of imagination), it 
contradicts the facts of our experience. The reader may judge by his 
own. 
Love, then, is accurate vision and compassion. 
But what is this love I write about? Christian writers have 
often taken pains to differentiate between different kinds of love. 
In The Four loves :c.s. Lewis identified familial love, erotic love, the 
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love of friendship, and agape, divine love. It is likely that Lewis was 
indebted to Anders Nygren's study, Agape and Eros, which has had 
an enormous influence on twentieth century pastoral theology. 
Nygren made a radical distinction between the love of God (in both 
senses, God's love for creatures and creaturely love for God) and the 
loves of people, which he lumped together under the name eros. To 
Nygren, divine love is "disinterested" love; entirely self-sufficient, it 
does not attach itself to any feature in the beloved. By constrast, 
eros always flows from need or desire. Divine love gives with no 
thought of receiving; human loves always include an element of 
desire. Perhaps following Nygren's line of thought, philosopher 
Irving Singer, in volume one of The Nature of Love, has written that 
agape is unconnected with love between persons. Only God can be 
the source or object of agape. Nygren glories in the gospel command 
that Christians are to love/agape God and their neighbor, a command 
which defines the ideal of Christian ethics and can be fulfilled only 
by God's love flowing into and through us. Singer, on the other hand, 
dismisses Christianity, since it leaves no room for human loves in the 
ideal. (Allen 68) 
Nygren and those influenced by him have made a kind of 
category mistake. With the reader's indulgence, I imagine the titles 
on a "bookshelf of love." Here is familial love, a slender volume 
given too little attention. Next to it stands courtly love, an addition 
to the library invented by medieval troubadours (according to some 
experts). Then we have the two volume set, romantic love and erotic 
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love, complete with indexes to motion pictures, novels, music and 
how-to sex manuals.· An older book on the love of friends stands 
next to a modern text which explores the idea of non-romantic 
friendships between men and women. A pamphlet at the end of the 
shelf tries to extablish the claim for another sort of love, that of the 
community. Neither friendship nor familial, this love borrows from 
both, binding together guilds, therapy groups, and congregations. 
Nygren and company want to place another book, on the love 
of God, on the same shelf. They think of agape as if it were one love 
among many, distinguished from the others by ~_€) its objects 
(everybody) and its nature ("disinterested"). Contrasted with human 
loves this way, agape comes to be seen as opposed to them. 
Following Allen (24-26), I think agape is no more a love among 
loves than a college is a particular building to be found among the 
buildings on campus. (Cf. Ryle 15) We have dozens of buildings on 
campus, but the college is an entity of a different order. Similarly, 
Love/agape should be thought of as on a different level from human 
loves. 
The loves are not unrelated to Love. Murdoch's "just and 
loving gaze," accurate vision combined with compassion, and Simone 
Weil's "attention" both well describe agape. But if, against Nygren 
and company, we see agape as accurate vision plus compassion, then 
we will see agape as the one indispensable ingredient in all the loves. 
What Allen says of friendship and romance applies to all human 
loves. 
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The ingredient of respect for "otherness" enables us to receive 
the love of others in friendship and romantic love, to be free of 
selfishness. To receive from another requires profound 
respect. In fact, it takes exactly the same kind of respect to 
receive as it does to give. Unless another human being is 
respected as a reality independent of oneself, the act of giving 
becomes patronizing and insulting. Agape is not to be 
characterized as always giving and never receiving, or as 
freedom from even the desire to receive. Rather, agape is the 
profound respect for the reality of others, a respect which 
makes it compatible both with giving and receiving. When 
agape is present as an ingredient in friendship and romantic 
love, these relations in which we give and receive can be 
unselfish. (Allen 26) 
Love/agape undergirds the loves. In a community drawn 
together by common interests, e.g. a religious congregation, mutual 
admiration may well fade for a time. If community love were 
entirely dependent on mutual admiration, the community couid 
dissolve when people tire of others' irritating habits. This often 
happens. But Love can step in to carry the community over rough 
places. 
Similarly, the heightened emotions of romance make a poor 
foundation for a permanent marriage. Modern western culture 
exhibits two minds about marriage. On one hand, many of our social 
practices and forms of speech still affirm the ideal of lifelong 
commitment in marriage; on the other hand, romance has come to be 
widely accepted as the proper basis of marriage. But romance, as 
many have observed, rarely lasts, and individuals change, so the fact 
that marriages do not last surprises no one. If we wish to practice 
lifelong commitments in marriage, we should practice Love, which 
can make up for the shortcomings of romance. 
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In this study, then, when we ask how one can learn love, we 
mean how one can learn Love/agape. However, to the extent that 
anyone learns Love, she will also be a more able lover in any of the 
senses of love. So I try to take examples of love from all sorts of 
relationships and I have not bothered to sort out the kinds of love 
until now, late in this second chapter. 
Here is a summary of my theses to this point. I) We can make 
moral progress, specifically by learning to love. 2) In order to grow 
in love we need to overcome our narcissistic need not to see 
ourselves and others. 3) W .. I 1 b . . earn ove y nurturing the "seeds of 
love" which enable us to see other realities, especially people, 
accurately. 
Metaphors for the Moral Life 
Return now to the unfinished discussion of chapter one. What 
should moral philosophy do? I suggested that philosophers ought to 
puzzle about and wrestle with a real part of human life; we ought to 
pay attention to actual moral struggles. 
So, in these first two chapters I hope to have shown, more by 
example than by argument, that an important obstacle to 
improvement in love is selfishness. I don't mean by "selfishness" a 
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grasping, clutching attempt to have people and things, but rather 
concentration of attention on the self, a concentration which reduces 
rest of the universe to small objects orbiting around a central, 
enormously important consciousness. (Of course, the first sort of 
selfishness can grow out of the second.) I approve of the role 
assigned to moral philosophy by Iris Murdoch: 
The problem is to accommodate inside moral philosophy, and 
suggest methods of dealing with the !act that so much of 
human conduct is moved by mechanical energy of an 
egocentric kind. In the moral life the enemy is th~ fat 
relentless ego. Moral philosophy is properly, and in ~he past 
has sometimes been, the discussion of this ego and of the 
techniques (if any) for its defeat. (The Sovereignty of Good 52 
My emphasis) 
Rationalistic ethical theory does not do this. Or rather, when 
rationalistic theorists do address the problem of egoism, it is a 
decidely secondary question. Kant, for example, would classify the 
whole matter as "practical anthropology." 1 Why? 
Standard rationalistic moral theory aims to tell us what we 
ought to do. And it is true that sometimes we do not know what to 
do--we struggle with confficts of rights, incompatible goods, etc.--so 
there is a place for standard theory. (More on this in the next 
chapter.) But standard theory does not focus so heavily on 
quandaries in order to be helpful, as if philosophers had ever 
bracketed their theories and asked themselves what they could 
l We will return to this discussion in the next chapter. 
contribute to the moral life of ordinary people. Standard theory 
concentrates on quandaries because of its basic assumptions. 
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Murdoch suggests that foundational issues in philosophy are 
often addressed by "metaphors" rather than by argument. 
(Sovereignty of Good 77-78) By metaphors she means images, 
complexes of interrelated ideas which cannot be pulled apart. Some 
philosophers resist philosophy-as-image-play because disagreements 
between holders of incompatible images are often inconclusive, or 
worse, unspeakable--the opposing sides never hear each other. But 
Murdoch thinks some things, including moral concepts, necessarily 
present themselves to us as metaphors. Philosophers who try to 
distill these metaphors into neutral language fail; something is lost in 
the distillation. When dealing with moral issues, philosophers' talk 
cannot be neutral any more than psychologists' talk can. 
Standard rationalistic ethical theories, for all their emphasis on 
objectivity and reason, are deeply metaphorical. Utilitarian, Kantian, 
or other, typical rationalistic moral philosophers live and breathe the 
metaphor of action. Thirteen year old Mia Havero, assigned readings 
in ethics by her tutor, quickly summarizes the field in a way which 
could fairly describe most standard theory: 
Ethics is the branch of philosophy that concerns itself with 
conduct, questions of good and evil, right and wrong. Almost 
every ethical system--and there are a great many of them, 
because even people who supposedly belong to the same school 
don't agree a good share of the time and have to be considered 
separately--can be looked at as a de'scription and as a 
prescription. Is this what people actually do? Is this what 
people ought to do? (Panshin 148) 
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Against ethics as action, Murdoch proposes that a more 
accurate metaphor is ethics as vision. "I can only choose within the 
world I can see, in the moral sense of 'see' which implies that clear 
vision is a result or moral imagination and moral effort." 
(Sovereignty of Good 37) Obviously, this chapter has been written 
in the conviction that Murdoch is right. 
Observe the results of the ethics as action metaphor. First, and 
most obviously, morality gets defined narrowly as what people do, 
right or wrong. Motivation, character, virtue, psychological 
wounding, and societal advantage or disadvantage are reduced to 
factors (dispositions, contingent situational details) which influence 
action. The ethics as action metaphor also narrows the field in terms 
of which actions are significant; only actions in which an agent 
chooses seem worthy of attention. 
Second, in a fight against relativism. the ethics as action picture 
inevitably leads to "lowest common denominator" (LCD) rules. As in 
arithmetic problems in which the student tries to find a denominator 
for his fractions which fits them all, the ethics as action philosopher 
tries to find a moral requirement which will fit every agent. Against 
the proponent of relativism, then, the philosopher responds, "Here, 
you see, we have a action incumbent on any rational agent in the 
relevant circumstances. Therefore relativism is wrong." Of course, 
lcd's other than rationality could be imagined, but the dominant 
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modern ethical theories, utilitarianism as much as Kantianism, appeal 
to rationality as the moral LCD. 
Third, the ethics as action metaphor denies or ignores (as 
morally unimportant) private behavior. A person may have it as a 
goal to become gentle; she may even be gentle. I would want to 
count this as an important moral fact about her. A philosopher in the 
grip of the ethics as action metaphor will ask what this gentleness 
amounts to if it does not show up in her choices. By this he means 
publicly observable choices: actions. Since he assumes he knows the 
answer to his rhetorical question (gentleness which does not show up 
in action is nothing, a mirage), the philosopher will label gentleness 
as a propensity to act in certain ways which may or may not be 
overruled in certain situations by other propensities. 
In this case the metaphor has simply closed down the area of 
discussion. What is gentleness? A propensity to act in certain ways? 
I would suggest that gentleness is a habit of vision, the habit of 
looking at someone's woundedness before and while forming 
judgments about him. Is this habit an action? I think it is well 
described as an inward action, just the sOrt of thing the ethics as 
action metaphor ignores. 
Murdoch should not be read to suggest--and I do not mean to 
suggest--that ethics has nothing to do with choices and actions. To 
live a good life a person must act; he must make and keep promises, 
pay debts, give to the needy, oppose injustice, rescue the drowning, 
vote {or not vote) for this or that party, and all the other examples of 
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morally significant choices loved by philosophers under the spell of 
the ethics as action metaphor. But to live a good life a person must 
also see the world accurately, a thing not done in a day. He must 
develop habits of attention, humility and compassion or else his 
choices and actions will be ill-made, defined by a backdrop of selfish 
fantasy. 
We should abandon the attempt to describe morality in value 
neutral terms. The metaphor of ethics as vision is loaded with 
values, for instance, that truth (and knowledge of it) is intimately 
connected with humility and compassion. What should be obvious--
though in standard rationalistic moral philosophy it is often ignored-
-is that the ethics as action picture is also loaded with values. What 
some of those values are and what results they lead to, will be 
partially addressed in the next two chapters, where I will argue that 
utilitarians and Kantians share many assumptions and that in Kant's 
case (where the assumptions are pressed to their conclusions) they 
lead to unacceptable conclusions. 
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CHAPTER ill 
A PLACE FOR RATIONALISTIC MORAL THEORY 
In the first two chapters, this study claimed that human beings 
can make moral progress. Specifically, we can learn to love, first by 
overcoming our need not to see the truth about ourselves, and 
second by tending the opportunities we are given to see others 
accurately. While making these suggestions, I have made critical 
remarks about modem ethical theory, much of which has little room 
for such theses. In this chapter we will explore a little more deeply 
the issues which divide this study from the main streams of ethical 
theory. 
Since offering the criticisms so far, it might be instructive to 
turn the tables (at least in imagination) and ask how an exponent of 
standard rationalistic moral theory would respond to what has been 
said in chapters one and two. Obviously, since I intend to defend my 
affirmations against the rationalist's critique, this procedure runs the 
risk of degenerating into an attack on a straw man. I hope to avoid 
that unhappy fate, because the "defense" of my position against that 
of the rationalist, here and in the next chapter, will consist mostly in 
trying to clarify the differences between the position offered in this 
book and that of standard rationalistic theory. The reader will have 
to judge for herself whether the rationalist opponent receives fair 
treatment. 
We can allow Immanuel Kant, in particular the author of The 
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Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (hereafter, Groundwork), 
to speak for rationalistic moral theory. Why this author? For two 
reasons: first, because Kant presents the rationalist approach to 
ethics with such rigor, and second (and more importantly), because 
the Groundwork clearly illustrates several main features of 
rationalistic ethics, points which moral philosophers who are often 
thought to disagree with Kant, e.g. utilitarians, share with him. 
Additionally, in the Groundwork Kant actually does discuss the 
failings of moralists whose works he would surely say are similar to 
this study in important ways. 
Kant's Critique of Chapters One and Two 
The author of the Groundwork would probably observe that 
this study, so far as it has gone, is an example of "popular practical 
philosophy." (Groundwork 30) In particular, he could point out three 
characteristics of this sort of philosophy. First, what Kant called 
"material" knowledge is mixed with "formal" knowledge; empirical 
considerations are interspersed with logical points. Second, Kant 
would note my heavy reliance on examples, which displace abstract 
arguments. Third, though perhaps to a lesser degree, what has been 
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said focuses on results, e.g. narcissism prevents love while learning 
to see enables love. 
All this contrasts sharply with the Groundwork. At the 
beginning, in his preface (Groundwork iii-ix), Kant insists that moral 
philosophy needs a base in "pure philosophy." Every field, he argues, 
benefits from division of labor; ought not the same be true of 
philosophy? Surely we only ask for confusion when we mix 
empirical ethics, which Kant would prefer to call "practical 
anthropology," with rational ethics. Of course, Kant does not rest his 
argument on this analogy with industry. "Every one must admit that 
a law has to carry with it absolute necessity if it is to be valid 
morally ... " he says. Obligation is the central moral concept which 
must be explained and grounded by practical philosophy. No theory 
tinged with the contingency of empirical knowledge can hope to 
carry what Kant sees as the most basic load of morality. Kant's own 
project in the Groundwork, which explains the little book's title, is to 
give a solid foundation to the concept of obligation. Pure a priori 
reason must show us the conceptual framework of ethics. 
Kant holds that obligation, if it is to be a real ought and not just 
a counsel of prudence, must be universal obligation; it must hold for 
all rational beings, not just people, and it must hold with absolute 
necessity. So he deliberately turns away from the use of examples. 
". . .no experience can give us occasion to infer even the possibility of 
such apodeictic laws. For by what right can we make what is 
perhaps valid only under the contingent conditions of humanity into 
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an object of unlimi~ed reverence as a universal precept for every 
rational nature?" (Groundwork 28-29) Many of the examples used 
in chapters one and two are rooted in psychology and describe 
human nature. Kant explicitly rejected such a move, since other 
rational beings might have different psychologies than ours. Moral 
laws must determine the will of a rational being as such. 
Further on the subject of examples, Kant says that to derive 
morality from examples actually destroys morality. (Groundwork 
29-30) By what principle, he would ask. did I select the examples I 
used?l The principle which justifies the choice of examples cannot 
itself be justified by means of those examples without engaging in 
vicious circularity. By eschewing examples, the pure moralist would 
help his readers more readily recognize that reason alone justifies 
the moral law. (Groundwork 33-34, the footnote reply to Professor 
Sulzer) 
Just as obligation must be universal and necessary, for Kant the 
truly good must be an unconditioned good. According to Kant, only a 
good will is unqualifiedly good, since virtues of character such as wit 
or resolution and gifts of fortune such as power or health could be 
turned to evil uses if combined with a bad will. (Groundwork 1-3) 
Kant readily admits the objection that a good will by itself does not 
1 It seems that Kant had in mind moral writers who justified their claims by 
reference to moral heroes--hence, his statement that even Christ could not fill 
that role since he must first be judged by a rational standard--and not 
examples precisely like mine, since most of my examples illustrate 
psychological hindrances or helps to love. I do not justify the goal of loving 
by my examples. Still, Kant could well ask why I thought loving was so 
imponant that I would collect examples of hindrances and helps to it. 
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produce good results, but he holds that this does not affect the value 
of the good will itself. Since results are often subject to chance, Kant 
refuses to countenance consequences as a factor determining the 
value of moral decisions. Now, I did not try to defend my positions 
in chapters one and two strictly on their consequences as did the 
utilitarianism which Kant despised. Still, we may suspect that Kant 
would be leery of the whiff of results oriented thinking in the 
argument that some narcissistic people need less moral law, since it 
feeds their false selves. 
Comparing chapters one and two to Kant's conception of pure 
morality, I think he would conclude that they are--at best--a 
secondary sort of moral philosophy, better termed practical 
anthropology. After: all, the goal in this study is to ask how someone 
could become a lover. At no point does it defend the idea that 
someone ought to become a lover. If a philosopher could show, as 
Kant believed that it could be shown, that love of others is a dictate 
of the moral law, then the practical question of how to become a 
lover could be appended to the a priori rational framework of 
morality .2 But without a grounding in pure philosophy, a study like 
2 Actually, th~ matter is more complicated than these remarks sugaest. Ka t 
says tha.t practical love, love residing in the will, can be commanded, whilen 
patholo~cal. love, that of the feelings, cannot. (Groundwork 13) Much of my 
mteres~ is m what Kant would call pathological love. However, Kant 
reco?ntzed that o~ a ~condary level practical reason had to pay attention to 
~on~mg~nt facts, . mcludrng human feeling. Thus, if I recognize that selfish 
mchnauons are hable to deflect me from the path of duty laid out by reason 
duty de_mands th~t I try to c~ange those inclinations. So Kant would approv~ 
the ~ro3ect of this book, provided that it be recognized as a secondary matter of 
practical anthropology and not real moral philosophy. 
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this one ignores the important theoretical issue and falls to the level 
of popular philosophy, producing "a disgusting hotch-potch of 
second-hand observations and semi-rational principles on which the 
empty-headed regale themselves, because this is something that can 
be used in the chit-chat of daily life." (Groundwork 31) Such an 
ungrounded combination of material and formal knowledge could 
damage morality, since it neglects strict rationality, the only defense 
against relativism. 
Kant's most profound accusation against popular philosophy is 
that it is "heteronomous." (Groundwork 87-89) In his view, when a 
rational agent, by reason alone, sees that the categorical imperative 
must be obeyed, he has achieved "autonomy." He gives himself the 
universal law, which he sees as universal, applicable to all rational 
beings. Autonomy fulfills a rational being's destiny: "This much only 
is certain: the law is not valid for us because it interests us (for this 
is heteronomy and makes practical reason depend on sensibility--
that is to say, on an underlying feeling--in which case practical 
reason could never give us moral law); the law interests us because it 
is valid for us as men in virtue of having sprung from our will as 
intelligence and so from our proper self ... " (Groundwork 123) Kant 
would say, we may conclude, that a study like this one, if intended as 
moral philosophy, is destructive of autonomy and true human 
dignity. 
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How Kant Illustrates Rationalistic Moral Theory in General 
In picking Kant to speak for rationalistic moral theory, I 
claimed that the Groundwork illustrated features shared by 
utilitarianism as well. Readers may wonder what they are. Kant 
would criticize my first two chapters for being a mixture of empirical 
and formal knowledge. Would he not criticize the theory of utility 
for the same reason, since the first move in utilitarianism is from the 
empirical observation that people seek happiness to the moral 
proposition that they should? Kant would criticize the appeal to 
examples in chapters one and two, but utilitarians probably would 
not. And, where Kant would be suspicious of results oriented 
thinking, Bentham and his philosophical heirs claimed that results 
are the only things that matter in ethics. How does Kant represent 
all rationalistic moral philosophy? 
We need to see that under their much debated differences, 
Kantianism and utilitarianism share a common view of the role of 
ethical theory. Begin (first point) with the observation that J.S. Mill, 
to take an example, would probably classify chapters one and two in 
a manner much like Kant. Mill distinguished the fundamental 
principle of morality from the subordinate principles people 
inevitably use in applying it. Mill supposed that most people get 
along fairly well most of the time using these secondary moral 
principles, just as Kant allowed that popular moralizing usually met 
most people's needs. But when secondary moral principles came up 
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short, Mill insisted on the need for the primary principle in order to 
combat relativism: 
If utility is the ultimate source of moral oblig~tions, utility may 
be invoked to decide between them when their demands are 
incompatible. Though the application of the standard may be 
difficult it is better than none at all; while in other systems, 
the mo;al laws all claiming independent authority, there .is no 
common umpire entitled to interfere between them: their 
claims to precedence one over another rest on little better than 
sophistry, and unless determined, ~s th~y gener~~ are, by the 
unacknowledged influence of considerations of utility'. a~~ord a 
free scope for the action of personal desires and parttahues. 
(Mill 277-78) 
If utility is the ultimate moral principle, a study like the 
present one can only have value as an exploration of a secondary 
principle. For Mill as much as Kant, the primary principle justifies 
and rules over secondary principles. 
Next (second), utilitarians and Kantians agree that the primary 
principle operates in the realm of rationality. Kant seems more 
consistent here, in that he also claims to derive his first principle 
from rationality while the principle of utility is supposedly empirical, 
but both sides picture the moral agent as a rational applier of the 
ultimate moral principle. People make moral decisions in an infinite 
variety of situations, so the first principle (Kant's or Mill's) will result 
in various actions, but once the facts of any situation are known, for 
both camps the decision is made rationally. 
So (third), for both sides, rational moral agents are 
interchangeable. Doing the right thing depends not on who I am, but 
on rightly applying the principle of utility or universalizing the 
maxim of my action--in the stipulated circumstances. 
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Further (fourth), since the fundamental level of morality is 
rational, it is as rational beings that we are moral beings. Again, 
Kant makes this more explicit. In his account, human freedom and 
dignity are tied integrally to autonomy, a function of practical reason. 
Hence, he insisted that right actions must be done, not only in 
conformity with duty, but from the motive of duty. Right actions 
done from inclinations such as sympathy or the desire for honor 
deserve praise (since we ought to encourage the performance of right 
actions) but not esteem. (Groundwork 10) Reason tells us what is 
right and we may not rightly rely on anything else. Even if they do 
not make it a cardinal point, I think utilitarians make a similar move, 
as witness the struggles of some of them to make sense of the 
common notion, denied by Bentham, that motives should weigh in 
our estimation of actions.3 Once reason has declared this or that to 
3 Mill struggled with tb.is problem. First, he says, "It is the business of ethics 
to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them . . . " Then, he 
reaffirms Bentham's position: ". . .utilitarian moralists have gone beyond 
almost all others in affitming that the motive has nothing to do with the 
morality of the action, though much with the wonh of the agent. He who 
saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his 
motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble ... " To the objector 
who claims that utilitarianism must therefore ignore the moral qualities 
which motivate actions, Mill says, "These considerations are relevant, not to 
the estimation of actions, but of persons; and there is nothing in the 
utilitarian theory inconsistent with the fact that there are other things which 
interest us in persons besides the rightness and wrongness of their actions." 
(Mill 269-271) But are these "other things" which interest us part of morality, 
as we normally think? If they are, it seems there is a great deal more to ethics 
than telling us our duties. 
-be the right thing to do. it does not matter why an agent does it. so 
long as she does. 
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And (fifth). for utilitarians and Kantians, law serves as the 
model for ethical theory. Kant, of course, is quite open about this; the 
job of pure practical philosophy is to justify universal obligation. 
Utilitarianism's legal model expresses itself more often in metaphor, 
as when Mill says that the first principle "umpires" between 
conflicting secondary principles or when he says that the job of 
ethics is to teach us our duties. 
Finally (sixth). both sides say the main job of ethical theory is 
to describe the principle rule of ethics and show how it works. Of 
course. once the rule is known, particular philosophers may give 
most of their time to elucidating its application to practical problems. 
tasks which necessarily involve them in messy empirical details. A 
utilitarian may fight against cruelty to animals or a Kantian make a 
detailed refutation of arguments against capital punishment. Both, 
however, would insist that their enterprise must be grounded in 
adequate theory. 
These similarities--among others, since I make no suggestion 
that my list exhausts the likenesses between Kantianism and 
utilitarianism--simply mark out the contours of a rationalistic 
approach to ethics. A variety of first principles have been suggested 
in the history of moral philosophy; others could be imagined. In 
every case, as long as ethical theory is supposed to tell us our duties 
as rational beings, the general shape of the theoretical enterprise will 
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be the same. As rational agents we will apply the first principle to 
the particular circumstances of our situation. In every case, a study 
which asks how people can become lovers--a study which must pay 
attention to particulars of psychology and personal history--will be 
classed as moral philosophy of secondary importance, at best. 
I think, for reasons I hope to make clear, that this is simply 
wrong. Before anything else, moral philosophy must make sense of 
the great commands, to love God and neighbor. Of course, besides 
protesting against the intrusion of religious concerns at this point, a 
rationalistic philosopher would say this objection confuses the 
practical importance of these commands with their theoretical 
importance. The great commandments could be crucial in practice 
while theoretically secondary. This may be. An analogy: think of the 
difference between the practical importance of a bridge engineer's 
calculations and the theoretical importance of the equations which 
underlie those calculations. However much we need to have strong 
bridges, theory must be more interested in the basic equations. 
Nevertheless, we may doubt that engineering provides a good 
analogy for ethical theory, though the stage has not yet been set to 
explain why. At this point note only that the practical and 
theoretical importances of a thing may diverge does not mean they 
do. Perhaps the practical importance of the great commands should 
cue us about where we should begin theoretical reflection. 
In any case, this study is not intended as an application of a 
rationalistic moral theory. I do not think moral philosophy must be 
grounded in some first principle conceived as operating on the 
rational level. I do not think it is as rational beings that we are 
moral beings. The next section explores how these denials come 
together. 
Theories of the foundations of Ethics 
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The rationalistic ethical theorist says I need to ground my 
question--How can I learn to be a lover?--in an adequate theory of 
ethics, which will reveal that every agent has a duty to love people .. 
Then, since if we take human psychology into account I am more 
likely to love people if I have certain motivations and inclinations, it 
is my duty to acquire those motivations and inclinations. Note that 
in this picture of things, my "duty to love people" is a duty to 
perform actions of a certain type ("loving" actions). The motivations 
and inclinations which make these actions more likely are not 
themselves love. 
Philosophers who disagree with this picture usually do so in 
one of two general ways. Philosophers who take the first way deny 
that we need a theory of any kind on which to base our moral 
reflections. Philosophers on the second path agree that moral 
philosophy ought to be based on theory, but not a theory of ethics. 
As one of the latter group, I will say something about the kind of 
theory of the foundations of ethics I find attractive. First, though, we 
should recognize and applaud some things the "ethics without 
theory" crowd could say. 
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Iris Murdoch, who is not herself an anti-theorist, shows how a 
philosopher could challenge the rationalist position without 
proposing an alternative in her essay, "The Idea of Perfection." 
There is a two-way movement in philosophy, a movement 
towards the building of elaborate theories, and a move back 
again towards the consideration of simple and obvious facts. 
McTaggart says that time is unreal, Moore replies that he has 
just had his ~reakfast. Both these aspects of philosophy are 
necessary to it. 
I wish in this discussion to attempt a movement of return. . . 
(Murdoch 1) 
"A movement of return": anti-theory philosophers can criticize 
the standard rationalistic moral theories by pointing to "simple and 
obvious facts" which those theories ignore, make irrelevant, or deny. 
As examples of two such facts Murdoch recommends "the fact that an 
unexamined life can be virtuous and the fact that love is a central 
concept in morals." (Murdoch 1-2) I suggest another fact, that love is 
an amalgam of inward and outward actions. an example of inward 
action being gentleness (cf. chapter two, p. 69) and an example of 
outward action being giving back rubs. Those who recognize this as a 
fact must set themselves against the picture that love consists 
entirely of a certain kind of actions. If we neglect either the inward 
or outward aspects of love, we will produce a caricature of it. 
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Murdoch's message is, if a theory makes no room for the 
existence of unreflective virtuous people, so much the worse for the 
theory! Of course, rationalistic ethical theorists will concede that 
ordinary folk don't need to spend their time pursuing abstract 
theory. But this is only because such theorists claim that the 
unsystematized maxims of ordinary morality can be grounded on 
and systematized by good theory. It should strike us as odd that 
such theories have to contort themselves to try to make room for the 
rightness of most moral feeling and doing. 
Again, Murdoch suggests that we should think it strange that 
standard ethical theories make love into a derivative, secondary 
concept and/or reduce love to observable actions. One need not have 
a theory to know that love is central to morality and involves the 
inward life as much as public behaviors. 
In general, the anti-theorist presents the rationalistic theorist 
with a phenomenological challenge: pay attention to real life morality 
and see if your theory makes sense of it. If, instead of making sense 
of the "facts," a theory produces n. • .one of those exasperating 
moments in philosophy when one seems to be relentlessly prevented 
from saying something which one is irresistably impelled to say" 
(Murdoch 21), the anti-theorist can demand that the theory be re-
examined. Perhaps the theory is right and what we feel we must say 
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is wrong, but perhaps not. Surely it would be a strike against a 
theory that it denied or ignored facts which it should explain. 
Standard theorists could respond to this phenomenological 
challenge by denying its validity. Why should a rational moral 
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theory have to explain ordinary beliefs? Utilitarianism, for example, 
could point to its own history. At one time most people accepted the 
"fact" that animals could not be moral patients in their own right, but 
only derivitively, as actions toward animals tended to produce 
actions of the same sort toward people. Rather than accommodating 
this fact, the theory of utility overthrew it. Perhaps ethical theorists 
ought to ignore ordinary moral judgments and take back the 
concession that most people get things right most of the time. 
This response is a counsel of desperation. The anti-theorist will 
ask if the defender of standard theory really means to lump "love is 
a central concept of morals" with "animals are not moral patients." 
Are they both pseudo-facts, which good theory may overthrow? It 
seems hard to believe that many rationalistic ethical theorists would 
say yes. And if some philosophers did say yes, if they stuck to their 
rationalistic guns and claimed that all purported facts of morality 
had to be backed up by good theory, and if they further claimed that 
it is just possible that love is not a central concept of morals, the 
anti-theorist need not feel threatened. Most rationalists are 
committed to some conception of human nature in which reason is 
supposed to play a defining (and usually ennobling) role: all people 
participate (or at least can participate) in reason; thus, all people can 
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h . 4 be moral. The anti-theorist need not accept any sue conception. 
· d t1·c Maybe the rationalist really Perhaps moral vision is non- emocra . 
f als The anti-theorist can't see that love is a central concept o mor . 
has no reason, on that account, to doubt the importance of love. 
I think the anti-theorist's criticisms of rationalistic theory are 
sound. A study which asks how an individual can learn to be a lover 
can be justified without recourse to theory. Look. Pay attention to 
morality as you know it in real life. Is not love worth study? The 
1.f some people are not interested in this anti-theorist need not worry 
theme, since some will be. 
In spite of the applause which these criticisms of rationalistic 
theory have won, we should not be content with them, since we can 
have a theory of the foundations of ethics. However, such a theory 
will not itself be moral philosophy, but metaphysics. It will tell us 
who we are and what our place in the world is. 
Traditionally' people have understood their place in the world 
Philosophers may build systems by means of myth and metaphor. 
on the myths and metaphors, but the deep going currents lie under 
as 
we have seen, Iris Murdoch argues that the .. man" 
the system. So, 
of modern moral philosophy is based on the metaphor of morality as 
action and suggests that the metaphor of morality as vision is better. 
She openly endorses Plato's myth of the cave. (Murdoch 92ff.) This 
story expresses several things well, she thinks. Specifically' our 
c " a critical examination of the essentialist assumption 4 Cf. chapter ,our ior 
which underlies the rationalist view of human nature. 
89 
moral problems are mainly problems of vision in that we spend our 
time looking at shadow play; release from shadow play brings a 
temptation, absorption with the self (Murdoch says the fire which 
throws the shadows on the cave wall symbolizes the individual 
psyche); and there is a real, though indefinable good (the sun, which 
cannot be directly looked at), which illumines all the goods of the 
world. 
I said that Murdoch endorses this myth, but that might not be 
quite accurate. She says of the story of the cave: "Of course we are 
dealing with a metaphor, but with a very important metaphor and 
one which is not just a property of philosophy and not just a model. 
As I said at the beginning, we are creatures who use irreplaceable 
metaphors in many of our most important activities." (Murdoch 93--
my emphasis) Metaphysical systems based on mythological stories 
often (always?) take those stories to be, in some important way, true; 
that is, they really do tell us about the world and how we fit in it. 
Think of religious creation stories and the metaphysical doctrines 
build on them. It would be hard to believe the metaphysical 
doctrine if one thought the underlying story was "only a metaphor." 
Murdoch, of course, does not deride the Platonic story when she calls 
it a metaphor; it is important, perhaps irreplaceable. It is not just a 
model. Still, it is not entirely clear how the myth of the cave works 
for Murdoch. Does it tell us how the world is, or just illustrate moral 
change? Surely Plato intended it to teach epistemological doctrine 
(and other things) as well as teach about morality. Myths, especially 
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myths which provide good rock on which to build systems of 
metaphysics, illuminate the world in several directions, so to speak. 
Murdoch does not say whether the myth of the cave throws light on 
anything but morality. 
I look for a theory of the foundations of ethics in a metaphysic 
built on theistic religious concepts. The fund of myths for such a 
theory is the traditional stories of the Jewish and Christian 
scriptures. No doubt similar theories could be built using Koranic 
material. Metaphysical systems, whether theistic or not, have their 
own ambitions (quite large, usually) and must be judged as adequate 
or inadequate, satisfying or unsatisfying, on those terms. Regarding 
a theory of the foundations of ethics, though, metaphysics must 
before anything else give us our place in the world. What sort of 
creatures are human beings? What is the significance of their 
characters and actions? 
Who are we? We ought to expect a theory of the foundations 
of ethics to make sense of--have room for--human reason and 
human feelings. Rationalistic theories have tended to have room 
only for reason. The moral philosopher ought to learn from 
psychologists, since moral theory must deal with real people. What 
is the significance of human beings? A theory of the foundations of 
ethics ought to allow us to find significance both in actions and 
imagination. Rationalistic theory has tended to to focus so tightly on 
action that imagination, the actions which go on "inside," has been 
neglected. 
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I do not look for a finished theory, in the sense of something 
unimproveable. After all, God is transcendent and perfect; our 
theologies are not. And I wish to leave as an open question whether 
any extant theistic metaphysic is successful both in terms of its own 
ambitions and in giving material for a theory of the foundation of 
ethics. Still, a theory of the foundations of ethics could be 
constructed out of theistic materials which would not be subject to 
the phenomenological criticisms the anti-theorist throws at standard 
rationalistic ethical theory. 
(How can I justify a belief about some possible theory which 
may or may not have been made? The best justification would be to 
construct the theory, but that is not this book. As a poor substitute, 
note how the criticisms leveled against rationalistic ethics by the 
anti-theorist fail to bite on religious ethics. 1. The unreflective 
virtuous person can hold a place of high esteem in religious moral 
thought, a position uncontrived and flowing naturally from virtues 
such as humility and obedience. 2. Religious ethics often emphasize 
the importance of both the inner and the outer life. 3. In some 
religious ethics love is seen as the leading moral concept; it is not the 
stepchild of duty or utility.) 
By this time a question may have occurred to the reader. It 
seems that I object to rationalistic ethical theories because they 
make the question of this study--how can I become a lover?--a 
secondary one. By agreeing that there might be a theologically based 
theory of the "foundations of ethics," have I not made my own study 
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into something to be appended to metaphysics? What is gained by 
grounding the question in metaphysics rather than a general theory 
of ethics? Why not just call a theory of the foundations of ethics a 
general theory of ethics and be done with it? Perhaps my grudge 
against rationalistic ethical theories could be assuaged if those 
theories were characterized as metaphysical speculations. 
Three points should be made: 
First, it makes a difference wh~ther moral philosophy is 
organized around a single principle of morality or by reference to 
something other than morality. Standard ethical theories try to 
systematize moral thought by subjecting all morality to a ruling 
principle which is itself a principle of morality. Just as a theistic 
theory would, a theory of the foundations of ethics may locate those 
foundations outside moral thought. As moral principles, then, the 
great commands could be of first importance. 
Second, rationalistic moral philosophers generally, with the 
exception of Kant, do not imagine their ruling moral principle to be a 
metaphysical truth as well. They might object to classifying the 
ruling principle as metaphysical speculation. The principle of utility, 
for instance, supposedly is derived empirically. Empiricism can be a 
metaphysical doctrine (and often is, even when its devotees deny it), 
but the principle of utility, though derived from empiricism. is 
supposed to be a moral principle. Kant, on the other hand, thought 
that autonomy was not only the ruling moral principle, but also the 
truth about rational beings (and therefore about human beings). 
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Third, rationalistic theories of ethics do even less well as 
theories of metaphysics than they do as theories of ethics. As 
regards ethics, a metaphysical system ought to tell us what we are 
and our role in the world. If we treat the standard rationalistic 
theories as metaphysics, they tell us we are essentially rational 
beings, whose role is to make calculations of utility or give ourselves 
the categorical imperative. But what can this mean, that we are 
essentially rational, when irrationality seems such a large part of the 
human picture? Kant answers. and again he is only more rigorous 
and clear than other rationalists: ". . .the law interests us because it is 
valid for us as men in virtue of having sprung from our will as 
intelligence and so from our proper self; but what belongs to mere 
appearance is necessarily subordinated by reason to the character of 
the thing in itself." (Kant 123--Kant's emphasis) We may take Kant 
to mean that if human beings are not rational, they ought to be; 
reason itself dictates this conclusion. We can discount all contingent 
appearance. Reason tells us "our proper self." 
This ought to strike us as exceedingly strange. 
Kant here engages in myth-making, or shows himself to be 
building metaphysics on a myth which he found ready to hand when 
he began philosophizing. The particular myth he believes--or 
assumes without question--is widespread in philosophy and worthy 
of attention. 
94 
The Myth of Autonomous Reason 
We usually think of ancient stories when we think of myths. 
The myth of autonomous reason is not a story, but it is ancient. It 
pervades philosophy, almost to the point of being co-extensive with 
philosophy as we know it in the West. In stripped down fonn, it is 
the idea that reason exists independently of any thinker. It includes 
the belief that in any decision making or belief fixing process there is 
exactly one most rational path. 
Human beings, of course, often fail to fix beliefs or make 
decisions in the "most rational" way. That is, we often criticize our 
beliefs and decisions as being confused, shortsighted, foolish or in 
some other way substandard. According to the myth of autonomous 
reason, this reflects poorly on human beings and their inability to 
think straight, but not on reason itself. According to the myth of 
autonomous reason, right reason leads to truth. Right reason is pure 
objectivity, "the point of view of the universe" in Sidgwick's phrase. 
The myth of autonomous reason shows itself, more or less 
clearly, in many philosophical enterprises, not just ethical theory. As 
Bernard Williams notes in the "Preface" to Moral Luck, almost all 
science hopes to attain to a conception of the world "independent of 
our peculiarities and the peculiarities of our perspective." (Williams 
x) Philosophers of science follow suit, struggling to find a way to 
affirm that science is a rational enterprise (a deep intuition which 
nearly all of them share) while recognizing that current theory is not 
the same thing as truth and that the history of science is full of 
irrational fits and starts. 
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Another example: philosophers of religion have spilt a great 
deal of ink debating whether belief in God is rational. Most of them 
recognize that belief in God is or isn't rational according to one's 
definition of rationality. They vigorously debate this or that 
conception of rationality, convinced that rationality is some thing 
which some definition will best describe. 
Whenever a philosopher says, "Reason dictates ... " or "Clear 
thinking will show ... " or " ... mere appearance is necessarily 
subordinated by reason. . . " (Kant), we should suspect the influence of 
the myth of autonomous reason. Whenever reason rather than some 
rational being is made into an actor, we may suspect the myth of 
autonomous reason is at work.5 We need not suppose that all these 
philosophers have an articulated belief that "reason" is somewhere 
"out there," independent of thinkers; that would be to convict them 
all of a sort of Platonism. I do think, though, that for many 
philosophers the myth of autonomous reason is a deep, almost 
untouchable assumption. It is connected to the first, most basic of all 
philosophic instincts: "let's think about this." 
Philosophers err, I believe, when they look for some thing 
e is to e a Wittgensteinian which corresponds to "reason." I tak th' b 
5 Of . cours~ we s~o~ld allo.w writers the freedom to use figures of speech, and 
sometimes reason 1s , an innocent substitute for the thought of some rational 
being. But often, as iii the Kant quote "reason" appears to be a strange thing: 
a fonn, the mind of God, or some such. ' 
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point. Asking, "What is reason?" is like asking, "What is meaning?" 
The myth of autonomous reason assumes there is some thing which 
is reason. In reality, we use "reason" and "rational" to describe a 
great many mental activities, which cannot be reduced to any single 
principle. A reasonable person exhibits skills, not all of them alike in 
any obvious way: 
the ability to draw inferences, 
the ability to think of counterexamples, 
the patience to stick with a problem when it seems unsolvable, 
the ability to make distinctions between related ideas, 
the ability to see the parts of a whole, 
the creativity to put seemingly disparate parts into a whole, 
the wisdom to pick out the important fact or opinion from 
unimportant ones, 
the willingness to criticize familiar ideas, 
etc. 
A person can think more or less reasonably at different times: 
"I just wasn't myself; I was so mad I couldn't think straight." Some 
people are more reasonable than others. But we do not make these 
judgments by comparing a person at two times or two people at the 
same time to an independently existing thing. Saying, "Tom is more 
rational than Bill," is like saying, "Tom is better than Bill at that sort 
of thing," and not like, "There is more of this sort of thing in Tom 
than in Bill." 
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The reader probably expects, now that the idea of autonomous 
reason has been labeled a "myth," that its every occurrence will be 
deplored or derided. Actually, I think it has a largely beneficial 
influence on philosophy. Analogously, science profitably uses 
theoretical concepts which describe situations which never happen or 
are impossible. In mechanics, for instance, we may theorize about 
what would happen on a frictionless surface, though we have no 
experience of such surfaces. By analogy with this use of a model, the 
myth of autonomous reason has at least two right uses. 
First, the myth of autonomous reason encourages philosophical 
criticism. According to the myth, in every case there is an ideally 
rational position or solution. Thus, any actual position or solution is 
liable to improvement; we are invited to look for flaws and make 
corrections. Compare the notion of autonomous reason with 
Murdoch's treatment of "good." Both are what she calls 
perfectionistic concepts. (Murdoch 60-62) Every good deed or thing 
invites us to see that it could be better; the good itself lies beyond 
any concrete good. Similarly, the myth of autonomous reason invites 
us to judge any rational decision or opinion in the light of reason 
itself. Philosophy would not be what it is without. its spirit of 
rigorous self-criticism. (Of course, most philosophers find self-
criticism hard to do; we happily believe our own howlers. But 
philosophy as a group activity is notoriously self-critical.) That the 
myth of autonomous reason encourages philosophical criticism is a 
good thing. 
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Second, at an even more basic level, the myth of autonomous 
reason encourages the philosophers' pursuit of understanding. The 
myth holds out the promise that life and the universe are not 
fundamentally chaotic. Somehow, if we keep at it, we will come to 
understand. Remember that in several dialogues Plato allows his 
characters come to no positive conclusion, but the conversation ends 
with an invitation or promise to return to the topic another day. To 
be a going concern, philosophy needs the confidence that rational 
thought about problems is worthwhile, whether that confidence is 
expressed as a belief that reason leads to truth or in some other way. 
The myth of autonomous reason feeds philosophic confidence. We 
can find the way if we just attune ourselves closely enough to right 
reason, which exists independently of us. We only need to keep 
doing philosophy and not give up. 
Though recognizing these good effects of the myth of 
autonomous reason, we need to see that it also has wrong uses. 
When we mistake the nature of rationality, taking it to be one thing, 
we are apt to decide that reason is a science or a calculus. That is 
mistake enough, but when philosophers like Kant add to it the 
doctrine that the true nature of human beings is to be rational, we 
get a distorted picture of what it is to be a person. The familiar 
picture of the rational chooser emerges, isolated from his history and 
character by his own penetrating understanding of those contingent 
(and therefore not ultimately important) facts. This rational chooser 
is the '"man' of modern moral philosophy" which Murdoch finds 
"alien and implausible." (Murdoch 9) He lives in utilitarianism and 
existentialism as well as Kantianism; Kant only has the virtue of 
drawing his profile more clearly than anyone else. 
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The myth of autonomous reason may or may not have 
deleterious effects in other areas of philosophy, but in moral 
philosophy it clearly falsifies who we are. I invite the reader to look 
and see. It is not simply as rational beings that we are moral beings. 
To the degree that rationality is part of our nature, and we may 
agree it is, it is a part of our nature as moral beings, but we must not 
think it is the whole story. We should be as interested in what it 
takes to be able to love and what it takes to desire to love as we are 
in decisions to love. 
In summary, then, standard rationalistic ethical theories fail as 
ethical theories unless, as Kant saw, they are also true as 
metaphysical descriptions of humanity and its place in the world. 
But Kant's description of humanity, which fits rationalistic theory, is 
simply not true. It makes wrong use of the myth of autonomous 
reason. 
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A Place for Rationalistic Moral Theory 
I am tempted to agree with philosophers who at this point 
would abandon standard moral theories as wholly useless. Why 
should we not philosophize about the moral dimensions of life in a 
manner such as was done in chapters one and two, paying attention 
to psychological material and the facts of morality that seem obvious 
to us? Some anti-theorists would counsel that we ignore the 
rationalist desire for a ruling principle and give our attention to 
small areas of the moral life, making as much sense as we can of one 
problem, virtue or vice at a time. In general, moral philosophy 
would be more satisfying if this advice were followed. This study 
itself is an attempt to think about one such question, a very 
important one. 
Nevertheless, there is a place for rationalistic theories in ethics-
-though perhaps not the ones we currently have. The characteristics 
of rationalistic theories which we have noted can clue us about their 
proper place. 1) Rationalistic theories use a legal model. 2) They 
focus on public actions, neglecting matters of character and motive. 
3) They reduce duty to what can be required of any rational agent, 
the least common denominator. Some questions of moral philosophy 
do seem to call for a theory of this sort, i.e., questions of public 
behavior which must be justified by one party or parties in a society 
to some other party or parties in that society. In other words, 
rationalistic moral theory can be of real use in political and legal 
philosophy. 
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This might seem to conflict with what was said above about the 
possibility of a satisfying metaphysic supplying an adequate theory 
of the foundations of ethics. If our ethical reflections can be 
grounded on a good theory which tells us who we are, why should 
we need a rationalistic theory, which admittedly gives a false reading 
of who we are, to solve legal or political problems? The answer is 
that we think about legal and political problems for social and 
personal reasons rather than rational or philosophical reasons. 
The position proposed here follows Bernard Williams. 
(Williams 80-82) Williams believes that values, moral and others, 
cannot be reduced to any unitary good, nor can they be traded off in 
some common currency of value. We shall return to this doctrine of 
the incommensurability of goods in chapters six and seven. Note 
now, though, that this position pits Williams against rationalistic 
theories which look. for a single supreme principle. 
Williams also believes, against utilitarianism and Kantianism, 
that in some situations there are unresolvable conflicts of obligation. 
It is the situation, not the less than perfect rational agent, which 
keeps the right action from being found. 
If these things are true, Williams says, we should re-examine 
our motives for trying to resolve conflicts about values. "If conflict 
among our values is not necessarily pathological, and if even where 
the situation is at fault, as with some conflicts of obligation, conflict is 
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not a logical affliction of our thought, it must be a mistake to regard a 
need to eliminate conflict as a purely rational demand, of the kind 
that applies to a theoretical system. Rather we should see such 
needs as there are to reduce conflict and to rationalise our moral 
thought as having a more social and personal basis." (Williams 81) 
Williams' point is that modern societies are complex, and 
morally significant actions are performed by public agencies, which 
are anwerable (in democracies) to those complex societies. The 
values of two or more parties in a society do not need to mesh or be 
rationally reconcilable as long as those parties do not impinge on one 
another. In legal and political arenas, though, the values of various 
parties do impinge on each other. Since legal and political conflict 
can be destructive, society needs--for social and personal reasons, 
not strictly rational ones6 --to reduce the conflict which arises from 
conflicts of values. 
Shall public agencies perform abortions? Should government 
be entrusted with the responsibility to execute criminals? 
should private property rights be circumscribed in favor 
or ~ervationist values? Around these and many like 
How far 
of cultural 
questions 
fl. · Our need to reduce that conflict is a intense con 1ct can anse. 
practical one. 
6 Of course, given what has been said in this chapter, it may be dou~ted if 
there are such things as "strictly rational reason5 as opposed to social and 
personal reasons. . But this doesn't weaken Williams' ~oint, since he m~rely 
says we don't need to resolve conflicts for purely rational reasons--h~ is not 
thereby committed to believing in purely rauonal rea~ons. and ~v.en 1~ he does 
believe in them, his readers can accept this point without bele1vmg m them. 
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Even if, as I believe, a good theory of the foundations of ethics 
can be made, moral philosophy based on it will not be monolithic. 
Nor should we expect all parties in a society to subscribe to the 
theory--especially if, as I expect, a good theory of the foundations of 
ethics is made out of theistic religious material. So, however much I 
believe in an ultimate unity of goods (a matter taken up in chapters 
six and seven), I agree with Williams that we can expect significant 
conflicts of values in society. Our need to reduce that conflict will not 
be rational or philosophical. There will be a place, then, for theories 
which organise moral thinking and feeling, especially about public 
questions of general duty. In addressing these questions, there may 
be a place for rationalistic moral theory. 
Note first: the role thus assigned to rationalistic moral theory 
falls far short of the grandiose vision usually held for such 
philosophy by its creators. 
Note second: it is an open question whether some other way 
could be found to think about legal and political questions, which 
could meet our practical need to reduce social and personal conflict 
as well or better than rationalistic theory. Societies must avoid 
relativism, but rationalism may not be the only way to do it. 
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CHAPTER IV 
KANT, TIIE MYTH OF AUTONOMOUS REASON 
AND ESSENTIAL HUMANITY 
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In the last chapter, the myth of autonomous reason was 
introduced as the idea that reason exists independently of any 
thinker. It includes the belief that in any decision making or belief-
fixing situation there is exactly one most rational path. (If two 
possibilities are equally rational, the most rational path is to prefer 
the two to all others while being agnostic as to which of the two 
should be preferred.) Though this myth has benefited philosophy by 
encouraging pursuit of truth and rigorous self-criticism, I claimed 
that the myth of autonomous reason caused mischief in ethics. First, 
philosophers often fall into the habit of thinking of reason as one 
thing rather than a collection of skills, a mistake which encourages us 
to think morality is mostly about making right decisions. Second, 
and more important, the myth of autonomous reason falsifies who 
we are. It encourages a wrong understanding of human nature and 
what our role is in the world. 
These charges, if true, justify the limited place assigned to 
rationalistic moral theories in the last chapter, that of judging public 
questions of general duty. But are they justified? Can it be shown 
that moral philosophers accepted the myth of autonomous reason 
and were misled by it? Cautious readers may be forgiven for 
thinking that more needed to be said. 
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This chapter, then, is an attempt to say more, to fill in some 
details. It is not, however, at all complete. Rather than explore the 
presence and effects of the myth of antonomous reason in the work 
of many philosophers--a project suggested by the claims made in 
chapter three, but which is beyond the scope of one volume--! will 
turn again to Immanuel Kant, who, perhaps more than any other 
philosopher, self-consciously and thoroughly worked out the 
implications of rationalism in ethics. This investigation will show (1) 
that Kant's work bears the mark of the myth of autonomous reason, 
(2) that the myth le,d him to a certain understanding of human 
nature (or, at least, that it fit well with a certain picture of human 
nature, even if Kant adopted that picture independently of the 
assumptions of the myth), and (3) that this understanding of human 
nature led Kant to write things which must strike readers, unless 
they are under the spell of his system, as mistaken and even bizarre. 
Kant's moral thought can be taken as an illustration of the 
deleterious effects of the myth of autonomous reason in ethics. 
Morality as the Duties of Rational A ients 
The place to begin is not with criticism, but with a fuller 
understanding of Kant's moral theory. There is no room here, of 
course, for a "full" treatment of Kantian ethics; many interpreters of 
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Kant have written whole books on the topic. l I will trace what seem 
to me to be the main ideas of Kant's ethics, which will ground the 
criticisms made later; Kant scholars may judge whether this brief 
resume fairly presents Kant's position. References will be taken from 
the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals and the Critique of 
Practical Reason (in this chapter referred to as Groundwork and 
Critique, respectively). 
In Kant's view, morality is at heart a matter of duty. He 
recognized that emotions impinge on the moral life, but he would 
insist (as we saw in the last chapter) that any attempt to think about 
morality which focused first on love rather than duty would be 
confused and doomed to failure. Moral worth, Kant said, attaches to 
actions done not just in conformity with duty, but from the motive of 
duty. (Groundwork 9-10) 
Duty occupied this exalted place in morality for two reasons. 
First, Kant thought that careful reflection on the ordinary moral 
judgments of everyday people revealed the fundamental importance 
of duty.2 Second, the concept of freedom, which is intimately tied to 
the idea of duty, is "the keystone of the whole architecture of the 
l o.f th,e secondary literat~re, the author has been most helped by R.J. 
Sullivan s . Immr:nuel Kant s Moral Theory. Though most of my interpretation 
of Kant m this chapter fits well with Sullivan's, it will be based on citations of 
Kant rather than secondary literature. Naturally, readers should not impute 
any of my criticisms of Kant's theory to Sullivan. 
2 Kant, along with most moral philosophers, grants that most moral beliefs of 
the general populace are correct. The problem is that philosophers haven't 
been able to n_ialce s;:stematic sense of ordinary morality. But the problem is 
not n_ierely ph1losoph1cal, as lack of good understanding of morality--and the 
resultm~ wrong-he.aded attempts to inculcate morality in young people--could 
undermine moraltty. 
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system of pure reason and even of speculative reason." (Critique 3) 
In other words, if morality is not primarily a matter of duty, Kant's 
whole critical philosophy collapses. Both of these reasons for the 
primacy of duty need more explication. 
1. Duty as the Underlying Assumption of Popular Morality 
Imagine the case of a parent or teacher dealing with two 
children who are prone to fight over toys. Generally, the adult tries 
to prevent the children from fighting, or at least to keep their fights 
from producing lasting harm. In addressing this problem, the adult 
may adopt many different strategies. She may separate the children, 
punish particular behaviors, tell the children to share the toys 
instead of fighting, or even refuse to intervene in the children's 
fighting, on the assumption that they will discover for themselves 
the unpleasantness of unregulated conflict and avoid fighting in the 
future. 
The adult does not merely want the children to refrain from 
fighting. A sort of armed truce could occur if they were motivated 
by fear of adult punishment or displeasure if they were caught 
fighting. At certain stages of development, the children may be 
incapable of acting on anything higher than a punishment-reward 
level, but even if the adult recognizes this and provides the indicated 
punishments or rewards, the adult's long-term goal is for the 
children to share the toys and not fight because it is right to do so. 
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In other words, the adult wants the children to recognize that they 
ought to do or not do something. 
For Kant, the main job of moral philosophy is to make sense of 
the concept of "ought." "Ought" is not only the goal of moral 
education (as in the imagined example of the adult with the 
belligerent children), it is the concept by which the adult participates 
in morality as a mature agent. 
Obligation poses an interesting philosophical question. Where 
does this conviction, that I or someone else ought to do something, 
come from? What is it? Clearly, to say something ought to be done 
is not the same as saying it is done. Science teaches us what is; 
morality seems to teach us what ought to be. How does this happen? 
In the "Preface" to the Groundwork, Kant wrote: 
Every one must admit that a law has to carry with it absolute 
necessity if it is to be valid morally--valid, that is, as a ground 
of obligation; that the command 'Thou shalt not lie' could not 
hold merely for men, other rational beings having no obligation 
to abide by it--and similarly with all other genuine moral laws; 
that here consequently the gound of obligation must be looked 
for, not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the 
world in which he is placed, but solely a priori in the concepts 
of pure reason; and that every other precept based on 
principles of mere experience--and even a precept that may in 
a certain sense be considered universal, so far as it rests in its 
slightest part, perhaps only in its motive, on empirical grounds-
-can indeed be called a practical rule, but never a moral law. 
(Groundwork vi) 
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This remarkable sentence reveals several important ideas 
which interlock with each other in the complex which is Kant's moral 
thought. 
First, the moral law must be unconditional. This is a basic 
assumption for Kant; it simply expresses what "everyone" means 
when he says something ought or ought not to be done. Of course, 
Kant admitted that most of the maxims of popular morality appealed 
to contingent, conditioned factors (such as utility, prudence or 
inclinations) to justify obligation. Underneath the sloppy thinking of 
popular morality, though, Kant said we would find an unconditioned 
moral law. The real moral law, even if unrecognized by 
unphilosophical people, is what gives popular moral judgments their 
force. 
Second, experience never gives unconditioned truth. This is a 
commonplace of philosophy in the modem era. With other 
philosophers of his age, Kant recognized that empirical science had 
drastically changed the way Europeans thought about the world. But 
science, for all its importance, was limited by its inductive nature; it 
never yielded certainty. This meant, for Kant, that science--and, of 
course, all other knowledge gained from the senses--could be of no 
help in discerning moral laws. 
Third, pure reason is unconditioned. This claim is, in effect, 
the myth of autonomous reason dressed up in Kantian terminology. 
More will be said below, in the section regarding Kant's moral theory 
and the myth of autonomous reason, about how Kant thought reason 
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could be unconditioned, something which he recognized as a problem. 
For the present, note that Kant thought that if we disregarded "the 
nature of man" and "the circumstances of the world" we would still 
be able to ground the moral law "solely a priori in the concepts of 
pure reason." Kant thought that pure reason could operate 
independently of "the circumstances of the world." 
Fourth, moral laws must be grounded in pure reason rather 
than experience. This conclusion simply ties together the previous 
propositions. If moral laws must be unconditional, if experience is 
never unconditioned and if pure reason is unconditioned, then moral 
laws must be grounded in the latter rather than the former. The 
important thing to see is that Kant thought analysis led clearly from 
the popular concept of obligation through the intermediate steps to 
this conclusion; only pure reason could provide the universal 
necessity integral to the commonly accepted idea of "ought." 
Fifth, moral beings must be rational beings. This contention, 
which follows from the idea that moral law is grounded in pure 
reason, lies behind Kant's comment that a . moral law must apply to 
all rational beings, not just men. Since real obligation allows for no 
exceptions, it must rule over all moral beings, and since moral laws 
are grounded in pure reason, all moral beings must be rational. In 
fact, insofar as we are recognizing and grounding the moral law, 
human beings are just like any other moral beings. Nothing 
contingent, in us or them, in our world or theirs, can have any 
bearing on the shape of moral law. 
I 
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Sixth, the essential human nature is rationality. In Kant's 
mental chart of things, the class "men" is a subclass of the class 
"rational beings." No one knows whether there are other non-empty 
subclasses of the class "rational beings" (at this point; we are in the 
Groundwork--later, in the Critique, Kant gives a practical reason for 
assuming the existence of at least one non-human rational being), 
but if other rational beings do exist, they will be more like us than 
different. No matter how great the empirical differences between 
men and other rational beings, our common rationality makes us 
merely different species under the same genus, "rational beings." 
Obviously, if I say that Kant thought people are essentially 
rational beings, I need not mean that he thought people always, or 
even often, act rationally. A purely rational being, e.g., God, would 
always act rationally and would therefore always act in conformance 
with the moral law. Kant wrote, "Hence for the divine will, and in 
general for a holy will, there are no imperatives: 'J ought' is here 
out of place, because 'I will' is already of itself necessarily in 
harmony with the law." (Groundwork 39) In contrast to a divine 
rational being, finite creatures such as human beings, who are 
subject to inclinations and thus not purely rational, experience the 
moral law as ought. "I ought" emerges in the tension between the 
dictates of pure reason and contingent inclinations. Without both 
sides, pure reason in the form of moral law saying one thing and 
natural inclinations saying something else, people would not 
experience obligation as "necessitation," Kant's word for the feeling 
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that I ought to do something I do not want to do. Kant saw no reason 
to explore how natural inclinations tempt us away from the path of 
duty, because this is obvious in everyone's experience. But there is a 
question about pure reason. How does it supply its half of the ought 
which we experience as necessitation? Kant thought that analysis of 
popular moral belief showed that pure reason had to have this role, 
but nothing in popular moral belief showed how pure reason worked 
to compel the will. To address this question, Kant wrote the Critique 
of Practical Reason. 
2. Duty as a Necessary Concept of Kant's System of Critical 
Philosophy 
Kant's call to philosophy came in the writings of David Hume. 
Hume pressed empiricism to skeptical conclusions, which in Kant's 
view left science as well as morality and religion without good 
philosophical foundations. Kant sought to correct what he saw as an 
intolerable situation by a thorough reconstruction of epistemology, a 
project he called critical philosophy. Only the briefest summary of 
Kant's critical philosophy will be given here, just enough to show how 
duty has an indispensable role in it. 
The crux of Hume's skepticism, in Kant's view, lay in his attack 
on causality. (Critique 50-51) Causality, as we normally think of it, 
is a necessary connection between two things (events or properties): 
if A, then necessarily B. But, Hume said, experience of connection 
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between things never shows that they are necessarily connected, 
only that they are connected. Causality, then, would have to be an a 
priori concept. But it is impossible to have a priori knowledge of 
things in the world. Therefore, Hume claimed, causality--the idea 
that one event in the world causes another event--is an intellectual 
fraud; we only believe in it through custom, never for good reason. 
Causality, Hume said, is inconceivable. 
Kant responded to this attack on causality with one of 
philosophy's oldest tools. He introduced a distinction. He allowed 
Hume's argument to be sound as regards things-in-themselves, "for it 
cannot be understo<?d, with reference to things-in-themselves and 
their properties as such, why, if A is given, something else, B, must 
also necessarily be given." (Critique 53) .. But we never deal with 
things-in-themselves, Kant said, but only with things-as-experienced. 
Additionally, 
. . .it is very understandable that A and B as appearances in 
one experience must necessarily be connected in a certain 
manner (e.g., with reference to their temporal relations) and 
that they cannot be separated without contradicting that 
connection by means of which experience is possible, in which 
experience they become objects and alone knowable to us. This 
was actually the case, so that I could not only prove the 
objective reality of the concept of cause with reference to 
objects of experience but also deduce it as an a priori concept 
because of the necessity of the connection it implies. (Critique 
53) 
Kant turned his attention away from things-in-themselves to 
the appearances of things as we experience them. While we cannot 
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tell if things-in-themselves have necessary connections between 
them (Hume's point, according to Kant), we can clearly see that 
appearances as we experience them do have necessary connections--
otherwise we could not experience them as we do. One of these 
connections is causality. Thus, at least in reference to things-as-
experienced. causality is conceivable and is, in fact. an a priori 
concept which makes experience possible. 
As an a priori concept, the category of causality (and all the 
other categories introduced in the Critique of Pure Reason; we focus 
on causality because Kant thought it crucial to morality) is free from 
the contingent nature of empiricism; in Kant's words, it has its seat in 
the "pure understanding." (Critique 54) We may, then, apply the 
category of causality to things-in-themselves, except that we don't 
know "the conditions for the application of these categories, and 
especially that of causality, to objects." (Critique 54) So we know the 
categories do apply to real objects, but we cannot by them gain 
experience of objects. "And if, when subsequently applied to things-
in-themselves which cannot be objects of experience, it [causality] 
cannot be determined so as to represent a definite object for the 
purposes of a theoretical cognition, it could nevertheless be 
determined for application to some other purpose, such as the 
practical." (Critique 54) We are barred from acquiring what Kant 
called theoretical or speculative knowledge of things-in-themselves, 
but we may apply the concept of causality to things-in-themselves 
for what he called practical purposes. 
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By "practical," Kant meant action in the world. Human beings 
act when they desire something; for Kant, the faculty of desire is 
equivalent to the will. Reason is practical when it influences the will. 
One sort of practical reason evaluates possible courses of action 
according to their prudential characteristics. For instance, will an 
action' lead to the desired result (happiness, utility, etc.) or not? Kant 
denied that such reasoning was genuinely moral, since it appealed to 
contingent facts in the world. As we have seen, his analysis of 
obligation in the Groundwork required that moral law be 
unconditional. 
Another sort of practical reason, "pure" practical reason, if it 
existed, would not appeal to contingent facts in the world. If a 
rational being had pure practical reason, it would have a pure will.3 
The pure will is a crucial idea for Kant. 
In the concept of a will, however, the concept of causality is 
already contained; thus in that of a pure will there is the 
concept of causality with freedom, i.e., of a causality not 
determinable according to natural laws and consequently not 
susceptible to any empirical intuition as proof [of the reality of 
the free will]. Nevertheless, it completely justifies its objective 
reality in the pure practical law a priori .. . (Critique 55) 
To review, by focusing on things-as-experienced rather than 
things-in-themselves, Kant claimed to have saved the category of 
3 For Kant, "pure will" is not the same as "holy will." A holy will is a will 
completely in conformity to the moral law. A being with a holy will (God) 
would always and naturally act according to the moral law. A pure will is a 
will determined by reason alone, apart from inclinations. A being with a pure 
will could act in accord with the moral law by recognizing the necessity of the 
moral law and subjecting all inclinations to its rule. 
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causality. Causality was shown to be an a priori concept, applicable 
to things-in-themselves, though not able to give theoretical 
knowledge of things-in-themselves. In the passage just quoted, Kant 
says that the concept of a will (practical reason) involves the idea of 
causality. If there is such as thing as a pure will, a will not 
determined by contingencies but by reason alone, then we have a 
practical reason to believe in a cause which is free. 
In the moral law, the categorical imperative, Kant thought he 
had the "determining ground" of the pure will. (Critique 56) The 
categorical imperative commanded the will independently of 
inclinations or hopes for success. Therefore, a pure will, a will 
undetermined by contingent facts, was possible. Kant carefully 
guarded against claims that this chain of reasoning gave knowledge 
of things-in-themselves. Nevertheless, the fact that human wills 
could be set in conformity to the law, motivated by reverence for the 
law, gave a concrete reason to accept the idea of "an empirically 
unconditioned causality," the free will. In a move suggestive of 
Wittgenstein's idea that some things could be shown but not said, 
Kant wrote that the "practical reality" of the free will could be 
"pointed out," even though the free will was not an object of 
theoretical knowledge. (Critique 56) 
Kant thought that what he called the "speculative" side of his 
critical philosophy had rescued inductive science from Humean 
skepticism. The categories of thought (causality, temporal relations, 
etc.) made possible only knowledge of appearances, but this was not 
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a problem; science had only to accept that its proper role was 
studying appearances rather than things-in-themselves. Within the 
realm of appearances, Kant had shown causality--the foundational 
concept of science--to be valid. 
The practical side of critical philosophy rescued something else. 
Many philosophers were worried by the notion, often occasioned by 
the growing success of science, that material determinism was true. 
If determinism were true, they worried, morality--insofar as it was 
conceived as requiring free will--would be undermined. In contrast 
to these thinkers, Kant readily accepted the doctrine that 
determinism ruled the world of appearances. Further, he agreed 
with those who held that morality requires a free will, that without 
freedom there is no moral responsibility. But by locating the free 
will in the realm of things-in-themselves, Kant saved morality (and 
religion as an appendage to morality) from determinism. 
We see, then, why Kant wrote that freedom served as the 
"keystone" of his whole system. (Critique 3) Only by freedom was 
morality saved from determinism. Only through the concept of 
freedom do concepts of God and immortality gain "stability and 
objective reality." (Critique 4) "Now is explained the enigma of the 
critical philosphy, which lies in the fact that we must renounce the 
objective reality of the supersensible use of the categories in 
speculation and yet can attribute this reality to them in respect to 
the objects of pure practical reason." (Critique 5) Because there is 
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freedom, we know that things-in-themselves exist and that human 
categories of thought really apply to them. 
We see that the moral law is able to determine a will 
independently of inclinations or other contingent factors. Therefore, 
a pure will, a will undetermined by contingencies, actually can occur. 
Therefore, anytime a pure will occurs we have a practical reason {not 
a speculative one) for accepting the reality of freedom, since a pure 
will combines the concepts of causality and freedom. Therefore, 
whenever a human being has a pure will, a will determined only by 
the moral law, he has a practical reason to accept the reality of 
freedom. Whenever my will is determined by the moral law and not 
by inclinations or other contingencies, I have a practical reason to 
accept the reality of freedom and with it the reality of things-in-
t he ms elves. 
For Kant, freedom holds everything together. 
As we saw in the last chapter, Kant said that when a rational 
agent sees, by reason alone, that the categorical imperative must be 
obeyed, he has achieved autonomy. Since the law the autonomous 
person gives himself is based solely on reason, it is free from the 
determinism which reigns in the world of appearances. So autonomy 
is equivalent to freedom. 
Now we can see why duty is crucial to critical philosophy. A 
person achieves autonomy only when she wills in conformity with 
the moral law. To will in conformity with the moral law is to will to 
do her duty. If it were not possible for pure practical reason to 
·120 
determine the will by the individual giving herself the moral law--if, 
in other words, Kant's conception of morality with duty at its heart 
was incoherent or false--then she could not be autonomous. There 
would be no freedom. So, 
If morality is not essentially duty, there cannot be moral law. 
If there is not moral law, there is no pure will. 
If there is no pure will, there is no practical reason to accept 
the reality of freedom and all the concepts which attach to it. 
Therefore, if morality is not basically duty, Kant's critical 
philosophy falls apart. We are left with skepticism in regard to 
things-in-themselves. But Kant was confident he had defeated 
skepticism: ". . . the moral law . . . does provide a fact absolutely 
inexplicable from any data of the world of sense or from the whole 
compass of the theoretical use of reason, and this fact points to a 
pure intelligible world--indeed, it defines it positively and enables us · 
to know something of it, namely, a law.n (Critique 43) "The least 
attention to ourself shows that this idea [the moral law] really stands 
as a model for the determination of our will." (Critique 43) 
Thus, Kant had two reasons for thinking morality was primarily 
duty. Duty lay beneath ordinary moral thinking, and duty was 
integral to the whole project of critical philosophy. 
How Kant's Moral Theorv Exhibits 
the Myth of Autonomous Reason 
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Both of Kant's reasons for thinking that morality is basically 
duty are rooted in the idea that reason functions in its own right, 
independent of any reasoner. First, he held that only "pure reason" 
could give obligation the force which ordinary moral judgments 
showed that it had. Second, he held that only a purely formal 
"determining ground" of the will could show that freedom was real, 
and such a formal rule could only prescribe duty. Both of these 
moves assume that pure reason, the source of the moral law (the 
purely formal determining ground of the will), actually exists. This is 
the myth of autonomous reason. 
To a certain degree, it is unnecessary to prove this point. Even 
a quick reading of Kant's work suggests that Kant's ethical thought is 
shot through with the idea that reason is independent of reasoners. 
For Kant, reason is an actor; it can determine the will apart from 
anything empirical. (Critique 20, 41-42, etc.) But we must be 
careful, for Kant recognized a difficulty in the myth which many 
philosophers have missed. 
As we have seen, Kant granted that mechanical necessity, i.e. 
determinism, reigns in the empirical world. (Critique 48) So human 
beings, including the self, viewed as objects of experience, are 
determined. For e~ample, a person's emotional attachments and 
desires (in Kant's terms, the person's inclinations) often color his 
thinking. Kant would agree with the determinist who claims that 
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these inclinations, combined with other admittedly hard to measure 
contingent factors, cause a person to think one thing and not another. 
So how can pure reason, assuming it exists, have any bearing on 
human thought, since human thought is as determined as any other 
part of human existence? 
Kant's answer, of course, makes use of the distinction between 
the world of appearance and things-in-themselves. Viewed as an 
object of experience (which is how I must see even my own 
subjective thoughts and feelings), I am entirely determined. But it is 
possible that I am also a thing-in-itself. As a thing-in-itself, I could 
be undetermined. I could be--but there is no speculative reason for 
saying I am. Only when ~he moral law appears, determining my will 
without reference to any contingencies, do I have a practical reason 
for saying more, that in me reason can be undetermined. 
Strictly speaking, this explanation does not explain. It does not 
say how pure reason expresses itself in my thoughts, which are part 
of the world of experience. Kant leaves as mysterious the interaction 
between noumena and phenomena, though he instructs his readers 
how to apply the categorical imperative without understanding the 
connection. "Ask yourself whether, if the action which you propose 
should take place by a law of nature of which you yourself were a 
part, you could regard it as possible through your own will." (Critique 
69) If the natural law which would describe the action could be 
approved if it were . a maxim of pure practical reason, then the action 
accords with duty. Note how Kant assumes the reader is able to 
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compare her "own will," presumably a pure will, determined only by 
the moral law, to some hypothetical "law of nature," a description of 
mechanically necessary causation. That people might do this, that is, 
that people could judge possible actions by the purely formal 
requirements of the moral law, is for Kant the greatest concrete proof 
that freedom and things-in-themselves exist, even if no example 
could be given of a person who actually did judge her actions solely 
by the moral law. 
It seems, then, that Kant recognized the problem, but failed to 
answer it. He does not say how pure reason can be related to the 
thoughts of people. He only insists that people may be seen as 
things-in-themselves as well as appearances (so far with speculative 
reason) and that they must be so regarded insofar as they are 
autonomous (the additional reach of practical reason). It is a 
mystery how a person whose every thought is determined by 
antecedent events can judge possible actions by pure reason, but 
Kant thinks practical reason shows this must be. 
Kant's position is equivalent to saying the myth of autonomous 
reason is true, even though no person, as observed, exhibits 
autonomous reason. Mystery shrouds any connection between true 
reason and the thinking of actual persons, but we still have reason to 
believe that true reason exists. If true reason did not exist, neither 
would the moral law; since the moral law does exist, true reason 
must exist too.4 
So, though Kant was more self-conscious than many 
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philosophers about the myth of autonomous reason--he at least saw 
that the idea is problematic--he still believed it. Morality, as Kant 
understood it, demands that reason be independent of the world of 
experience. Enough has been said, then, to justify my first claim, that 
Kant's work bears the mark of the myth of autonomous reason. 
How Kant's Work Exemplifies a Certain Picture of Human Nature 
Above, while listing central ideas in Kant's moral theory, I said 
that according to his mental chart, human beings were a species 
under the genus rational beings. In other words, Kant thought 
people were essentially rational, even though they may rarely, or 
never, act rationally. To further support this important contention, I 
offer these passages, one of which was partially quoted in the last 
chapter. 
This much only is certain: the law is not valid for us because it 
interests us (for this is heteronomy and makes practical reason 
depend on sensibility--that is to say, on an underlying feeling--
in which case practical reason could never give us moral law); 
the law interests us because it is valid for us as men in virtue 
of having sprung from our will as intelligence and so from our 
proper self; but what belongs to mere appearance is necessarily 
4 This is simply an alternate way of putting the point of Kant's footnote 
comment (Critique 4) that freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law, while 
the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom. 
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subordinated by reason to the character of the thing in itself 
(Groundwork 123, Kant's emphases) 
To substitute subjective necessity, i.e., habit, for the objective 
which pertains only to a priori judgments would be to deny the 
faculty of judging an object, of knowing it and what belongs to 
it. It would mean, for example, that what usually or always 
follows a certain prior condition could not be inferred to follow 
from it, since that would imply objective necessity and an a 
priori concept of a connection. It would mean only that similar 
cases may be expected, as animals expect them. (Critique 12) 
Man is a being of needs, so far as he belongs to the world of 
sense, and to this extent his reason certainly has an inescapable 
responsibility from the side of his sensuous nature to attend to 
its interest and to form practical maxims with a view to the 
happiness of this and, where possible, of a future life. But still 
he is not so completely an animal as to be indifferent to 
everything which reason says on its own and to use it merely 
as a tool for satisfying his needs as a sensuous being. That he 
has reason does not in the least raise him in worth above mere 
animality if reason only serves the purposes which, among 
animals, are taken care of by instinct; if this were so, reason 
would be only a specific way nature had made use of to equip 
man for the same purpose for which animals are qualified, 
without fitting him for any higher purpose. (Critique 61) 
In the first passage, Kant says that reason tells us that 
rationality is our "true self," in spite of any experiential evidence to 
the contrary. The second passage distinguishes between human 
k.-iowledge, which is made possible by a priori judgments, and 
animal expectation, which is the most that can be had a posteriori. 
Only unconditioned reason enables our thought to rise above "habit." 
The third passage, besides giving another example in which reason is 
an actor (reason is said to say things "on its own"), tells us that 
reason is what distinguishes people from animals. 
126 
These, and similar passages, show that Kant held a certain view 
of human nature. Kant did not invent this view; it is so common in 
philosophy that it may be called the traditional belief. 
In the history of philosophy, the traditional belief often arises 
in response to a metaphysical question: What is Man? This question 
is sometimes understood to ask what separates people from God, and 
a Kantian phrase gives the traditional answer: Man is the finite 
rational being (as opposed to the infinite rational being). More often, 
the traditional belief has arisen to answer another question: What 
separates people from animals? According to the traditional belief, 
rationality separates people from animals; people are essentially 
rational. For all his innovations, Kant was at one with the main 
tradition of western philosophy in this basic position. 
The third passage quoted makes it plain that Kant did not 
consider the non-rational elements of human nature (our "sensuous 
nature") to be unimportant. He said we ought to use our rational 
faculties to look out for our interests and inclinations--as far as we 
can within the moral law. But if that is all the use we make of 
rationality, we are no different from the animals. And Kant put this 
in evaluative terms; we are better than the animals only to the 
degree that we use our rationality for those ends which reason itself 
commands. 
\ 
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This evaluative note is part of the traditional belief. In 
virtually all cultures and in most of philosophy, human superiority to 
animals is taken for granted. Our tradition often asks how or why 
people are better than animals, but rarely whether they are better 
than animals. 
Consider how the traditional belief uses an obvious difference 
between people and animals, the fact that animals do not talk. 
According to the traditional belief, animals do not talk because they 
are not rational; speech is the best behavioral mark of rationality. 
The fact that virtually all people talk while animals do not is thus 
made into evidence for the traditional belief.5 Further, since rational 
beings are superior to non-rational beings, animals' lack of language 
(and therefore reason) justifies human use of animals. 
Observe that the traditional belief results from a search for the 
essential human characteristic. The traditional belief is essentialist. 
Like Socrates grilling Meno for a definition of virtue, philosophers 
who search for a definition of Man want a characteristic common to 
all people which at the same time distinguishes them from animals. 
The traditional belief says that characteristic is rationality. 
Clearly, Kant accepted the traditional belief; rationality is the 
true human self. Since it is so basic to the Western philosophical 
tradition, he may never even have questioned it. But in swallowing 
5 Experiments in which apes learn some sign language only underscore the 
traditional belief. With great effort one or two animals have been taught a 
fraction of the language skills billions of human two-year-olds pick up 
effortlessly. 
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the idea that reason is our true nature, Kant also accepted the 
principle of essentialism, that humanity has some defining 
characteristic that separates it from animality (and raises it above 
animality). Kant's position, which in this case is the position of most 
philosophers in the West, rests on essentialism. 
The third main point I want to make in this chapter is that 
Kant's picture of human nature led him to mistaken conclusions in 
ethics. But if, as I have just contended, Kant's picture of human 
nature agrees with the dominant picture of human nature in our 
philosophical tradition, it may be hard to see his mistakes as 
mistakes unless the outline of the picture is challenged and redrawn. 
So, before we reach the last point, we must take a detour: an 
examination of the essentialist assumption which undergirds the 
traditional belief about human nature. The detour sign is found in a 
passage in Wittgenstein. 
says: 
A Wittgensteinian Challenge to the Traditional Belief 
In section 25 of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein 
It is sometimes said that animals do not talk because they lack 
the mental capacity. And this means: 'they do not think, and 
that is why they do not talk.' But--they simply do not talk. Or 
to put it better: they do not use language--if :'e except . th~ 
most primitive forms of language.--Commandmg, questI~nmg, 
recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history 
as walking, eating, drinking, playing. (Philosophical 
Investigations 12) 
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If we unpack this little paragraph, we will find a direct 
challenge to the traditional belief. To see this, one needs only to 
remember that in the traditional belief, human language is the most 
telling of all the behavioral marks of human rationality. Reason 
shows up in science, of course, and practical decisions (e.g. Aristotle 
says reason allows people to pursue happiness rather than mere 
pleasure), but the ability to talk marks us as rational as nothing else 
does. Wittgenstein sums up the traditional belief simply as "they 
[animals] do not think, and that is why they do not talk." 
Wittgenstein's rejection of the traditional belief cuts to the 
heart of its doctrine: "But--they simply do not talk." He admits that 
animals do not use language, with the stipulation that we only mean 
'· 
they do not use complicated language, but he rejects the move from 
"they do not talk" to "they do not think." 
Curiously, Wittgenstein does not make his point about animals 
explicit in the passage just quoted. He does not say that animals 
think. Instead, he makes a point about people. "Commanding, 
questioning, recounting, chatting are as much a part of our natural 
history as walking, eating, drinking, playing. "6 The things the 
traditional belief turns to as the best marks of rational beings, 
Wittgenstein lists as part of our natural history. He implies, I take it, 
6 Note that commanding, quesuomng, recounting, and chatting are all 
complicated language uses; according to traditional belief, all marks of human 
rationality. 
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that natural history describes us as one of the animals. Human 
rationality, then, is part of our animality, not the thing that separates 
us from other species. This is in direct opposition to Kant, who held 
that reason raises us above other species. 
Later in Philosophical Investigations (part Il, section i; p. 174), 
Wittgenstein considers whether a dog could hope. He conjectures 
that while a dog could be angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, and 
startled, it could not be hopeful. Only someone who has mastered 
language can hope. "That is to say, the phenomena of hope are 
modes of this complicated form of life," he writes. It seems that 
Wittgenstein thought of language on a scale of complexity, from the 
primitive forms of language of animals to the complicated forms of 
people. He probably thought of thinking in the same way, as ranging 
from simple to complex. 
Possibly, Wittgenstein here offers a different answer to the 
question, What is Man? Where the traditional belief defines 
humanity as finite rational beings, Wittgenstein could be read as 
defining humanity as the animals with the most complicated forms of 
thought and language. I think, though, that this is a wrong way to 
put things. Wittgenstein is not giving a different answer, but a 
different kind of answer (better still, a different kind of response) to 
the question. 
The traditional belief, we noted, is essentialist. In other 
contexts, Wittgenstein laid the blame for many philosophical errors 
on the urge to understand words through their essences. In section 
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66 he writes, "Don't say: there must be something common, or they 
would not be called 'games"'--but look and see whether there is 
anything common to all." (Philosophical Investigations 31) Rather 
than attribute to Wittgenstein a new essentialist definition of 
humanity, I read him as challenging the craving for such a definition. 
Whether this reading of Wittgenstein proves accurate or not (a 
matter hard to settle), it suggests that the traditional belief rests on a 
faulty assumption, the assumption that humanity can be defined by 
a single trait or particular combination of traits common to all people 
and not shared with animals. Since anybody can readily pick out 
many examples of human beings, the question, What is Man? affords 
an opportunity to follow Wittgenstein's instruction to "look and see." 
Let us list candidates for an essential trait of humanity. 
1. All human beings are homo sapiens, that is, they share a 
common biological nature. Biologists undoubtedly could define the 
term more precisely, probably mentioning a certain genetic structure 
or a combination of physical traits. This definition is true, and it is 
essentialist: the specified biological description fits all people and no 
animals. It is also not what the traditional belief needs. 
The biological candidate borders on tautology. In the context of 
our question--What is Man? What is human nature?--it says people 
are people. (In other contexts, I presume, such as medicine, the 
biological definition of humanity is not tautological and represents a 
real gain in knowledge.) The philosophical quest for an essential 
characteristic of humanity looks for something that grants special 
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experience which accompanies play, and second, that animals cannot 
have such experiences. Both assumptions are unsubstantiated and 
probably false. The objection exhibits what Wittgenstein called a 
mental cramp. 
4. In his science fiction story, Stranger in a Strange Land, 
Robert Heinlein hit on laughter as the distinguishing mark of 
humanity. Apparently no animals other than people engage in 
humor. (Obviously, the hyena's "laugh" is not a laugh.) Once again, 
we may wonder how we know animals do. not laugh, but even if that 
is granted problems arise. We could doubt that all people laugh; 
some people really are humorless and not all of them see that as a 
lack in themselves. One could speculate that all people are capable of 
humor and that humorless people have merely lost something 
human. But if that is true, humor can hardly be the essential human 
trait, since people are still people after they lose it. 
More importantly, the ability to laugh is not the sort of 
essential characteristic the traditional belief wants. Like biological 
differences between our species and others, it does not seem to 
support the elevated status people (not just philosophers) want to 
give to people. For instance, surely we are not justified in testing 
carcinogens on rabbits merely because we laugh and they don't. 
Laughter's failed candidacy reminds us that for the traditional belief, 
the essential characteristic of humanity is also an ennobling and 
praiseworthy characteristic. 
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5. Human beings enjoy things,such as music, food, sex, hot 
showers, and baseball. For a philosopher like Kant, this trait is the 
opposite of what we are looking for. Enjoyments, based on 
inclinations, are precisely the things we share with animals. If we 
cannot think of something other than these sorts of traits, Kant might 
say, we are no different from (implying, no better than) the animals. 
But if we subtract from life all such enjoyings, is what is left a human 
life? 
Of course, one can overstate Kant's denigration of inclinations. 
He did believe we have a duty to pursue our own happiness, which 
includes enjoying things. But he would insist that the essential part 
of humanity cannot be anything contingent; reason reveals that the 
true self is noumenal. Therefore, we can fairly attribute to him the 
belief that human life is still essentially the same, even if we 
subtract from it all phenomenal enjoyments. If we find that we 
rebel against this idea because it is literally incredible, we have 
cause to doubt Kant's picture of human nature. 
6. Human beings think and talk. More specifically, they 
sometimes think rationally and talk philosophy. Together, of course, 
thinking and talking constitute the core of the traditional belief. 
Wittgenstein, we have seen, challenges the idea that animals do not 
think. Perhaps their thought and language are only less complex 
than ours. But then, the thought and language of one person may be 
much more complex than another person's. Could we measure 
complexity of thought, so that the differences between all people is 
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so much smaller than the differences between people and animals 
that we would have a reliable way to tell them apart? This is at least 
conceivable, if doubtable. Even if this is granted, the difference 
between our species and another would only be larger than the 
difference between individuals of our species, a difference of 
quantity, not quality. I wonder if the traditional belief can be 
content with anything less than an absolute qualitative difference 
between people and animals. Kant thought there was. 
The traditional belief could be wrong about its particular claim-
-that rationality and language distinguish humanity from animality--
and still be right in its general claim that some essential trait of 
humanity exists. I will suggest three more. 
7. Our ethical traditions tell us that every human being is the 
focus of moral worth. The cry of the oppressed is: "I, too, am a 
human being!" The traditional belief holds that the moral status of 
human beings depends on their distinction from the animals. Again, 
Kant is an example. People have dignity as autonomous rational 
beings, that is, those who are able to give themselves the form of the 
moral law. Hence, we should never treat a person as a means only. 
I have no desire to deny the moral dignity of every person. 
But if human moral worth depends on some trait that distinguishes 
us from the animals, then human moral worth cannot itself be that 
trait. (One could maintain, of course, that human beings are 
distinguished from and superior to the animals simply because they 
have individual moral worth. But this is bald assertion, not 
explanation. It is not the traditional belief.) 
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But, some defender of the traditional belief might object, 
human beings ·cJo have moral worth, worth not attributable to any 
animal. (Only the most radical animal rights proponent would deny 
we ought to choose the interests of a human being over those of an 
animal in hypothetical forced choice scenarios.) So there must be 
some characteristic or combination of traits which people share and 
which no animal has and which explains human moral worth. 
Well, we do crave an explanation for our belief that people 
have greater moral worth than animals, a belief I share. But, do not 
say there must be a common element. Look and see. 
8. People are self-conscious subjects. Philosophers make much 
of this idea, but what does it come to in real life? We ought to have 
an understanding of self-consciousness before we say it serves as the 
characteristic the traditional belief looks for. 
Here are examples of what could be called self-consciousness: 
(a) "I was embarrassed." (b) "And then I thought, 'She's going to say 
no,' so I really turned on the charm. Boy, was I cool--and I knew it." 
( c) "Let it be the real I that prays, and the real thou I pray to." ( d) 
"Mom, Dad and my boyfriend were all in the stands, but I said to 
myself, 'Forget all that,' and just concentrated on the basket." 
In (a), someone felt a feeling. In (b), a person acted a part 
which he was able to label. In (c), a person assumes that her 
personality may include elements hidden from herself and tries to 
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make allowance for this possibility. In (d), a person pushed away 
distractions in order to accomplish a task. Perhaps this is enough to 
make us doubt that self-consciousness is a single phenomenon. If it 
is not, how does it serve to mark humanity? Is one of these sorts of 
self-consciousness, or some other one, the essential human trait? Is 
there a common element to every experience we call self-conscious? 
(A chasm opens before us. The common element of humanity is self-
consciousness; the common element of self·consciousness is 
something else; that something else has yet another common 
element; etc.) 
Two more questions: do all people share the requisite 
experience of self-consciousness? Do we know there is no such 
experience for animals such as monkeys or dolphins? Taking self-
consciousness as the essential characteristic of humanity is frought 
with many questionable assumptions. 
9. Human beings are moral agents. We not only want others to 
pay attention to us, we feel we ought to pay attention to others. We 
accept blame and take credit for things we do. We exhibit such traits 
as honesty, laziness, kindness, etc., or their opposites. Can moral 
agency serve to distinguish humanity from animality? 
No. First, like moral wonh, moral agency is held by the 
traditional belief to depend on, not constitute, the essence of 
humanity. Second, like rationality and language, moral agency seems 
to lie on a scale from unresponsible automata like viruses to the 
completely self-aware chooser of existentialist novels. It can be 
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doubted that an easy cut-off will be found between human character 
and that of animals. Ordinary speech, for instance, ascribes 
viciousness, loyalty, and bravery to some dogs. Is this only a manner 
of speaking, as defenders of the traditional belief usually say? 
Wittgenstein noted that we do not speak of dogs as hoping (Fido 
expects his dinner; we do not say he hopes for it). I suggest that the 
fact that some words seem to apply to dogs while others do not may 
indicate a real, if unsystematized, observation that dogs have certain 
characteristics but not others. Wittgenstein would probably say that 
some moral characteristics are part of one form of life, while others 
are only part of more complicated forms of life. If this makes sense, 
the difference between people and animals again appears to be one 
of degree, not of kind. 
We have taken this long detour in order to raise doubts about 
the underlying assumption of the traditional view of human nature, 
the assumption that there is some essential human characteristic. 
Wittgenstein compared our concept of number to a thread, made of 
many intertwined fibers, with no element common to the whole. 
(Philosophical Investigations, section 67, p. 32) If we reject the 
search for an essentialist definition of humanity, we may use the 
same metaphor for human nature. Many , traits, including reason 
and speech, make up our nature, but none of them need be common 
to us all. 
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I suggest that there is no defining trait of humanity. Even if 
there is, it is not rationality or speech.8 This means that Kant's 
picture of human nature is thoroughly misconceived. Therefore, we 
ought not to be surprised that his understanding of human nature 
led him to conclusions which are mistaken. 
Kantian Conclusions Which Cannot Be Acce.pted 
Many passages could be quoted, but two will suffice. Kant 
wrote: 
It is doubtless in this sense that we should understand too the 
passages from Scripture in which we are commanded to love 
our neighbour and even our enemy. For love out of inclination 
cannot be commanded; but kindness done from duty--although 
no inclination impels us, and even although natural and 
unconquerable disinclination stands in our way--is practical, 
and not pathological, love, residing in the will and not the 
propensions of feeling, in principles of action and not of melting 
compassion; and it is this practical love alone which can be an 
object of command. (Groundwork 13) 
8 Scripture says that God created people in her image (Genesis 1:26), and that 
God is love (1 John 4:16). It would seem that Christian speculation about the 
Imago Dei should center on the possibility that the ability to love is the 
defining human characteristic. Cf. Marilyn McCord Adams' brief comments in 
the section "The Nature of God" in her anicle, "Forgiveness: A Christian 
Model." (Faith and Philosophy, July 1991, 277-300, esp. pp. 290-291) 
Historically, of course, theologians have adhered to the traditional belief 
instead. 
It would be interesting to explore the contention that love is the essential 
human trait. I will not do so here, because 1) it would require another volume, 
and 2) the criticisms of Kant (and through him of the traditional belief) in this 
chapter stand without it. At this point, it is enough to see that rationality is 
not the essence of humanity. 
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For inclinations vary; they grow with the indulgence we allow 
them, and they leave behind a greater void than the one we 
intended to fill. They are consequently always burdensome to 
a rational being, and, though he cannot put them aside, they 
nevertheless elicit from him the wish to be free of them. Even 
an inclination to do that which accords with duty {e.g., to do 
beneficient acts), can at most facilitate the effectiveness of 
moral maxims but not produce any such maxims. . . . reason, 
when it is a question of morality, must not play the part of 
mere guardian of the inclinations, but, without regard to them, 
as pure practical reason it must care for its own interest to the 
exclusion of all else. Even the feeling of sympathy and 
warmhearted fellow-feeling, when preceding the consideration 
of what is duty and serving as a determining ground, is 
burdensome even to right-thinking persons, confusing their 
considered maxims and creating the wish to be free from them 
and subject only to law-giving reason. (Critique 118) 
The Groundwork passage gives Kant's famous reading of the 
great commandments. Love, according to Kant, is a positive good will 
toward everyone, that is, control of our maxims in accordance with 
duty--rather than anything pathological. Why did he think this? 
Kant's immediate answer was that we cannot directly control our 
emotions; therefore it would be unjust for God to command that we 
do so (the doctrine of ought implies can). More fundamentally, 
though, Kant grounded morality in the traditional belief. If 
rationality is the essence of a person, and if all morality (the moral 
law, moral agency, moral responsibility) is tied to that essence, then 
pathological inclinations are irrelevant to morals, or at most a 
decidedly secondary matter. 
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It is important to see that this reading of scripture is only 
possible through a kind of philosophical spectacles. A less biased 
reading of the New Testament (and the Pentateuchal materials which 
lie behind the gospels) will not restrict the great commandments 
from matters of inclination. Indeed, the commandments say we are 
to love God and each other with all our heart. Kant's philosophical 
commitments have led him to a blatant misreading of the text. 
Unless we share similar philosophical commitments, we have no 
reason to think morality is mostly a matter of applied reason. What 
we call morality may be importantly related to several traits, not just 
rationality. Once free of the traditional belief, we may see that 
sensitivity, desires (bad and good), and imagination, to name only 
obvious candidates, play roles in morality as surely as rationality 
does. If they do, and if God paid attention to people as they are, then 
it might well be possible for God to command people to love him (and 
each other) pathologically--with all their heart. 
In the passage from the Critique, Kant reaches an equally 
strange conclusion. Truly rational people,. he says, will regret having 
inclinations, even good ones. Though it is impossible, they will "wish 
to be free of them." Why? In practice, inclinations are not 
dependable, since feelings come and go. But Kant gives a deeper 
reason: inclinations--even those which move us to act in accord with 
duty--cannot "produce" truly moral maxims. Only unconditioned 
pure reason can produce real moral law. So, the truly rational {and 
therefore truly moral) person would wish consistently to live out his 
true nature; he would wish to be free of all emotions, including 
"sympathy and warmhearted fellow-feeling." 
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There is always a danger, when reading a text from another 
time or place, of not entering into the author's worldview enough to 
read it fairly. In other places, Kant argues that we have a duty to 
develop benevolent feelings in ourselves, since we know they will 
increase the odds we will act in accord with duty. But this does not 
change Kant's basic position. The heart of morality is recognition of 
the moral law, so all matters of inclination are secondary. In 
actuality, Kant's position here simply draws out the implications of 
the traditional belief. If human beings are essentially rational, then 
morality really is chiefly a matter of duty. 
Nevertheless, we must recognize and reject this position as 
mistaken, even bizarre. It is simply not true that healthy people 
would wish to be free of sympathy and fellow-feeling. Readers may 
judge for themselves. Would a parent hope that her child develops a 
strong sense of duty, but regard sympathy as unimportant in the 
child's moral growth? Would a teacher hope this for a student? A 
husband for his wife? A friend for a friend? Someone who wishes to 
argue Kant's position cannot take refuge by noting that these are 
cases of other people while Kant said the rational person would wish 
himself to be free of benevolent inclinations. Kant's conclusion rests 
on the iron implications of his starting point and apply as much to 
other rational beings as to the self. In Kant's view, the truly rational 
person would wish all rational people to be free from all inclinations, 
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since they cannot ground the moral law. Assumptions which drive 
us to such a conclusion cannot be right. 
Enough has been said to support the third point of this chapter, 
that Kant's view of human nature led him to espouse positions which, 
unless one is under the spell of his system, must strike the reader as 
mistaken. Much of the lure of Kant's moral theory lies in the fact 
that it works out the implications of a widespread traditional 
philosophical belief. I contend, though, that upon examination that 
belief is groundless; upon examination, Kant's ethics and other 
similar theories will lose their attraction. 
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CHAPTERV 
HOW NOT TO TIIlNK ABOUT MORAL PROGRESS 
A passage from The Sovereignty of Good I have quoted already: 
The problem is to accommodate inside moral philosophy, and 
suggest methods of dealing with the fact that so much of 
human conduct is moved by mechanical energy of an 
egocentric kind. In the moral life the enemy is the fat 
relentless ego. Moral philosophy is properly, and in the past 
has sometimes been, the discussion of this ego and of the 
techniques (if any) for its defeat. In this respect moral 
philosophy has shared some aims with religion. To say this is 
of course also to deny that moral philosophy should aim at 
being neutral. 
What is a good man like? How can we make ourselves 
morally better? Can we make ourselves morally better? 
These are questions the philosopher should try to answer. 
(Murdoch 52) 
If Murdoch is a philosopher trying to win a place for discussion 
of moral progress in philosophy, Lawrence Kohlberg is a psychologist 
who has tried to win a place for discussion of cognitive moral 
development in psychology. The large extent to which he has 
succeeded can be judged by the enormous quantity of theoretical and 
research literature published in the field of moral development since 
Kohlberg began his doctoral research in 1956. For both his admirers 
and detractors, Kohlberg's work has dominated the discussion of 
psychological theories of moral development for a quarter century. 
As reconceived by Murdoch, moral philosophy will learn from 
psychology. She thinks we need to gain some understanding of the 
workings of the selfish ego so that we may overcome its tendency to 
define all the world in terms of itself.I The reader should note how 
drastic a reconceiving of moral philosophy this is. Standard ethical 
theories do not have much room for questions of moral 
improvement, because in them the right thing to do (the crucial 
moral question) is determined by the rational application of 
theoretically well-grounded decision procedures. Agents can only 
progress by becoming able to judge more rigorously the right action 
and/or be becoming more conscientious in performing the actions 
such judgment demands. For example, Kant, who said we have a 
duty to develop certain inclinations, and thus could have developed a 
doctrine of moral progress, relegated such matters to "practical 
anthropology," not really a moral question at all. Against this, 
Murdoch holds that a central task of moral philosophy is to find 
techniques for the defeat of egoism, i.e. methods of moral progress. 
In a manner parallel to Murdoch, Kohlberg thinks psychology 
can learn from philosophy; more than most social scientists, he shows 
1 Note that in her tum to psychology Murdoch finds cenain Freudian 
conceptions helpful; this does not mean, however, that she endorses all of 
psychoanalytic theory. Similarly, my use of Steven Johnson's work in chapter 
one doesn't mean I endorse any panicular psychological theory. Philosophers 
should be free to leam from various psychological schools. 
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an awareness of the philosophical issues inherent in psychological 
studies of human nature and morality. The revolution Kohlberg has 
proposed, and to some degree fomented, in psychology is as great· as 
the revolution indicated by Murdoch's reconception of moral 
philosophy in that field. 
In this chapter I will try to summarize Kohlberg's methods and 
results; discuss his philosophical assumptions, only some of which he 
seems to be aware of; and criticize his work as being an example of 
how not to think about moral progress. The reader should be aware 
of two obstacles which greatly increase the difficulty of this stated 
task. First, the sheer volume of work published by (1) Kohlberg, (2) 
his associates and students, (3) other research psychologists friendly 
to his theory, and (4) the many psychologists, sociologists and 
philosophers who have attacked his theory from a variety of 
perspectives makes it impossible to give anything like a complete 
summary of the issues Kohlberg's work has raised. I can only point 
out those matters which I deem most important and leave it to 
readers familiar with the literature of moral development research 
to decide if I have read it fairly. Second, Kohlberg's theory is a 
moving target; he and his associates have significantly revised their 
methods and claims over the years. No doubt, this speaks well of 
Kohlberg's willingness to accept criticism of his own theory and 
change his mind, but it makes the task of analysis and criticism more 
difficult. Fortunately, in 1984 Kohlberg published the second volume 
of his Essays on Moral Development, entitled The Psychology of 
Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages, a 
collection of articles written by Kohlberg and his associates which 
traces the development of his theory and includes a current 
statement of it. Most references in this chapter will be to that 
volume. 
At the outset, Kohlberg's work must be seen against the 
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background of American social science of the mid-twentieth century. 
Like Murdoch, he found that as understood by most of his 
professional colleagues, his field did not allow him to say things 
which seemed obvious. In particular Kohlberg rebelled against social 
relativism and the anti-cognitivism of behavioristic theory. Kohlberg 
wanted to study how moral actors think about moral issues; he 
rejected theories which told him thinking was irrelevant to moral 
behavior or that it amounted to internalizing arbitrary social 
standards. 
Kohlberg quotes Berkowitz as an example of social relativism in 
psychology: "Moral values are evaluations of actions generally 
believed by the members of a given society to be either 'right' or 
'wrong."' (Kohlberg 3) With this definition went the assumption that 
different societies could have radically opposed evaluations of 
actions, so that children in different societies would judge some 
particular action differently (right in one society, wrong in another) 
and both children would be correct. This seemed to Kohlberg to 
ignore the fact 
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... that individual moral actors have their own points of view. 
Student civil disobedience is an example of a behavior studied 
by psychologists that may be wrong by the standards of the 
majority but right by the moral actors' own moral standards. 
Socially relativistic studies of moral values and behavior that 
neglect the actors' own standpoint soon lead into 
inconsistencies and lack the ability to order the research data 
gathered. (Kohlberg 3) 
Kohlberg recognized that his objections to social relativism and 
behaviorism ran deeper than their failure to make sense of research 
data. After all, the great virtue of behaviorism, according to its 
devotees, is that it strictly limits itself to observable and manageable 
data and rejects unnecessary theoretical entities. B.F. Skinner was 
thus able to equate good with whatever provides positive 
reinforcement. According to Kohlberg, it is the "psychologists' 
fallacy" (modeled on Moore's "naturalistic fallacy") "to think that a 
definition of morality could be made purely in terms of effectiveness 
in ordering research data without dealing with the philosophic 
concern about what the truly good should be." (Kohlberg 2) In other 
words, psychologists who commit this fallacy slide from theories 
which explain behavior to theories which explain morality without 
realizing they have moved from "is" statements to "ought" 
statements. 
Behind both behaviorism and social relativistic theories of 
morality Kohlberg detected the influence of logical positivism. 
(Kohlberg 278-279) Social scientists typically tried to give value· 
neutral definitions of moral matters, striving to limit their discourse 
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to scientific, verifiable statements. But this was impossible, since 
value-neutral discussion of moral matters inevitably assumes a 
moral relativist stance. In matters of morality, Kohlberg denied that 
psychology could be neutral. (Compare Murdoch: "To say this is of 
course also to deny that moral philosophy should aim at being 
neutral.") 
So far, philosophers will probably approve of Kohlberg's 
rebellion against this sort of background. Positivism has long since 
lost its cachet in philosophy. Kohlberg's reading of analytic 
philosophy, in particular R.M. Hare's Language of Morals, encouraged 
him to break with the dominant philosophic assumptions of 
American social science of the 1950's, assumptions which are still 
distressingly prevalent in many ·schools of psychology and sociology. 
The counter-assumptions which Koblberg made, which enabled 
him to study the thinking of moral actors, and the research he built 
on those assumptions have greatly changed psychological thought 
about morality. I will try to summarize both fairly. 
Kohlberg's Prqject: Assumptions and Methods 
Kohlberg's writings show him to be conscious of three main 
groups of assumptions underlying his work. 
Influenced by Hare, Kohlberg tried to make metaethical 
assumptions which seemed to him to fit with the ordinary use of 
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words like moral and moral development. Compared to many 
psychologists, he was wonderfully explicit about what these were. 
a. The assumption of value relevance implies that moral 
concepts are not to be understood as value neutral. . . 
b. The assumption of phenomenalism implies reference to 
concious processes. 
c. The assumption of universalism implies that moral 
development has some features to be found in any culture. . 
d. Prescriptivism is the idea that one ought or should do 
something, not simply the idea that one would do it. . . . 
e. Cognitivism or rationalism is the idea that moral 
judgments are not reducible to, nor directly expressive of, 
emotive statements but, rather, describe reasoning or reasons 
for action where reasons are different from motive. 
f. Formalism is the notion that there are formal qualities 
of moral judgment that can be defined or argued upon 
regardless of whether or not agreement exists on substantive 
matters. 
g. The assumption of principledness implies that moral 
judgments rest on the application of general rules and 
principles. They are not simply evaluations of particular 
actions. 
h. The assumption of constructivism implies that moral 
judgments or principles are human constructions generated in 
social interaction. . . . 
i. These assumptions lead to a corallary assumption of the 
primacy of justice. . .. Thus, moral judgments and principies 
imply a notion of equilibrium, balancing, or reversibility of 
claims. (Kohlberg 215-216) 
These assumptions let us see what Kohlberg was looking for in 
his research: conscious, rational mental processes which could be 
found in all cultures and which progressed in an orderly fashion to 
produce principles of justice which would prescribe right actions for 
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moral agents. These processes would have identifiable formal 
structures, structures independent of actual decisions by individuals 
about moral dilemmas. 
In addition to metaethical assumptions, Kohlberg made certain 
theoretical psychology assumptions. In his research, Kohlberg looked 
for Piagetian stages of cognitive development. In the cognitive-
developmental tradition of psychology, Piagetian stages had four 
characteristics: 1) different modes of thinking--structures--can be 
distinguished which serve the same general function at different 
times in an individual's life; 2) these structures appear in an 
invariant sequence which in an individual can be sped up, slowed 
down or stopped by societal influence. but not changed in order; 3) 
each sequential stage forms a "structural whole," an underlying 
organization of thought which the individual uses on a variety of 
tasks; and 4) the stages form a hierarchical pattern in which each 
succeeding stage integrates and displaces the earlier stage. (Kohlberg 
238) Kohlberg hypothesized that research would find such an 
invariant pattern of stages in test subjects' thinking about moral 
dilemmas. 
Kohlberg made yet another assumption or set of assumptions. 
He thought that moral philosophy would have no trouble giving a 
rational explanation for the pattern of stages in moral reasoning. 
Each stage would supplant the one preceding it for logical, not merely 
psychological, reasons. The development of moral reasoning would 
be seen as moving .to higher, more adequate levels, finally issuing in 
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a general moral principle at the highest level. He assumed, then, that 
if research confirmed his hypothesis, that confirmation would tend to 
support the normative claims of the philosophical principle which 
best ordered the development of the moral reasoning stages as a 
rational series. Kohlberg realized that such claims--that psychology 
could inform philosophic debate about normative ethics--would be 
highly controversial. Nevertheless, he stood by this third group of 
assumptions and the conclusions derived from them until the late 
1970's. (Kohlberg 222) 
Kohlberg first tested his hypotheses in a cross-sectional study 
of three groups of boys, ages 10, 13, and 16. The boys differed in 
social class and sociometric status. 53 of these boys were subjects of 
a longitudinal study in which they were re-interviewed regularly at 
3-4 year intervals for 20 years. (Colby and Kohlberg 44) 
Interviewers asked each boy to respond to nine hypothetical 
moral dilemmas. The dilemmas addressed three problems of justice 
identified by Aristotle: distributive justice, commutative justice and 
corrective justice. The dilemmas were grouped into three forms (A, 
B and C), each of which had one dilemma of each kind. 
Each dilemma consists of a short story which tells of some 
person facing a moral problem; the boys were asked what that 
person should do.2 An example, the famous Heinz dilemma. 
2 There is one exception to this: in dilemma . VII, the ques~on is which . of two 
characters did the worse thing in a companson of cheating and stealing. 
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Dilemma III: In Europe, a woman was near death from a 
special kind of cancer. There was one drug t~at the doctors 
thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a 
druggist in the same town had recent!~ discovered .. The drug 
was expensive to make, but the druggist was chargmg ten 
times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400 for the 
radium and charged $4000 for a small dose of the drug. The 
sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to 
borrow the money and tried. every legal means, but he could 
only get together about $2000, which is half of what it. cost. He 
told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell 
it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I 
discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So, 
having tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and . 
considers breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his 
wife. 
Should Heinz steal the drug? (Kohlberg 640) 
After asking a boy what Heinz or the fictional agents in the 
other dilemmas should do, the interviewer probed the boy's thi~king 
with "why?" questio~s. e.g. "Is it actually right or wrong for him to 
steal the drug?" "Why is it right or wrong?" etc. The purpose of the 
interview was to determine if the hypothesized formal structures of 
thinking about moral dilemmas would be present. The boys' answers 
and reasons were transcribed, which allowed them to be evaluated at 
the time of the origi11al study (1957-58) and re-evaluated later. 
Over the years, Kohlberg and his colleagues devised different 
ways to score test subjects' responses. The early scoring systems, 
"Sentence Rating" and "Global Story Rating," produced results which 
initially seemed to confirm Kohlberg's hypotheses. But in the 
longitudinal study and in other studies which sought to replicate 
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Kohlberg's work, these scoring systems produced enough sequence 
anomalies in moral stages to provoke a reworking of the scoring. 
Kohlberg and his colleagues claim these revisions resulted in a 
clearer differentiation of moral judgment structure from content. 
The result, "Standard Issue Scoring," aims at greater objectivity and 
reliability by specifying clear and concrete stage criteria. (Colby and 
Kohlberg 43-44) In the 1980's, the transcripts of the longitudinal 
study were re-scored using Standard Issue Scoring and a blind rating 
system; different raters scored each form for each interview. 
The original study focused on boys from the Chicago area. 
Since 1958, however, researchers have done similar studies 
(sometimes using slightly modified questions, depending on cultures) 
including women, adults as well as children, and people in various 
countries, including separate studies in Turkey and Israel. 
Though one might want to break into the story at this point to 
make analytical comments, we are not ready for that. Before asking 
what really drives Kohlberg's thought, I ought to summarize his early 
public claims and the storm of controversy they aroused. Then we 
need to see how Kohlberg and his colleagues modified their claims--
and how they did not modify them--before evaluating those claims. 
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Claims and Controversy 
Beginning with "The Development of Children's Orientations 
Toward a Moral Order: Sequence iri the Development of Moral 
Thought" in 1963, Kohlberg and (later) his associates have published 
over one hundred articles and several monographs presenting the 
results of their research. Having read only a fraction of these many 
thousands of pages and a smaller proportion of the even more 
extensive secondary literature written in response to Kohlberg, I 
must again emphasize that what follows are what I deem the 
important issues in cognitive moral development research. However, 
since Kohlberg returns again and again to similar themes, we can be 
confident that they also reflect what he thinks important in his work. 
In brief, Kohlberg and his associates claim that empirical 
research tends to confirm his initial hypotheses. 
Subjects seemed to use a coherent structural orientation in 
thinking about a variety of moral dilemmas. Their thinking 
developed in a regular sequence of stages, neither skipping a 
stage nor reverting to use of a prior stage. The Standard Issue 
Moral Judgment Scoring System was found to be reliable and 
appears to be a valid measure of Kohlberg's moral judgment 
stages. (Colby and Kohlberg 41) 
According to Kohlberg's theory of moral stages, individuals' 
thinking about moral issues develops through six discernable stages, 
grouped by pairs into three main levels. The preconventional level 
is marked by the social perspective of the concrete individual, the 
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conventional level by a member-of-society perspective, and the 
postconventional level by a prior-to-society perspective. Over time, 
Kohlberg modified his definitions and claims about some of his 
stages, especially stage 6, but the three main levels have remained 
the same. 
The six developmental types of stages defined in my 
dissertation were divided into three major levels of 
development: 
Level A. Premoral: 
Stage 1--Punishment and obedience orientation. 
Stage 2--Naive instrumental hedonism. 
Level B. Morality of conventional conformity: 
Stage 3--Good-boy morality of maintaining good relations, 
approval by others. 
Stage 4--Authority-maintaining morality. 
Level C. Morality of self-accepted moral principles: 
Stage 5--Morality of contract, of individual rights and 
democratically accepted law. 
Stage 6--Morality of individual principles of conscience. 
(Kohlberg xxix) 
Each stage gives different answers to Kohlberg's questions: 
"What is the right thing to do?" and "Why should we do the right 
thing?" At the preconventional level, stage 1 (Heteronomous 
Morality), right is obedience and the avoidance of rule-breaking; the 
reasons are avoidance of punishment and the power of 
authorities/parents. The stage 2 (Instrumental Purpose and 
Exchange) child follows rules only when it is to his immediate 
interest. Right is what's fair. The reasons for right action are to get 
what you want and get along in a world where. other people have 
interests of their own. 
At the conventional level, stage 3 (Mutual Interpersonal 
159 
Expectations and Relationships), right is living up to expectations and 
"being good," which includes trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude. 
The stage 3 person does these things in order to be a good person in 
her own eyes and because of her belief in the Golden Rule. Stage 4 
(Social Sytem and Conscience) brings an emphasis on law and a more 
systematic understanding of conventional relationships. Right 
consists in fulfilling actual duties to laws and social groups, 
motivated by the need to defend the society or institution from 
breakdown. 
At the postconventional level, stage 5 (Social Contract or Utility 
and Individual Rights), right is impartiality and obedience to rules 
mutually agreed upon--the social contract--in a world where people 
have differing values and many rules are relative. A stage 5 person 
acts from a sense of obligation to the good of the whole group and 
belief in individual rights like life and liberty. Stage 6 (Universal 
Ethical Principles) individuals follow self-chosen ethical principles, 
which are seen to underlie the social contract. When societal rules 
violate the principle of justice, one acts in accordance with the 
principle rather than rules. Belief in the rational validity of 
universal moral principles motivates stage 6 behavior. (Kohlberg 
621-639, cf. chart 174-176) 
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In his earliest published reports of his research, Kohlberg 
called these stages developmental ideal types, rather than stages. 
Only after longitudinal and cross-cultural data had been collected 
and a assessment method which revealed invariant sequence in the 
data had been developed did he write (in 1983) that the evidence 
justified calling them stages. (Kohlberg xxx) 
As the longitudinal data were accumulating, a problem 
emerged in Kohlberg's own research and that of others who tried to 
replicate it. A significant minority of the test subjects seemed to 
revert from stage 4 to stage 2 around age 20. All of these subjects 
returned to stage 4 or 5 by age 25. Evidently, college age relativism 
played a role of some kind in a complicated and roundabout 
progression from conventional to postconventional morality, in which 
for a period of 2 or 3 years the individual would give responses 
characteristic of naive hedonism. For a time, Kohlberg's research 
team entertained the idea that real regression occurred in these 
cases. Then, since all of the "regressees" returned to higher stages, 
they tentatively labelled them "stage 4 1/2," a transitional stage 
between stages 4 and 5. Eventually, the reversion problem and 
other anomalies in stage scoring led Kohlberg and. his colleagues to 
reformulate their scoring system. By postulating A and B substages 
to the six stages of the system and more precisely defining the 
structure of thought in each stage, they obtained a scoring method 
which they could claim was valid and reliable and which revealed an 
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invariant sequence of stages. (Kohlberg 426-446, Colby and Kohlberg 
44-47) 
Scoring changes brought about changes in age to stage 
correlations. Early reports by Kohlberg and his associates indicated a 
fairly rapid growth through the stages in youth. For instance, in his 
1969 paper, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental 
Approach to Socialization," Kohlberg reported that studies in the U.S., 
Taiwan, and Mexico all showed a marked progression from age 10, at 
which far more than half of all subjects were at stages l and 2. to age 
16, at which stage 4 had become dominant (about 30%) with stages 3 
and 5 close behind and a significant minority (5-10%) at stage 6. 
(Kohlberg 55-56) With Standard Issue Scoring, this picture changed 
significantly. By the 1980's, no longer did Kohlberg claim to have 
found any true stage 6 subjects, and no true stage 5 subjects were 
found before age 24. (Kohlberg 270, 458) 
In spite of these on-going struggles to organize and understand 
a rapidly growing body of research. Kohlberg suggested far-reaching 
conclusions and made recommendations for moral education based 
on his findings. 
First, regarding theoretical psychology, Kohlberg claimed that 
the evidence showed that children developed morally in a 
generalizable pattern in which cognitive change was the key. He did 
not deny motivation or emotional affect a place in morality, but 
claimed that their development was largely mediated by changes in 
thought patterns. (Kohlberg 63-64) Many studies, including the 
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famous research by Hartshorne and May in the 1920's, had indicated 
behaviors such as cheating and lying correlated far more highly with 
situational factors such as likelihood of detection than with the 
subjects' reported values, lending support to a behaviorist suspicion 
of supposed entities such as "character traits." In contrast, Kohlberg 
claimed that cognitive and developmental factors did correlate well 
with Children's behavior, especially at stages 5 and 6. (Kohlberg 69-
70)3 
Second, concerning moral philosophy, in the 1971 paper "From 
Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away 
with It in the Study of Moral Development," Kohlberg argued that a 
normative philosophical theory which could explain the greater 
adequacy of each successive stage revealed in his research would be 
isomorphic with a psychological theory which explained why one 
stage led to another. (Kohlberg 223) The two theories would be one 
theory. Thus, Kohlberg claimed that his research tended to support 
the philosophic theory which best explained the progression of the 
stages. "From ls to Ought " left the reader with the unmistakeable 
impression that an adequate philosophic theory of justice would be 
some variety of Kantianism. (Utilitarians were stuck at stage 5.) 
Third, regarding moral education, education could be 
structured so as to promote moral development. Beginning with the 
work of Kohlberg's graduate student Moshe Blatt with intermediate 
3 Obviously, these claims (in "Stage and Sequence," 1969) were made before 
scoring revisions attenuated any claims about stage 6 and made stage 5 into an 
adult stage. 
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and high school students in 1969, cognitive-developmental 
interventions were tried in a variety of institutional settings. Blatt 
engaged his students in Socratic classroom dilemma discussions for a 
semester. With before and after testing, he found that a third of 
them moved up a stage while a control group remained unchanged. 
(Kohlberg xii) Where possible, in other interventions Blatt's methods 
were combined with democratic governance, e.g. in a high school 
many school related decisions were put in the students' hands. 
Evaluations made in connection with most of these interventions 
reported individual stage progression. (Higgins, Power and Kohlberg 
74) Later, attempts were made to measure the "moral atmosphere" 
of high schools in order to compare alternative schools, in which 
democratic governance was practiced, to regular schools. This 
research tentatively indicated that cognitive-developmental 
interventions could affect the moral atmosphere of a school as a 
whole, as well as individual students. (Higgins, Power and Kohlberg 
103-105) 
Given the sweeping nature of Kohlberg's positions, many social 
scientists and philosophers criticized the assumptions, methods and 
conclusions of cognitive-developmental moral psychology. Of these 
criticisms, here are eight. 
1. A number of Kohlberg's critics seem offended by his non-
relativism or "absolutism." Anthropologist Rick Shweder (421-424) 
and psychologist Robert Liebert take this line, which can be read as 
the response of the behaviorist and/or social relativist in social 
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science. Liebert represents what he calls' the cognitive-behavioral 
approach, which 
. . .assumes that appropriate responsiveness to environmental 
consequences is the fundamental mechanism of biological 
adaptation. Verbal and substantial behavior within the moral 
sphere, like all behavior, is under the direct influence of both 
objectively and subjectively perceived or anticipated 
con~equen~es. Any ~uch behavior is intended to gain reward, 
a~o1~ pumshment, w1~ praise, or secure some other advantage 
withm the payoff matnx of social interaction. It is not a 
ror;riantic expression of moral goodness or principled thinking. 
(Liebert 184) 
Liebert goes on to say that what develops in "moral 
development" is moral sophistication, the abilty to secure 
advantages in ever more efficient, powerful and complex ways. 
Hard-headed relativism recognizes that all individual organisms 
pursue their own interests. "Moral maturity, from the cognitive-
behavioral perspective, involves the expression of increasingly 
farsighted efforts to live pragmatically and pursue one's own self-
interest." (Liebert 185) 
A good number of anthropologists and sociologists criticized 
Kohlberg for ignoring the fact that moral values are dependent on 
culture. (The cultural relativism argument seems to be alive and 
well in some fields, if not in philosophy.) His work was thus an 
example of cultural imperialism. We can place such objectors in this 
first category. 
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To the extent that this first criticism is simply a restatement of 
traditional behaviorism, it explains much of the heat of the debate 
over cognitive-developmental moral psychology. The philosophical 
reader of some literature in this field is struck mostly by the way 
opponents talk past each other. It goes without saying that Kohlberg 
felt no need to adjust his theory to the criticisms of relativists, which 
were based on assumptions he rejected. 
2. Along with a restatement of behaviorism and relativism, 
many of Kohlberg's critics in the social sciences took issue with 
specific research findings. Sometimes the differences center on 
different interpretations of the same data. For instance, Liebert and 
Kohlberg both refer to studies of students who participated in the 
free speech movement at Berkeley in the 1960s. Liebert says the 
original study published by Haan, Smith and Block in 1968 showed a 
lack of correlation between sitting-in and scores on developmental 
tests. (Liebert 186) Kohlberg claims that when the original transcript 
were rescored with "Standard Issue Scoring" (see above) there was a 
clear and positive correlation between higher moral stage and 
sitting-in. (Kohlberg 541-546) I will not try to adjudicate these 
matters or say more about data debates. They are not crucial to the 
philosophical issues as I see them. 
3. In early papers such as "Stage and Sequence" and "From ls 
to Ought," Kohlberg claimed that many high school age students 
reached stage 5, some even reaching stage 6. A number of readers, 
more sympathetic to cognitive-developmental moral psychology than 
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Liebert or Shweder, wondered whether this made sense of adult 
development. Do most people reach their full moral development so 
early? Or are there adult stages of moral development? As we have 
seen, Kohlberg later retreated from some of these claims, partially in 
response to critics who asked that his theory make some room for 
the common sense notion that people continue to grow morally in 
their 30's, 40's, and beyond. In particular, Jurgen Habermas' 
suggestion of an adult "seventh stage" moved Kohlberg to modify his 
thinking, even though he rejected the idea of a seventh "hard" stage, 
that is, one that would meet Piaget's criteria. (Kohlberg 249-250, 
385-386) 
4. Some writers criticized Kohlberg for giving too simple an 
account of moral motivation. According to his theory individuals at 
stage 5 and 6 are motivated by their rational appreciation of societal 
structures, individual rights, impartiality, and universal principles. 
When someone realizes that his behavior violates the principles he 
recognizes as rationally valid, cognitive dissonance will move him to 
change his behavior. 
But critics noted that later stages are supposed to integrate, not 
obliterate, the insights of earlier stages. Surely, even if people at 
stage 6 act out of a need to live up to rational principles, people at 
earlier stages often act from other motives. How does a stage 6 
principle make room for the essential affective element in love? 
Such critics were not always unsympathetic to Kohlberg's general 
theory. For instance, M.L. Hoffman has written a good deal about 
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altruism and empathy, suggesting not only that they motivate much 
behavior, but that there may be links between the development of 
empathy and justice reasoning. (Hoffman 299-300) 
5. Many critics noted that Kohlberg based his findings on data 
drawn from hypothetical dilemmas. But real life moral issues have a 
different phenomenological feel than hypothetical stories. Can we 
assume that moral progress measured by responses to hypothetical 
dilemmas will be matched by progress on actual problems faced by 
the test subjects? Behaviorists like Liebert like to point to studies 
which seem to indicate wide discrepancies between responses to test 
questions and moral problems created by researchers to mirror real 
life dilemmas, such as the Milgram experiments in which test 
subjects were asked to administer painful shocks to other people, 
though there were in fact no shocks given. (Liebert 186) 
6. Kohlberg's most famous critic combined these last two 
objections to his theory, his dependance on hypothetical dilemmas 
and his neglect of actual motivations. Carol Gilligan interviewed 
women (a marked c;ontrast to Kohlberg's main longitudinal study) 
about a problem they faced in their own lives, whether to have an 
abortion or not. It seemed to Gilligan that these women did not see 
their problem in terms of principles (right to life versus right of self-
determination), but in terms of care and responsibility (care for the 
self versus care for the other). Superficially, these responses could 
be scored as a Kohlbergian stage 3. This Gilligan refused to do. She 
proposed two orientations to moral problems: the justice orientation 
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which organizes Kohlberg's stages and an orientation of care and 
responsibility. While most people use both orientations. she claimed, 
most men use the justice orientation more while most women use the 
care and responsibility orientation more. 
I will note later how Kohlberg took Gilligan's criticisms into 
account in modifying his theory. It should be noted that her critique 
came from within cognitive-developmental psychology. Her basic 
approach to research fits well with Kohlberg's; though well-known, 
her criticisms do not present a radical challenge to his assumptions. 
7. The "psychologist's fallacy" which Kohlberg pinned on his 
behaviorist opponents is a form of the naturalistic fallacy. Yet, in 
"From Is to Ought ," Kohlberg thought he could make empirical 
findings inform normative ethical discussion without falling into the 
naturalistic fallacy himself. Many philosophers denied that he had. 
From the beginning, Kohlberg's reading of philosophy had led 
him to hypothesize moral development much like that he found in 
the data. It is no surprise, critics objected. that if you begin by 
reading Kant your highest stage sounds like the categorical 
imperative. Such theory tainted research could have no bearing on 
normative ethical debate. 
In time, Kohlberg greatly changed his Is to Ought claims, 
though he did not ~bandon them completely (see below). 
8. Several friendly critics charged Kohlberg not so much with 
error as with narrow vision. His work researched only one important 
facet of moral development, they claimed. For example, James Rest 
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wrote that psychology ought to study at least four inner processes 
which interact to produce behavior: (1) interpreting a situation, (2) 
determining what ought to be done in a situation, (3) deciding what 
one would do in a situation (given that human beings have other 
values in addition to moral values), and (4) implementing a course of 
action. Some research has been done in each area, but very little has 
explored the interrelationships between these processes. In Rest's 
view, a conprehensive theory of moral development would 
completely integrate all four. Since Kohlberg's work tells us 
something about the second and third processes, but not the first or 
fourth, it cannot be considered at all complete. (Rest 27-33) 
Adjustments and Responses to Criticisms 
As noted above, Kohlberg modified some of his claims, 
especially from the mid-1970's on. Examples of his responses to 
criticism: 
1. Though he gave no ground to behaviorism or cultural 
relativism in terms of his basic assumptions, Kohlberg became more 
circumspect in presenting his findings. For instance, he wrote that 
the claim that stage 5 is a more adequate level of moral reasoning 
than stage 3 was not a claim that a person at stage 5 was better than 
than someone at stage 3. Similarly, Kohlberg repudiated any 
intention of comparing different cultures in terms of moral 
development. (Kohlberg 330-331) 
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2. Against objectors who challenged his empirical data Kohlberg 
simply produced more studies or otherwise defended his work. 
3. Influenced by Habermas, Kohlberg gave up calling his theory 
one of moral development and decribed it as a theory which gives a 
"rational reconstruction of the ontogenesis of justice reasoning." 
(Kohlberg 217-224) Kohlberg learned from Habermas to think of his 
work as hermeneutic interpretation of subjects' responses in test 
interviews rather than a positivistic test measurement.4 He stopped 
thinking of the interviewer as an observer and saw him as a 
participant in a dialogue. Necessarily, then, interviewers brought 
their own normative beliefs to their interpretation of test subjects' 
responses. The research goal became by imagination to enter into 
the subject's way of seeing the world so that her responses could be 
understood as rational. This, of course, assumes that subjects' 
responses are rational; hence, the theory gives a "rational 
reconstruction" of the development of thinking about justice issues. 
Kohlberg did not retreat from his claim that the stages are 
stages. Human beings do move through just this sequence of ways of 
thinking about moral dilemmas. So much he claimed to be supported 
by empirical fact. But reading Habermas helped Kohlberg to see that 
his psychological theory which tried to explain the facts was 
complementary (rather than isomorphic) to a normative ethical 
4 I oversimplify events. As I have noted, Kohlberg and co. had become 
dissatisfied with their scoring methods for reasons of their own. They began 
moving toward a more interpretive stance in evaluating interviews as early as 
1975. Kohlberg's reading of Habermas in the 1980's confirmed and gave 
philosophic grounding to this shift. 
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theory. In moving from the "identify thesis" to the "complementarity 
thesis," Kohlberg gave up the heart of his "Is to Ought" claim. He no 
longer thought that the success of a psychological theory which 
explained how one stage emerged from its predecessor could serve 
as evidence for its complementary normative ethical theory. 
However, if a theory in psychology failed to account for the evidence, 
that failure would count against the theory's philosophical 
counterpart. So, in a way reminiscent of Popperian philosophy of 
science, psychology might falsify a philosophical theory, but it could 
not support it. (Kohlberg 318) 
4. In Kohlberg's original theory, stage 6 represented the 
endpoint of moral development, that of thinking and living in 
Kantian autonomy. As I noted above, Kohlberg later abandoned any 
claim to have found stage 6 in his research. Stage 5 was also re-
envisioned as a completely adult development. 
Along with these changes, Kohlberg showed increasing interest 
in possible adult stages of morality. (Kohlberg 249-250) He was 
convinced that adult development did not fit Piaget's criteria for 
hard structural stages (e.g. invariant sequence), but that important 
changes--"soft" stages--did occur in adulthood. Postconventional 
justice reasoning could tell a person what to do in a dilemma, but 
Kohlberg found older subjects still asking Why be moral? and What 
is the purpose of life? Kohlberg thought older people often continued 
a search for ethical and religious perspective on life, a search which 
led to an integrative sense of morality fitting into a cosmic order. 
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5. Though he had given up stage 6 as an empirically 
supportable endpoint to moral development, Kohlberg continued to 
hold that some endpoint was theoretically necessary. A rational 
reconstruction of the ontogenesis of justice reasoning could be 
proposed only from the standpoint of a goal. If the sequence of 
stages is a rational one, to what do they lead? 
In a major change, Kohlberg allowed that one could state a 
stage 6 principle otherwise than in terms of a principle of justice, for 
example, in terms of care or agape. (Kohlberg 273) A researcher like 
Gilligan need not accept the rather Kantian ethical theory which 
undergirded his stage theory in order to study moral development 
with it. She could give a rational reconstruction of the sequence of 
stages from the perspective of a principle of care. But Kohlberg 
rejected the idea that a care orientation was opposed to or 
independent of a justice orientation. In a passage of special interest 
to this study, he turned to the Bible for an example of the tie 
between justice and care: 
In the New Testament there are two alternative statements of 
the Golden Rule. The first can be seen in the fairness 
orientation as 'Do unto others as you would . have them do unto 
you.' The second version is phrased in terms of the orientation 
of care as 'Love they neighber as thyself.' Like other 
statements of postconventional morality, the teachings of the 
New Testament often integrate considerations of care and 
justice presenting, as modern moral philosophy does, a view of 
justice which is beyond either strict contract, strict retribution, 
or strict obedience to rule. Rather, it is a view of justice which 
focuses on ideal role-taking, a principle which can be called, 
alternatively, respect for persons (i.e., justice) or caring for 
persons as ideal ends in themselves (i.e., the ethic of care). 
(Kohlberg 357) 
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6. His outlook broadened by Gilligan's criticisms, Kohlberg came 
to see his theory as explaining, not the whole moral domain, but a 
part of it. His was a theory of the ontogenesis of justice reasoning, 
not of morality. (Kohlberg 212) Further, he admitted that moral 
reasoning was not the whole of morality; researchers had to address 
the connection of reasoning to moral action, which necessarily would 
mean giving attention to questions of affect. Nevertheless, Kohlberg 
remained convinced that justice reasoning played a central role in 
moral development, a point made explicit in "The Current 
Formulation of the Theory." (Kohlberg 304-307) The primacy of 
justice reasoning in morality united several of Kohlberg's concerns, 
specifically that moral judgment is prescriptive, universal, cognitive 
and structural. "While the assumption of the primacy of justice has 
not been 'proved' by our research, the fact that data collected under 
this assumption meet the requirements of sequentiality, structured 
wholeness, and relationship to action indicates the empirical 
fruitfulness of the assumption." (Kohlberg 308) 
7. In later studies, Kohlberg and his associates tried to respond 
to those who objected to his dependence on hypothetical dilemmas. 
Interviews allowed test subjects to talk about their thinking about 
such issues as military service, divorce, etc. in their own lives. They 
also tested high school students with "practical dilemmas," which, 
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though still hypothetical, were set in situations in the students' own 
schools. (Higgins, Power and Kohlberg 82-83) 
8. Critics of Kohlberg's early claims persistently asked that his 
theory make better sense of the gap between moral reasoning and 
moral behavior. In response, he and his colleagues distinguished 
between deontic judgments (judgments of right) and judgments of 
responsibility (judgments of what I should do). They then measured 
judgments of responsibility by various interview techniques. 
(Kohlberg and Candee 58-60) According to these studies, judgments 
of responsibility lag behind deontic judgments (e.g., someone giving 
stage 4 reasoning about a deontic judgment might, for stage 3 
reasons, make a different responsibility judgment about the same 
issue), but they conform more and more closely to deontic judgments 
at higher stages. Thus, the cognitive-developmental school admitted 
that people's action~ often do not square with their words while still 
maintaining that change in the way people think about moral 
problems is the main factor in change in their behavior, 
Critique 
A detailed account of the criticisms of and changes in 
Kohlberg's theory has been necessary in order to say why it fails to 
help us think about moral progress. Kohlberg and company have 
been willing to hear objectors and change their theory; but the 
changes have not touched the theory's deepest roots. It remains 
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fundamentally flawed. Saying this does not mean I think Kohlberg's 
work is useless. Surely he has performed a valuable service by 
pointing out and disagreeing with the positivistic assumptions of 
much social science. One can disagree with Kohlberg without wanting 
to re-enshrine relativism as a totem of behavioral science. 
Regarding moral progress, Kohlberg's early presentations of his 
theory (roughly, through 1975) go wrong in just about every way 
they could. Four main problems: 
1. Kohlberg emphasized thinking, to the neglect of affect. Of 
course, this flowed naturally from his desire to defend the place of 
rational cognitive processes in morality, and we cannot justly expect 
a researcher to cover all aspects of morality. But Kohlberg made 
extraordinary claims about the importance of cognitive processes in 
moral development. 
The very word "development" gives away the game. Human 
beings may very well go through identifiable stages in the way they 
think--about everything, not just moral dilemmas. I am no expert, 
but as a parent I am quite willing to believe psychologists who say 
that at certain ages/stages children are ready to tackle certain 
cognitive tasks. We naturally expect them to develop in these ways, 
and would be alarmed if one of them did not. Kohlberg wanted to 
transfer the same expectation to moral development: here are the 
stages that children naturally ought to move through. 
I do not want to challenge Kohlberg on empirical grounds here. 
As noted above, many psychologists have questioned his empirical 
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findings, but I am willing to assume that the stages of justice 
reasoning are pretty much as he describes. What I am challenging is 
the move from "development of justice reasoning" to "moral 
development." ReaL moral development, if there is such a thing, must 
include affective development. 
Kohlberg's theory has little room for moral regression. This is 
predictably. The concept of development implies natural 
progression. One stage flows logically into the next. But we may 
observe that a fact of the moral life is that people can get worse as 
well as better. I can give in to the easy view of things, in which 
people are furniture in my world. I can forget to pay attention to 
others. I can fall back into the traps of narcissistic defenses in order 
to feel good. I can quit loving. Something is wrong with a theory 
which so focuses on cognitive stages that it makes no sense of moral 
regression. 
2. Kohlberg emphasized action, to the neglect of "seeing" (in the 
sense of chapter two). As I have noted, some of his critics attacked 
his theory for not accounting for moral action, since people's actions 
often differ from their reported thinking. We should not let this 
criticism obscure the basically act oriented nature of Kohlberg's 
theory. Though he probed his subjects' thinking, it was always 
thinking directed to action. 
In the Heinz story, as in all the hypothetical dilemmas in 
Kohlberg's original study, the details of the problem are given. In 
effect, the interviewer tells the subject, "These facts are all you need 
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to know. Now, should Heinz steal the drug? Why or why not?" But 
this act orientation ignores the "fat relentless ego" which, as Murdoch 
reminded us, makes it maddeningly difficult to see the facts of many 
situations. We do not live in a world in which the facts relevant to a 
moral problem are given; none of us face "Heinz" problems. Indeed, 
the first hindrance to moral progress is my inability to even see a 
problem. A research method which ignores the fundamental moral 
problem of coming to see the moral world accurately cannot tell us 
much about moral progress. 
3. Kohlberg emphasized ought rather than good, to the neglect 
of "moral vision" (in a sense to be given in chapter six). "Ought" is a 
minimalistic idea; like rationalistic moral philosophers, Kohlberg was 
interested in what could be required of anybody in a specified 
situation. In contrast, the good is a perfectionistic idea; since every 
good thing could be better, philosophers who emphasize the good 
tend to ask how someone can get better in his particular situation. If 
my goal is to do the rationally required right thing, I need properly 
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grounded rules of conduct and a high degree of conscientiousness. 
But if my goal is to get better (e.g. become a lover), I need a vision of 
something better. I need something I can admire and pursue. A 
theory of ethics which does not give me a vision of the admirable 
does not give me anything to progress toward. 
4. Kohlberg's is to ought claim rested on theory-tainted data. 
In an overarching way, this is true of his whole theory; it reflects the 
assumptions of much modern moral philosophy. In particular, 
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though, Kohlberg wanted empirical psychological data to inform 
normative ethical theory. But the data gathered were as much a 
product of his ethical beliefs as of the research which those beliefs 
shaped. 
I am not now retracting what I said earlier, that moral 
philosophers ought to be "paying attention to psychological material 
and the facts of morality that seem obvious to us." (Chapter 3, page 
100) The problem with Kohl berg's is to ought claim was that he tried 
to established facts of morality on the basis of psychological material 
which had been gathered in a search organized by those facts of 
morality. Even if, as Kohlberg believes, justice reasoning is central to 
morality, responses to the Heinz dilemmas do not show it, because 
the Heinz dilemma was constructed to focus on justice reasoning, not 
morality. 
As we have seen, Kohlberg later greatly changed the is to ought 
claim. He no longer said his data directly supported his theory, only 
that if his data had been different they would have disconfirmed his 
theory. But, should we grant that this change answers the charge of 
theory tainted data, the later presentations of Kohlberg's theory 
(after 1975) still do not correct the first three problems, though they 
modify details of the theory considerably. 
The reader will probably have noticed that the first three 
problems I identified--that Kohlberg emphasized thinking, action and 
obligation, to the neglect of feelings, seeing the facts and moral 
vision--parallel main themes of this study. In short, Kohlberg serves 
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as an example of standard modern ethical theory, only drawn from 
the ranks of psychology rather than philosophy. This matter is 
worth detailing a little. Compare the six points in common between 
Kantianism and utilitarianism (Chapter 3, pages 79-82): 
First, Kohlberg would agree with Kant and Mill that in morality, 
matters of principle come before matters of affect. Standard theories 
tell me that the first principle directs such and such an action; since 
certain dispositions (in psychological terms, certain affects) make 
such actions more probable, I ought to acquire those dispositions 
(affects). In another way of saying the same thing, Kohlberg says 
that justice reasoning is primary in defining the moral domain. 
Thus, while morally relevant emotions and sentiments are 
part of moral development, it is important to distinguish 
between the description or expression of a feeling about a 
moral situation and the making of a moral judgment about it. 
Expressions of the speaker's emotions about Heinz and the 
druggist or about the feelings of Heinz or the druggist do not 
directly constitute moral judgments. Such expressions tell us 
something about the affective and ego development of the 
subject, but they do not tell us anything directly about the 
specifically moral development of the subject. (Kohlberg 293, 
my emphasis) 
I suspect a passage like this is directed against a familiar 
target, emotivism. But one need not make the emotivist claim that 
all normative moral talk merely expresses feelings in order to insist 
that affective and ego development are part of the "specifically moral 
development" of a person. 
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Second, again like Kant and Mill, Kohlberg looks for rational 
principles to adjudicate moral disputes. And among rational 
principles, Kohl berg looks for a hierarchy, so that some supreme 
principle will umpire between the secondary ones. The alternative 
to principleness, Kohlberg believes, is relativism. (Kohlberg 296-300) 
Third, Kohlberg agrees with standard ethical theorists in 
regarding rational moral agents as interchangeable. Moral judgments 
are supposed to be applicable universally, not just to individuals 
within a culture, but to people in all cultures. 
Fourth, just as Kant does, Kohlberg's theory plays up one 
motive of moral behavior, a kind of conscientiousness driven by a 
need for cognitive equilibrium. In Kant's terms, right actions are 
performed in accordance with duty and from the motive of duty. 
Kohlberg is not quite so restrictive, in that he does not question the 
validity of other moral motives at the conventional level, but the 
only motive his theory seems to use (especially in his earlier 
presentations of it) at the postconventional level is the cognitive 
need to avoid disharmony between one's deontic judgments and 
one's responsibility judgments, expressed in actions. 
Fifth, implicitly rather than explicitly, Kohlberg uses law as the 
model for ethics. Readers can see this in the general tone of the test 
dilemmas, as well as in dilemmas which ask for responses to 
specifically legal problems.5 
5 Examples from Kohlberg's original study: in dilemma III', which follows the 
Heinz dilemma, a police officer wonders whether to report that Heinz stole the 
drug; in dilemma IV', a doctor wonders whether to report a fellow doctor who 
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Sixth, Kohlberg's belief in the primacy of justice reasoning 
suggests that he would agree with standard ethical theorists that the 
main task of ethical theory is to describe the first principle of 
morality and show how it organizes the field. 
In response to Gilligan and other critics, Kohlberg allowed that 
his theory covered only a part of the "moral domain." 
We admit, however, that this emphasis on the virtue of justice 
in my work does not fully reflect all that is recognized as being 
part of the moral domain. We may note that, in addition to 
justice, the moral domain also includes reference to a virtue 
emphasized by Christian ethical teachings. This virtue, agape 
in the Greek, is the virtue we call charity, love, caring, 
brotherhood, or community. In modem American research this 
virtue has been called prosocial behavior (see, for example, 
Rushton [1982] and Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg [1977] or an 
'ethic of care and responsibility' Gilligan (1982]). (Kohlberg 
227) 
In spite of thus making room for love, and admitting that 
justice reasoning was a part of morality, Kohlberg clearly believed 
that justice was the central concept of morals. Against this, I suggest 
that we ought not to look for a most important rule. It is not just 
justice vs. love, though those are the terms Gilligan has pressed on 
Kohlberg. A voice from the religious tradition of our culture suggests 
other important concepts of morals, also neglected by standard 
ethical theories: "He has showed you, 0 man, what is good. And what 
does the LORD require of you? To act justly and to love mercy and to 
mercy-killed a cancer patient; also in dilemma IV', a jury has to consider 
whether to convict the doctor who killed his patient. 
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walk humbly with your God." (Micah 6:8 New International Version) 
While this study is devoted to questions about love, similar labor 
could be given to mercy and humility. 
As an example of standard ethical theory, Kohlberg does not 
see how limited a place his theory of justice reasoning has in 
morality. It neglects moral feelings, the need to see the world and its 
people accurately, and the need for something to admire and pursue. 
Since it is in our interest to limit the conflict which arises in societies 
from conflicts of values, theories of justice have a place in morals. 
But worrying about such theories should not be the first task of 
moral philosophy. As Murdoch suggested, moral philosophers ought 
first to recognize the nature of the ego which prevents us from loving 
and try to find ways to defeat it. 
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CHAPTER VI 
A VISION OF TIIE GOOD 
Begin with stories of lovers. 
Jean Donovan 
Jean Donovan was a Catholic lay volunteer who worked with an 
Ursuline sister named Dorothy Kazel in El Salvador. l They traveled 
the countryside in the midst of civil war in a white Toyota van. They 
moved supplies, gave rides to refugees, and helped villagers who 
could not afford vehicular travel search for family members when 
they "disappeared." Jean was especially concerned to help children, 
the orphans of war or other disasters. 
Jean enjoyed a reputation among Maryknoll missionaries as "St. 
Jean the Playful." She had a guitar and a motorcycle; with one she 
played Irish folk ballads, with the other she gave rides to children. 
Every week Jean baked chocolate chip cookies for Archbishop 
Romero--until his death in March, 1980. As a lay volunteer, Jean 
struggled to decide her future; should she marry or continue her 
ministry as a missionary? 
l Information about Jean Donovan has been taken from four anicles in the 
December, 1990 (Vol. 19 No. 10) issue of Sojourners. See works cited. 
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In late November, 1980, Jean and her friends hosted the U.S. 
Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White, whom they had met at a 
Thanksgiving service, at their base in La Libertad. The ambassador 
and his wife invited the sisters to visit in his official residence when 
they next came to San Salvador. On December 1, 1980, Jean and 
Dorothy, with Father Paul Schindler, took up the Whites on their 
invitation. They talked far into the evening and--since night travel 
was dangerous--stayed the night. 
On December 2, Jean and Dorothy did some shopping before 
going to the airport to pick up some missionary friends. Two of the 
friends, Maura Clarke and Ita Ford, had been unable to get tickets for 
the flight, so Jean and Dorothy returned to the airport to pick them 
up at 6 p.m. The four did not make it to La Libertad for a party 
which had been planned for that evening. Their friends, concerned 
for their safety, discovered the van the next day: abandoned, 
stripped, burned. On December 4, Ambassador White witnessed the 
removal of the bodies of the four women from a shallow grave; they 
had been first identified by their sandals, an item few Salvadoran 
peasants could afford. Jean's face had been crushed by a bullet. At 
least two of the women had been raped. 
Unfortunately, it must be said that respectable people soon 
hinted that the churchwomen died because they were somehow tied 
to one side in the civil war. Ronald Reagan had just been elected 
President of the United States. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, designated by 
Reagan to be Ambassador to the United Nations, said that the nuns 
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were political activists on the side of the guerillas. On March 18, 
1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig suggested that the women's 
van had tried to run a roadblock and " ... there may have been an 
exchange of gunfire." 
It must also be said that Ambassador White, who was familiar 
with U.S. efforts to investigate the killings until he was removed by 
the Reagan administration, insists that there was no evidence 
whatever for Haig's statement. 
Why was Jean Donovan in El Salvador? Her own words may 
help explain. In a letter to a friend, 
Several times I have decided to leave El Salvador. I almost 
could except for the children, the poor, bruised victims of this 
insanity. Who would care for them? Whose heart could be so 
staunch as to favor the reasonable thing in a sea of their tears 
and helplessness? Not mine, dear friend, not mine. 
In the question she asked the Whites on December l, the night 
before her death, 
What do you do when even to help the poor, to take care of 
the orphans, is considered an act of subversion by the 
\ government? 
Jean Donovan died, I think, because she wanted to love 
children in a place and time where there was little room for it. 
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Andre Trocme 
Andre Trocme pastored a protestant church in the French 
village of Le Chambon in the 1930's and 1940's. When he and his 
wife, Magda, and their four children moved to Le Chambon in 1934, 
the village seemed to them to be dying. Located on a high volcanic 
plateau in Southern France, the village alternated between long, cold, 
windy winters and a busy three-month tourist season in which the 
villagers tried to fleece every coin they could from visitors. Trocme 
thought it was as if he had been called to help this inhospitable 
village die. (Hallie 78) To inject new life into the community, Trocme 
fostered the opening of a school, a year-round enterprise which 
would bolster the local economy. But the Cevenol School was to be 
more than that. Independent of the state school system, it would 
show forth a spirit of peace, internationalism and nonviolence, causes 
important to Trocme. Trocme induced a conscientious objector friend 
from university days, Eduard Theis, to come to Le Chambon as 
assistant pastor and schoolmaster. 
A largely protestant village in Catholic France, Le Chambon 
housed long memories of persecution of Huguenot forebears. 
Trocme's energetic ministry soon tapped into the Chambonnais' sense 
of community. They became intensely loyal to him. As Hitler's 
Germany rearmed and French patriotism revived in response to it, 
many people criticized the nonviolent ideals of the Cevenol school. 
But protestant churches in France, since they are outside the 
dominant Catholic church, have their own political structure in which 
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local presbyteries make most decisions without consulting regional or 
national leaders. In spite of criticism, the presbyterial council of Le 
Chambon decided to stand by their pastor, even if he was listed as a 
conscientious objector, an illegal status. (Hallie 84) 
In the "temple" (a name of derision given to Huguenot churches 
in France by persecutors in earlier centuries) of Le Chambon, Trocme 
and Theis preached a message of active nonviolent resistance to evil. 
Trocme scorned any connection between pacifism and passivity in 
the face of evil. Accordingly, he and Theis denounced the racism, 
brutality and hatred of Nazi doctrine and urged the Chambonnais to 
overcome evil with love. They had no specific plan. A follower of 
Christ must simply be ready and look for creative ways to love when 
the time came. (Hallie 85) 
With German occupation of France, the time came. At first, 
resistance to the Vichy government in Le Chambon was largely 
symbolic; villagers refused to salute the flag or ring church bells 
when commanded to do so. But these symbolic actions were 
significant in their timing. Imagine the situation for a Frenchman in 
1940. We have lost the war, yet we have a French government; the 
leader is Marshal Petain, our great hero; French police enforce the 
laws; and Germany seems certain to defeat its last foe, England. 
Why, in this situation, should anyone make trouble by resisting? It 
would be pointless and hopeless. The Chambonnais' quiet refusal to 
salute and rings bells cut through this moral fog; they recognized and 
were determined to resist evil. (Hallie 86-92) 
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Soon Le Chambon found more concrete ways of love. Refugees 
began turning up at the Trocmes' door and were taken in. A simple 
phrase--"and were taken in"--but a phrase of illegal love. For 
refugees to be helped, they had to be hidden. False identity and 
ration cards had to be made. Some of the refugees had to be led 
secretly to the Swiss border, others hidden until the end of the 
occupation. All this the nonviolent resisters of Le Chambon did. As 
time passed, they began to "specialize." Le Chambon became a place 
of refuge for children. 
Resistance in Le Chambon was not that of a tightly controlled 
organization. Unlike the Cimade, an underground network created 
and led by Madeleine Barot and other women for the one purpose of 
helping refugees escape France, Le Chambon was simply, first and 
always, a village. Few of the villagers knew whether or how many 
Jews were hiding in their neighbors' houses. But from the winter of 
1940-41, when Magda Trocme heard the knock of the first refugee 
and immediately admitted a German Jewish woman, until the end of 
the occupation in 1944, no Chambonnais ever refused to give shelter 
to a refugee and no Chambonnais ever betrayed a refugee. (Hallie 
196) 
There were, of course, others who resisted the Germans. 
Especially as the war went on and Germany suffered defeats, people 
joined various groups of the Maquis or De Gaulle's Secret Army. 
Undoubtedly, such armed resistance required courage. It is not the 
Chambonnais' courage that marks them as different. Rather, their 
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love, an intensely practical readiness to do the good thing that lies at 
hand, a love which included the persecutor as well as the persecuted, 
draws our attention to Le Chambon. 
Andre Trocme was not a gentle person. "Magda Trocme once 
called her husband a turbulent stream, thrusting its way with great 
speed and force through and around obstacles, changing always as it 
struck and flowed." (Hallie 47) In contrast to the steady and self-
effacing Eduard Theis, Trocme could explode in great anger. Trocme 
described himself as un violent vaincu par Dieu, "a violent man 
conquered by God." (Hallie 265) Briefly, in the late 1930's, Trocme 
toyed with a plan to use his German fluency to get close to Hitler and 
assassinate him. But he wrote that he feared "seperating himself 
from Jesus who rejected armed violence to counteract the crime 
being prepared against him." (Trocme 5) Trocme believed that Jesus' 
example of love was one of immediate help to the concrete individual 
combined with a deliberate rejection of two things: violence 
committed in the name of massed individuals and "abstention," the 
route taken by those who withdraw from conflict with evil. (Trocme 
142-148) 
Andre Trocme's passionate, active, inventive love led 
eventually to his recognition as one of the "just ones" by Israel. In 
1972, after his death, Magda planted his tree at Yad Vashem, the 
memorial of the holocaust victims, along the path of the just ones. 
192 
John Woolman 
Born in 1720 in New Jersey, John Woolman died in York, 
England, in 1772. He worked at times as an orchardist, dry goods 
shopkeeper, schoolteacher and surveyor, though he found his lifelong 
trade as a tailor could meet his financial needs. Far more important 
than any of these occupations, to his mind, would have been his role 
as a Quaker minister. As such, Woolman traveled often, by foot and 
horse, through several of the English colonies in North America. 
While working as a young man for a retailer, Woolman was 
asked to write out a bill of sale for a slave. "The thing was sudden; 
and though I felt uneasy at the thoughts of writing an instrument of 
slavery for one of my fellow-creatures, yet I remembered that I was 
hired by the year, that it was my master who directed me to do it, 
and that it was an elderly man, a member of our Society, who bought 
her; so through weakness I gave way, and wrote it; ... " (Woolman, 
Journal 14-15) The sensitivity which made him see this as a moral 
failure, a co-operation with evil, drove Woolman into a remarkable 
ministry of love. 
Since George Fox, who said that he "lived in the virtue of that 
life and power that took away the occasion of all wars," Quakers have 
held a testimony against war. In the early eighteenth century, 
though, they had no such testimony against slavery; in fact, in 
America, Quaker prosperity enabled many to own slaves themselves. 
But Woolman saw that the getting and keeping of wealth is surely 
one of the greatest occasions of war. (Woolman, Journal 162-163) 
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How could he, a Christian called to love his neighbor, participate in a 
system in which the labor of prisoners captured in African wars was 
used to bring wealth to white men? Surely this injustice could only 
lead to hatred and violence. To be obedient to truth, Woolman felt 
he must refuse to ever again cooperate with slavery. 
Besides writing letters and pamphlets against slavery, 
Woolman visited slave holding Quakers. During these visits he spoke 
against slavery and, since he was often hosted in slaveowners' 
homes, paid for such hospitality--urging the masters to give the 
money to their slaves, or else giving it to them directly--rather than 
benefit from forced labor. Further reflections on slavery led him to 
abandon the use of sugar and clothing dyes, since both products were 
heavily dependent on slave labor. One could imagine that such direct 
confrontation of slave owners would produce angry contention, if not 
violence. But Woolman's concern, in opposing slavery, was for the 
evil effects of the system on the master as well as on the slave. His 
gentleness, compassion and integrity won him a hearing even in the 
homes of Quaker slaveholders. As a result of the ministry (agitation 
would be the wrong word) of Woolman and other Friends concerned 
about slavery, American Yearly Meetings officially disapproved of 
slaveholding before Woolman's death. 
Readers should not imagine that Woolman's ministry was 
limited to opposing slavery. He wrote and spoke about the 
connections between wealth and luxury on one hand and social 
divisions and war on the other. In 1763, while the passions of the 
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French and Indian war were still high, he visited Indians in 
wilderness country, an experience which led him to protest the sale 
of alcohol to Indians. (Woolman, Journal 134-139) In the last year 
of his life he traveled to England to engage in ministry there. 
One could analyze Woolman's motivations in many ways, but 
the deepest source of his ministry was love. His thoughts about his 
desire to visit the Indians (while confined all day to a tent in the 
wilderness) probably apply to all his work. 
Twelfth of sixth month being the first of the week and a rainy 
day, we continued in our tent, and I was led to think on the 
nature of the exercise which hath attended me. Love was the 
first motion, and thence a concern arose to spend some time 
with the Indians, that I might feel and understand their life 
and the spirit they live in, if haply I might receive some 
instruction from them, or they might be in any degree helped 
forward by me following the leading of truth among them; and 
as it pleased the Lord to make way for my going at a time 
when the troubles of war were increasing, and when, by reason 
of much wet weather, travelling was more difficult than usual 
at that season, I looked upon it as a more favorable 
opportunity to season my mind, and to bring me into a nearer 
sympathy with them. As mine eye was to great Father of 
Mercies, humbly desiring to learn his will concerning me, I was 
made quiet and content. (Woolman, Journal 142, emphasis 
added) 
When one reads William Lloyd Garrison or other abolitionists of 
the nineteenth century, the sense of conflict, of a great social 
struggle, cannot be avoided. In Woolman, the struggle is quiet, 
inward. He did not measure his ministry by success, though he 
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cheerfully noted episodes in which slave owners granted freedom to 
slaves after conversations with them and recorded decisions by 
monthly, quarterly, and yearly meetings against slavery. For 
Woolman, the quiet rest of an obedient and loving soul was the 
important thing. 
Herbert Nicholson 
I wish that I could remember exactly when and where I first 
met Herbert Nicholson. It seems I have known him all my life. 
But I know it was sometime during the chaotic and turbulent 
years of World War II. The memory is clearest about what he 
did at Manzanar War Relocation Center. There I saw him bring 
joy where there was sadness, hope where there was despair, 
and love where there was hate. He brought these gifts to us as 
we struggled for dignity behind barbed wire and watchtower. -
-Togo Tanaka (Nicholson and Wilke vii) 
Born in 1892, Herbert Nicholson went to Japan as a Quaker 
missionary in 1915. While there, he met and married Madeline 
Waterhouse, a Congregationalist from California. The Nicholsons 
continued in Japan, with occasional visits to the U.S., until 1939, 
when the growing threat of war settled them in Southern California, 
where they ministered in the West Los Angeles Japanese Methodist 
Church. Though a lifelong Quaker, Nicholson cared little for 
denominational labels; he worked with anyone in whom he sensed 
the motions of divine love. 
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On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt issued Executive 
Order 9066, permitting the removal and concentration of Japanese 
Americans in the Pacific States and parts of Arizona. In the rushed 
evacuation that followed, many families sustained great losses in 
selling their belongings while others hastily stored their goods in 
warehouses or churches. By August, 1942, over 110,000 people had 
been interned without charge or trial. 
Receiving permission to visit the camps in July, Nicholson 
loaded a rented truck with pianos, hymn books, discarded library 
books, and many other requested items and drove it to Manzanar, 
the relocation camp ,closest to Los Angeles. In the next two years he 
made numerous trips to the Poston and Gila camps in Arizona as well 
as to Manzanar. Nicholson also drove to Topaz in Utah, Minidoka in 
Idaho, Heart Mountain in Wyoming, and Amachi in Colorado. 
(Nicholson and Wilke 80, 86, 98) On most of these visits he drove a 
truck belonging to Tom Yamamoto, an internee, ferrying all sorts of 
personal belongings to the prisoners. 
In January, 1944, the United States began drafting Japanese 
Americans into the Army. (The famous 442nd, a special combat unit 
made up of Nisei volunteers, had been authorized in January, 1943.) 
This additional injustice--drafting young men from among people 
detained without trial, to serve in the military of the country which 
considered them dangerous aliens--caused anger and bitterness in 
the camps. Herbert Nicholson decided to go to Washington, D.C. to 
express his feelings to John McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War. 
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Along the way he revisited some of the relocation camps, urging the 
young men not to make their situation worse by rioting. In 
Washington, military officials agreed with Nicholson that Japanese 
soldiers had proven their loyalty, that drafting people from the 
camps was unjust, and that the camps should be emptied. But they 
claimed public opinion demanded that the Japanese not be released. 
If Nicholson could demonstrate a public desire for the camps to open, 
he was told they could be opened immediately. So Nicholson 
organized a letter writing campaign, using contacts he had made all 
over the western United States. Within four months, 150,000 letters 
came to Washington, requesting the internees' release. Nevertheless, 
the release was not announced until December, after the 1944 
election. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Mitsue Endo case, 
which said that Japanese citizens could not continue to be held, was 
subsequent to these political decisions. (Nicholson and Wilke 111-
122) 
After the war, Nicholson raised funds for agricultural relief 
efforts in Okinawa and Japan. With the help of other volunteers, he 
transported hundreds of goats, useful for their milk production, on 
old liberty ships. Then he and Madeline resettled in Japan, where 
they ministered in hospitals, prisons and leprosaria regularly. In 
1961, they retired to the United States. 
In 1977, the 89 year old Madeline slipped into an unconscious 
vegetative state. I knew Herbert in those years, the late 70's and 
early 80's, when, helped by his daughter Virginia, he cared daily for 
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his comatose wife with patience and evident love. In his nineties, he 
still visited Quaker meetings and other churches, speaking with 
humor and deep concern, urging people to trust God and grow in 
love. 
A.K. Smith 
My father grew up in rural poverty in the Arkansas River 
valley of southeastern Colorado. As a young man, he followed an 
older brother to Washington State, where he worked in fruit 
orchards, forests and factories of one sort or another. Unlike Jean 
Donovan, Andre Trocme, John Woolman and Herbert Nicholson, my 
father's drama as a lover did not take place against the backdrop of 
war or massive oppression. A story slow to unfold, it occupied the 
days, months and years of ordinary family life. 
Things started slowly, without being sought. My father and 
mother married in 1948, in the heart of the baby boom. By 1951, 
when they had not yet had a child (and worried that they might not), 
they adopted an infant boy born to a young woman in the hospital 
where my mother worked as a nurse. When I was born in 1954, 
followed by my younger sister in 1956, they felt they were only one 
child short of the family size they wanted. (Remember that large 
families were common in those years.) Then Andrew Smith was 
born in 1958--and died the next day. After three ceasarian 
deliveries, doctors forbade any more pregnancies for my mother. My 
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parents felt as if Andrew's death had left a permanent hole in their 
lives. 
A few years later, an opportunity came to fill the hole. My 
older sister, a teenaged "juvenile delinquent" in the terminology of 
the day, was placed as a foster child with our family. Her behavior 
had already disrupted more than one foster placement. Apparently 
she saw something special in this home; a year later she asked Dad 
and Mom to adopt her. 
State Foster Agency caseworkers recognized a good thing when 
they saw it. If these people could help a difficult teen, why not 
persuade them to open their home to other hard to place children? 
And so, through the sixties and early seventies, a procession of foster 
children came to share our home. Some lived with us only a few 
months, some a few years. . Two of my brothers, though never 
offically adopted, stayed through high school graduation; my parents 
are still "Dad and Mom" to them. Later, after my older adopted 
brother's death, my parents took in Steve's daughter and legally 
adopted her. Once again Dad is shepherding a child toward healthy 
adulthood. 
Stories and Vision 
I want to say two things in this section: 1) to grow morally, we 
need a vision of the good (to grow as lovers we need a vision of love), 
and 2) visions are given through stories. 
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I should try to say what I mean by "vision." Though 
importantly related to the topic of chapter two, what is meant here 
by a vision of the good is not the same as the moral seeing of that 
chapter. Moral vision (chapter two sense) is the ability to pay 
attention to the reality of other things and people, to see them as 
subjects in their own right and have compassion for them. A moral 
vision (present sense)--of the good, or of love--is a global 
understanding, involving rational thought, emotions, and imagination, 
of something toward which a life can be directed. A moral vision 
seizes on some thing or person and makes that thing or person an 
object of admiration and pursuit. 
Note that as defined, many things can be the object of moral 
vision. I think, in fact, that people have different moral visions, 
directed to different objects; that these objects of admiration and 
pursuit are as various as success, greatness (military, artistic or 
moral), racial purity, happiness, a theological or philosophical creed, 
nationalism, integrity, renunciation, love, and many other things; and 
that much of human goodness and evil results from the pursuit of 
the objects of our moral visions. 
The claim being advanced here is this. To grow morally, we 
need a vision of the good; more specifically, to grow as lovers we 
need a vision of love. We need to understand what love is in a way 
that involves our emotions and imagination as well as our rational 
thought. The moral life is characterized by growth, motion, travel 
(not, of course, in the behaviorist sense of public actions); we are all 
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pilgrims of one sort or another. If as pilgrims we want to reach or 
avoid some destination rather than another, or even make progress 
toward or away from some destination, we need to have a vision of 
what we are pursuing or avoiding.2 Without such an understanding, 
we may well waste our lives traveling in circles. That we need a 
vision is, I think, obviously true; I will make no more positive 
argument for it. In the next section ("Vision and the Good"), however, 
I will try to defend this assertion--that we need a vision of love to 
grow as lovers--against an objection to it. 
Modem moral philosophers do not write much about moral 
vision. But if, as Iris MurdocJ1 suggests, moral philosophers ought to 
'. 
ask how we can make ourselves morally better (Murdoch 52), they 
need to think about the goals toward or away from which people 
travel in the moral life. Given the assumptions and questions which 
frame most discussion in ethical theory, assumptions and questions 
generated by the myth of autonomous reason, we should not be 
surprised that ethical theorists have largely ignored moral visions. 
2Readers might wonder at my awkward insertion of the idea of avoiding a 
moral destination. An example might help. Hermann Graebe was a German 
engineer working for the Todt organization in Poland and the Ukraine in 
World War II. He did not want to believe reports that the Einsatzgruppen were 
killing Jews. But then he witnessed an "action" in Dubno. Later, he said, "One 
of the most terrible things I remember seeing--and that I have reported 
before--was a father, perhaps in his fifties, with his boy, about as old as my 
son, Friedel, was at that time--maybe ten years old--beside him. They were 
naked, completely naked, waiting for their tum to go into the pit. The boy was 
crying, and the father was stroking his head. The older man pointed to the sky 
and talked quietly to the young boy. They went on speaking like that for a 
while--! could not hear what they said because they were too far away from 
me--and then it was their tum." (Rittner and Myers 40-41) Repelled by the 
vision of evil this experience gave him, Graebe helped save over three 
hundred Jews in Eastern Europe. 
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Ethical theory generally is not interested in moral pilgrimage, but in 
principles and decision procedures. Even the accepted forms of 
philosophical conversation--lectures, treatises, etc.--work against us. 
As I have claimed in chapters three and four, standard ethical 
theorists labor under the myth of autonomous reason. As 
philosophers they are supposed to appeal to reason; the truth, moral 
truth included, is supposed to be open to any rational mind that 
cares to think. Hence, we have the philosophical lecture, which aims 
to be precise, coherent, and well-grounded.3 But human rationality 
is never autonomous rationality. Since human beings feel and 
dream, moral truth (to say nothing of other truths) demands more 
than rational apprehension. Moral philosophy needs to make a place 
for stories. 
Stories provide the stuff of visions .because they touch our 
emotions and imaginations as well as our rationality. By helping us 
to a more global understanding of the thing we pursue, stories give 
us a goal. 
a. Stories obviously engage the rational mind. Consider 
theology, which can be characterized as attempts to systematize the 
truth of stories. Like philosophy, theology has in it opposing 
movements of thought. One theologian or school of theology builds 
up a position, much like the impulse in philosophy to construct a 
metaphysical or epistemological system. Then critics tear the system 
3 My remarks should not, of course, be construed as lack of appreciation for 
precision. coherency, or well-groundedness. Would that my own writing had 
these virtues. 
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apart. Where philosophical critics often accuse the system of 
incoherency or ignoring some plain fact, the theological critic often 
accuses the system of ignoring an important facet of traditional 
stories. 
Stories have a staying power greater than theologies. 
Theologies can go stale and lose their ability to hold people's 
attention. When this happens, impassioned reformers sometimes 
step forward to shake the religious community and reshape the 
theology. Whence the reformers' passion? Usually, they have heard 
the stories with a fresh ear, as if for the first time. Engaged by the 
story, tlrey try again to understand it, thus producing new theology. 
Stories have a greater fecundity than theologies because they 
are less precise. Often reformers find them applicable to a new 
generation's issues while the old theologies seem tied to tired 
questions. After centuries of repetition, having been used in 
different ways by different theological systems, a story may 
generate new questions (or old, forgotten questions) for theologians 
to ponder. 
Obviously, I have special interest in some theological stories, 
Biblical ones. But what is true of Biblical stories is also true of moral 
stories in general. Stories can engage the intellect. Perhaps even for 
those purposes of rational discussion, for which moral philosophers 
have adopted discursive lectures, they should consider telling stories. 
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b. Stories engage the emotions. Consider, for example, Philip 
Hallie's account of his first encounter with Le Chambon and Andre 
Trocme. 
There was once an art cnuc, I have been told, who had a sure 
way of identifying ancient Maltese art objects: he found himself 
crying before them. . . 
Of course these are symptoms of an awareness of excellence. . 
. .any doctor will tell you that symptoms are important, and 
just as pain can be a symptom of disease, painful joy can be a 
reliable reaction to excellence. 
One afternoon I was reading some documents relating to 
Adolf Hitler's twelve-year empire. . . . 
Across all these studies, the pattern of the strong crushing the 
weak kept repeating itself and repeating itself, so that when I 
was not bitterly angry, I was bored at the repetition. . . . 
On this particular day, I was reading in an anthology of 
documents from the Holocaust, and I came across a short article 
about a little village in the mountains of southern France. . . . 
About halfway down the third page of the account of this 
village, I was annoyed by a strange sensation on my cheeks. 
The story was so simple and so factual that I had found it easy 
to concentrate upon it, not upon my own feelings. And so, still 
following the story, and thinking about how neatly some of it 
fit into the old patterns of persecution, I reached up to my 
cheek to wipe away a bit of dust, and I felt tears upon my 
fingertips. Not one or two drops; my whole cheek was wet .. 
And so I closed the book and left my college office. . . .But that 
night when I lay on my back in bed with my eyes closed, I saw 
more clearly than ever the images that had made me weep. I 
saw the two clumsy khaki-colored buses of the Vichy French 
police. . .I saw the police captain facing the pastor. . . 
Then I saw the only Jew the police could find, sitting in an 
otherwise empty bus. I saw a thirteen-year-old boy, the son of 
the pastor, pass a piece of his precious chocolate through the 
window to the prisoner. . .I saw the villagers passing their gifts 
through the window until there were gifts all around him. . . 
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Lying there in bed, I began to weep again. I thought, Why 
run away from what is excellent simply because it goes 
through you like a spear? (Hallie 1-3) 
Hallie admits that an emotional reaction is not an infallible rule 
by which to separate excellent things from dross. But no theoretical 
account of nonviolent loving rei:istance to evil, e.g. one of Andre 
Trocme's more abstract sermons in the period before the war, can 
cause wonder and admiration in us as can the story of the empty 
buses. We rejoice to hear such stories. We wish we could be like 
that. Desiring to become like what we admire, sometimes we do (to 
varying degrees). 
c. Stories engage and feed the imagination. One could readily 
admit that stories touch our emotions and intellect and fail to see 
how important their affect is on our imagination. I count 
imagination--one function of which is to let me see the world from 
someone else's point of view, even though I am not that person--as 
crucial to character. (Cf. Chapter 2, p. 61) 
I can imagine a world, and my own self, different from the way 
they are now. But this is possible only if my imagination is rich 
enough. An impoverished imagination, which cannot see the world 
or the self other than they are, often lies behind the passive 
indifference to evil which makes it possible. Few alcoholic co-
dependents are aware that their "helping" and "patience" only enable 
the alcoholic in their lives to destroy himself. 
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Lack of moral imagination can cause evil. I suspect that few 
people who beat children think to themselves that they are doing 
wrong. They probably do not think much about it at all; this is just 
the way children are treated in their world. Child beaters do not 
need to be told what they are doing is wrong so much as they need 
to be able to imagine themselves living in a world where children are 
treated differently. 
The stories that feed a person's imagination probably indicate 
that person's character more accurately than any doctrine of morals 
she espouses. What does she admire? What does she pursue? Of 
course, the stories we profess to admire (such as the catalog with 
which I began this chapter) are not the only ones which shape our 
imaginations. Stories of horrible, ugly and evil things often fascinate 
us and help create our moral vision. We hope that stories of evil will 
always repel us, but sometimes we must admit that they attract us. 
In this regard, as in the matter of coming to see people accurately, a 
person can do something to aid her own progress. even if it is a 
difficult and only partially effective thing. We can--to some degree--
choose which stories will feed our imaginations. 
I have given a sampling of the stories which are important to 
me. These stories are rooted in Christian non-violent ethics, the 
agape commands, which in turn are rooted in the story of Jesus. 
They share other similarities. Woolman, Nicholson and Trocme were 
avowed pacifists; Jean Donovan, Trocme and my father were 
especially involved with children; Nicholson, Trocme, and Donovan 
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faced their greatest tests in time of war; Woolman and Nicholson 
were Quaker ministers; and all but Trocme were Americans--and 
even Trocme attended seminary in New York, where he met Magda. 
These people are also different in various ways--their educations, 
social backgrounds, etc. I think, though, that such similarities and 
differences are superficial; the main thing is their common moral 
vision. 
Any moral theology based on the story of Jesus must make 
sense of his saying that the commandments to love God and neighbor 
surpass all other religious duties. So Christian theologians and moral 
philosophers have tried to communicate the primacy of love. The 
story sets the bounds and provides the raw material for the 
theological task. Most often, in the process of making a coherent 
system out of the story material, the theologians and philosophers 
reduce things to ordered and connected propositions, such as, "the 
commandments to love God and neighbor surpass all other religious 
duties." 
(So I include myself with the philosophers and theologians. 
There is nothing wrong with trying to make sense of religious stories, 
even producing an ordered propositional system or. a creed. The 
problems come when we think the system we have made of the 
stories can replace the stories.) 
Many people have noted the inability of such propositional 
systems to help moral pilgrims. However true a theology is (by 
definition, no theology is perfectly true; God is not captured in 
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doctrine), it remains only an intellectual system, with limited grip on 
our emotions or imaginations. Stories, on the other hand, can give 
people on the way -\risions which fire their passion and enlarge their 
imagination. 
So if I believe, for instance, that Jesus' command that his 
followers love their enemies means that modern Christians ought to 
be pacifists, how should I explain this to someone else? I can 
certainly arrange sentences in a logical "argument" that proves my 
abstract proposition. Would this persuade a Christian who takes a 
just war position? Almost surely not. Disagreement goes on and on 
between people who give good rational arguments for mutually 
exclusive conclusions. Just war theologians know the arguments for 
pacifism and pacifists are regularly confronted with the arguments 
for just wars. I suggest the arguments do not persuade because the 
disputants have differing moral imaginations; they see different 
possibilities and give different accounts of events in the world. So 
how can I speak for Christian pacifism to a friend? Perhaps if I tell a 
story he will by it gain a moral vision in which pacifism makes sense. 
Jesus' story is foremost for Christians, of course. But Biblical 
stories have been told so often and so overlaid with interpretation 
that they sometimes, leave us cold. Latter day stories capture the 
imagination and make the theology based on Jesus' story come to life. 
Clearly, moral excellence does not depend on believing 
Christian theology, but it does need an imagination shaped by a 
vision of the good. I suspect that any vision of the moral goal will be 
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better communicated by stories than by the propositions of a ethical 
system.4 
Vision and the Good 
I have repeatedly used the phrases, "a vision of the good" or "a 
vision of love" in this chapter. Some philosophers would object that 
such talk reveals my naivete. After all, what is "the good"? 
Bernard Williams writes approvingly of Isaiah Berlin, who 
"always insisted that there is a plurality of values which can conflict 
with one another, and which are not reducible to one another; 
consequently, that we cannot conceive of a situation in which it was 
true both that all value-conflict had been eliminated, and that there 
had been no loss of value on the way." (Williams 71) Williams 
disbelieves in any Utopian future in which value conflicts have been 
eliminated; this could only be accomplished by the loss of some 
things which have been counted as virtues by people at different 
places and times. 
Utopians might object that such purported virtues represent 
false consciousness. A pacifist Christian might claim that when the 
Kingdom comes, ferocity, sometimes prized in martial societies, will 
be revealed as a false value. A Marxist might claim that when 
4Cf. Kant's opm1on of moral examples (Groundwork 25-34), which is almost 
diametrically opposed to mine. He claims that universal rational laws cannot 
be based on stories; therefore, they are useless for pure practical philosophy. 
But that is just the wrong use of stories. 
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communism is achieyed, many bourgeois false values will fall by the 
way. Williams shares Berlin's scepticisms about such claims: "As in a 
given choice at a given time one value has to be set against another, 
so also there is loss of genuine human value over time." (Williams 
76) 
Williams does not think the existence of such persistent 
conflicts of value is a bad thing. He claims, for instance, that 
aesthetic values sometimes come into conflict with moral claims and 
that "while we are sometimes guided by the notion that it would be 
the best of worlds in which morality were universally respected and 
all men were of a disposition to affirm it, we have in fact deep and 
persistent reasons to be grateful that that is not the world we have." 
(Williams 23) Williams illustrates his point by suggesting that it 
would be a duller world if Gauguin, for conventional moral reasons, 
had not gone to the South Seas. A similar example: by many 
accounts, Wagner was a scoundrel, a dishonest freeloader who 
thought the world not only owed him a living but its constant 
undivided attention. Yet we are grateful that he lived and that 
people allowed him to abuse them, for this enabled him to write 
music. Not all values we treasure are moral values. 
Of course, conflict of values must be managed and, in some 
circumstances, reduced. But Williams denies that we have a rational 
need to reduce conflict of values; rather, as I noted in chapter three, 
social living gives us practical reasons to keep conflicts under control. 
(Williams 81-82) 
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Iris Murdoch, on the other hand, thinks that good is unitary, 
though she recognizes that such a belief is a consoling idea: "The 
notion that 'it all somehow must make sense,' or 'there is a best 
decision here,' preserves from despair ... " (Murdoch 56-57) She is 
wary of consolation, since it tempts us to believe all sorts of fantasies 
and keeps us from seeing the real world. Nevertheless, she draws 
attention to the virtues. How, for example, do we distinguish 
between true courage and rashness, ferocity, self-assertion and so 
on? By reference to other virtues: the best courage is also steadfast, 
calm, temperate, intelligent, loving, etc.5 Her suggestion is that the 
virtues are connected, and that increasing moral sophistication 
reveals increasing unity. 
Now it might be supposed that my contentions in this chapter, 
in particular my contention that to grow morally we need a vision of 
the good, depend on this debate being decided in favor of Murdoch 
and against Williams. If there is not "the good," but only many 
incommensurate goods, how can it make sense to speak of "a vision 
of the good"? 
This supposition is wrong for two reasons. First, if Murdoch is 
right and the good is unitary, its unity is on a ratified level, as she 
5This suggests a possibly better way of putting the contrast between the 
Chambonnais and the Maquis. I said before that they were both couraaeous 
and that it was . the Chambonnai_s' love ':"hich drew our attention. Perh:ps we 
shouI? say that 1t was the supenor quality of the Chambonnais' courage, in 
that 1t was m~rked by love rather than hatred, which makes us admire them. 
Someone convinced of the unity of good might even suggest that the Maquis 
exhibited ferocity rather than true courage. Someone who thinks like 
Williams, that goods are not unitary, would prefer the first way of putting the 
matter. 
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recognizes. "It might be said that 'all is one' is a dangerous falsehood 
at any level except the highest; and can that be discerned at all?" 
(Murdoch 56) Believers in a single good might think (like the 
utopians Williams disagrees with) that some of what appear to be 
goods really are not. But they would also have to agree that the 
ultimate good might well appear as diverse goods in a penultimate 
world. Finite creatures can only collect or pursue a finite number of 
goods. If the number of penultimate goods is large (as believers in 
the unity of good would probably admit). finite creatures can only 
pursue some of them. So even if there is (in an ultimate sense) only 
a (single. true) vision of the good, finite creatures will necessarily 
pursue (limited and probably diverse) visions of the good. 
Secondly. if Williams is right and there exist many 
incommensurable goods. this fact in no way diminishes the role of a 
vision of (some) good in human development, whether that 
development is moral progress (or regress) or something else. So 
long as one admits that character develops, that human beings are 
always on the way, one must admit the importance of the goals 
toward which or away from which people move. Believers in the 
incommensurability of goods could question whether moral progress 
is worth much attention or effort. Williams notes that scepticism 
about certain features of the concept of morality, such as its being 
independent of luck and its being grounded in a moral order, may 
lead to scepticism about the importance of morality. (Williams 39) 
Perhaps egoistic values or aesthetic values would seem (to some 
people at least) worth greater attention, in which case we should 
speak of the need for an egoistic vision or a vision of beauty. 
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As readers could guess, I am more inclined to agree with 
Murdoch than Williams. One reason lies just here. Williams says 
that if morality becomes less important to us we will still have a 
concept of morality, only a different one. But he does not say how 
far to go on this line. Suppose I like playing electronic games on my 
computer; achieving high scores is a good. But achieving high scores 
on computer games requires time, a precious commodity for a finite 
creature. If goods are incommensurable, it may not make sense to 
ask how the good of achieving high game scores measures against the 
good of spending time with my sons (or writing philosophy). Yet it 
seems I can measure these goods against each other. How far can 
our concept of morality be modified by admitting the idea that goods 
are many and unique before it becomes unrecognizable as morality? 
But all this is beside the main point. Even if goods are many and 
unique, we need a vision of a good to pursue it. 
So, whether good is unitary or not, people on . the way need a 
vision of something admirable to pursue. But not just anything will 
make a suitable object of admiration. The admired good must be rich 
enough to support global understanding; it must engage reason, 
emotions and especially imagination. I cannot yet have a vision of 
the good of achieving high computer game scores. I cannot enter into 
it; there is not enough there. It would be hard to imagine a story 
which presented achieving computer games scores as admirable, 
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though I suppose some master storyteller could do it. In contrast, 
the stories of lovers with which I began, even in the truncated forms 
in which I presented them, appeal to our emotions, challenge our 
understanding and enliven our imagination. I suspect that stories of 
lovers will always be richer than stories of computer game high 
scorers. Murdoch would agree and would have no trouble explaining 
why, for love is much more closely related to good than computer 
game success is. 
The Good and the Journey 
Pierre Sauvage was born in Le Chambon in 1944. Later, he 
became fascinated with the story of the village that sheltered his 
parents, making his very existence possible. His film about the 
Chambonnais' resistance during the war, "Weapons of the Spirit," 
makes important connections between a vision of the good and 
healthy self esteem. The Chambonnais identified themselves as 
Christians; their vision of love was shaped by Andre Trocme's and 
Eduard Theis's presentation of the New Testament story. But 
Sauvage also points out that they had a solid sense of who they were, 
as individuals and as a people. He asks a question. 
If, indeed, it is true that the people of Le Chambon and 
elsewhere had a very secure, very anchored sense of self, a 
spontaneous access to the core of their being, that resulted in a 
natural and irresistable proclivity to see the truth and act upon 
it, and if it is indeed true that many or all the Righteous 
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Gentiles of the Holocaust displayed the characteristic of 
psychological solidity, then a question arises that my wife and 
face all the time as we raise our young son: How does one 
nurture that powerful and benevolent sense of self-esteem? 
(Rittner and Myers 138) 
This returns us ·to the questions of chapter one: how can I 
overcome my need not to know? How can I help my children to 
know that they are worthy citizens of the world just as they are, 
without meeting impossible standards of beauty, success, or moral 
perfection? 
Sauvage also raises a question about stories and the language 
we use to tell them. 
The people of Le Chambon, through their individual and 
collective actions, endangered the lives of each and every one 
of them. Yet, there, too, the risks are acknowledged but not 
considered to have been a critical part of the decision-making 
process. We tend to interpret this, and indeed dismiss it, as 
modesty. But could it be that everybody, except the 
courageous themselves, attaches more importance to courage 
than is warranted? Could it be that whenever we 
overemphasize the courage of the righteous, we do not 
communicate anything about its nature or help to encourage its 
emergence? 
A glib reference to the courageous, selfless people of Le 
Chambon may thus have a hollow ring to our ears and generate 
no real responsiveness in these people, because such words 
correspond to an empty concept. Perhaps the subconscious 
intent of such vocabulary is in fact to make such people seem 
essentially different from you and me, and thus not really, not 
challengingly, relevant to our daily lives. 
How do we learn to view the people of Le Chambon, and 
others like them, as people with a solid, productive grasp on 
life, and not as incarnations of fairy-tale virtues which we can 
then preach about and/or ignore? (Rittner and Myers 139-140) 
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The good that we admire in a story must also be a good we can 
pursue. I suggest that we ought to multiply our stories. Just as the 
story of Jesus can seem helplessly distant from us, encrusted as it is 
with theology and debate, any story of a lover can seem high and 
unreachable. But stories of latter day lovers can give us access to the 
story of Jesus, and multiple stories can give us access to the story of 
a Magda Trocme or an Eduard Theis. 
As Sauvage implies, we need to remind ourselves that these 
lovers were ordinary people like us. Perhaps they were 
psychologically healthy, but no more healthy than we can be. 
As I have noted (Chapter 2, p. 49), Iris Murdoch thinks there is 
something right about the Christian idea of grace, though she does 
not believe in God. Feeble attempts to see the world accurately, she 
says--in art, nature or people--are rewarded by an increased, 
unlooked-for ability to see. She does not argue for the existence of 
grace; she invites her readers to check their own experience. 
(Murdoch seems not to have noticed, or else she has ignored, the 
consolatory power of this idea.) If she is right, or if some religious 
doctrine of grace is true, then moral pilgrims can expect wonderful 
surprises. Selfishness is almost impossible to escape, and a vision of 
the good may seem almost impossibly high; but if we pursue the 
vision, real moral progress can occur. We can get better. 
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CHAPTER VII 
ON ORDERING LOVES 
Readers of chapter six, "A Vision of the Good," may have been 
unsatisfied with the cursory attention given there to the problem of 
incommensurable goods. It described how Iris Murdoch and Bernard 
Williams can be taken as representatives of two sides, one which 
affirms the ultimate unity of goods and one which denies any such 
unity. The aim, of course, was simply to defend the importance of 
moral visions and the stories which give them, whichever side was 
right. One need not take Murdoch's side to see that a moral vision 
can help the moral pilgrim. But if goods are incommensurable, the 
fact that they are must condition the way we think about many 
issues in moral philosophy, hence the reader's unsatisfaction with the 
discussion in chapter five. 
Clearly, not all the ramifications of the alleged 
incommensurability of goods can be discussed in a short space, so 
this chapter will focus on just one problem connected with it, which 
may be called the problem of ordering loves. We will find that this 
problem is a central one, consideration of which will reveal 
something right and something wrong in the ways the 
incommensurability of goods has been expressed by philosophers. 
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The problem of ordering loves arises if someone loves more 
than one person or thing and if those loves can conflict with each 
other. I will take it for granted that lovers do love more than one 
person or thing and they often find these loves in at least prima facie 
conflict. Whether loves remain in conflict after all things have been 
considered is part of the problem; philosophers who assert the 
incommensurability of goods will say yes, while philosophers who 
believe in the unity of good affirm that ultimately all right loves will 
harmonize. 
Discussion of this problem could begin at a number of places. I 
will start with Susan Wolfs article, "Moral Saints," which raises in a 
distinctive way the plurality of goods people pursue. Consideration 
of Robert Adams' response to Wolf will define more clearly the issues 
involved. Since moral relativism is never far from the discussion of 
the incommensurability of goods, I will explore what Bernard 
Williams and John Kekes have to say about relativism and how Kekes 
distinguishes between a pluralism of goods and relativism, defending 
the former against the latter. Only after considerable exposition, 
then, will I try to say something constructive about ordering loves. 
How Good Should I Be? 
In "Moral Saints," Susan Wolf writes with some awareness of 
the importance of moral visions, though she write of "ideals" rather 
than visions. If we strive to be as good as possible--as that ideal is 
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given in utilitarian or Kantian ethical theory--Wolf claims we will 
find a contradiction between that ideal and other ideals we hold, 
even though, she says, "it is generally assumed that one ought to be 
as morally good as possible." (Wolf 419) If we are not as morally 
good as we could be, she says, the generally accepted view marks 
this down as a failure, attributable to imperfections in our nature. 
But the ideal of moral goodness, of either main variety, may conflict 
with other ideals we have of a good life, that is, the sort of life it 
would be good to live. 
Wolf points to several non-moral excellences which good lives 
may display, such as haute cuisine, athletic prowess, artistic skill, 
biting humor, skill in interior design, etc. Her criticism of moral 
sainthood begins (1) by accepting these non-moral ideals of the good 
life as things we ought to admire. "In general, the admiration of and 
striving toward achieving any of a great variety of forms of personal 
excellence are character traits it is valuable and desirable for people 
to have." (Wolf 426) Then she notes (2) the empirical fact that our 
world has practically unlimited opportunities for doing moral good 
(alleviating hunger, homelessness, illiteracy, etc.). So, if we ought to 
do as many morally excellent things as possible, there will be no time 
or energy for non-moral excellences. Since for Wolf both (1) and (2) 
are true, she says w,e have to change in one of two ways; either we 
should improve our theories of ethics so they produce an ideal for 
which we can strive without excluding non-moral ideals, or we 
should realize that it is not generally true that we should be as 
morally good (as expressed in a theoretical ideal) as possible. 
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Wolf describes two general pictures of moral saints. The 
Loving Saint genuinely finds her happiness in the happiness of 
others; her desires are unlike most people's. The Rational Saint has 
ordinary human desires, but for duty's sake always acts in the 
interests of others. Both lives are other directed: "dominated by a 
commitment to improving the welfare of others or of society as a 
whole." (Wolf 420) Neither gives a place to the pursuit of non-moral 
excellences, since "if the moral saint is devoting all his time fo 
feeding the hungry or healing the sick or raising money for Oxfam, 
then necessarily he is not reading Victorian novels, playing the oboe, 
or improving his backhand." (Wolf 421) Utilitarian theory will 
generally approve of the Loving Saint, and Kantians will like the 
Rational Saint. (Wolf 427) 
A utilitarian, Wolf admits, need not preach moral sainthood for 
everyone. Utilitarians recognize the great variety of interests, 
talents, and pleasures which people admire. If very many people 
devoted themselves to the interests of other people or society as a 
whole, then necessarily some of these good making things would be 
neglected and the general happiness would suffer. So the utilitarian 
would approve of most people pursuing personal values. But what 
about the utilitarian himself? Wolf says he would have to devote 
himself to moral sainthood; no improvement in the general happiness 
which he could achieve by pursuing personal values (through 
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cooking, art, or whatever) could be preferred reasonably over what 
he could achieve by giving himself to feeding the starving or housing 
the homeless. (428) Further, even if the utilitarian did increase 
general happiness through some excellence (say, playing a really 
beautiful game of chess), he would value the excellence because it 
produced general happiness. But this is backwards, says Wolf, "it is 
not because they produce happiness that these activities are 
valuable; it is because these activities are valuable in more direct 
and specific ways that they produce happiness." (429) Utilitarianism, 
it seems, cannot escape Wolfs criticism of moral sainthood. 
Wolf considers two versions of Kantianism. The first, which 
takes cognizance of Kant's belief that we have a duty of benevolence, 
falls victim to a criticism similar to that leveled against 
utilitarianism. A duty of benevolence in a world full of unmet basic 
needs such as the world we have would leave little room for 
intellectual or artistic excellence. And, to the degree that the Kantian 
did develop non-moral excellences, it would be out of respect for the 
"dignity that members of our species have as a result of being 
endowed with pure practical reason .... But [that] is hardly what one 
expects to be dominantly behind a person's aspirations to dance as 
well as Fred Astaire, to paint as well as Picasso, or to solve some 
outstanding problem in abstract algebra, and it is hardly what one 
hopes to find lying dominantly behind a father's action on behalf of 
his son or a lover's on behalf of her beloved." (Wolf 431) 
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The second version of Kantianism, Wolf says, sees in the 
requirement to universalize maxims a limit to moral saintliness. We 
could not desire that everyone's every action be an act of 
benevolence, and we can treat others as ends without promoting 
their interests at every moment. In this version of Kantianism, we 
fulfill our moral duty by observing a list of specific duties. Beyond 
these minimum requirements, morality has nothing to say, so this 
interpretation of Kant will not yield an ideal of a moral saint. 
Interestingly, Wolf criticizes this second Kantianism for just 
that feature of it that avoids the problem of moral sainthood. 
For to put such a limit on one's capacity to be moral is 
effectively to deny, not just the moral necessity, but the moral 
goodness of a devotion to benevolence and the maintenance of 
justice that passes beyond a certain required point. It is to 
deny the possibility of going morally above and beyond the call 
of a restricted set of duties. Despite my claim that all-
consuming moral saintliness is not a particularly healthy and 
desirable ideal, it seems perverse to insist that, were moral 
saints to exist, they would not, in their way, be remarkably 
noble and admirable figures. ( 432) 
I think that Wolf rightly has put her finger on something 
important here, which I have tried to express in terms of admiration 
and pursuit of a vision. Morality consists not only in keeping certain 
minimal requirements, but also in pursuing something excellent. As 
Wolf says, "A moral theory that does not contain the seeds of an all-
consuming ideal of moral sainthood thus seems to place false and 
unnatural limits on our opportunity to do moral good and our 
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potential to deserve moral praise." (433) In sum, the minimalistic 
version of Kantianism unnaturally limits the scope of morality, while 
the perfectionistic version falls prey to Wolfs criticism of moral 
sainthood. 
Wolf concludes that utilitarianism and Kantianism cannot avoid 
projecting an ideal of moral sainthood. In general, she doubts that 
any theory of morals could be constructed which would not come 
into conflict with our beliefs that certain non-moral excellences ought 
to be pursued in preference to purely moral interests. (434) We are 
driven to the only remaining alternative, i.e., we should change our 
attitude toward moral theories. If some ethical theory leads to an 
untenable ideal, as both utilitarianism and Kantianism do, we should 
not count that against the theory. Rather, we should recognize that if 
we want to live "perfectly wonderful" lives, we may well not live 
"perfectly moral" lives. (436) It is not true, according to Wolf, that 
we should be as morally good as possible. 
Wolfs argument moves between two foci, moral goods and 
non-moral goods, while my interest in this study has been love. 
While "good" and "love" name significantly different concepts, whose 
relationship is complex, they are enough alike for Wolfs conclusions 
to bear on the problem of ordering loves. 
Think of an executive in a famine relief agency. Her fund 
raising and project planning literally save lives, but she feels as 
though the time her work takes is stolen from her husband and 
children. We can describe this as a conflict of two goods, but it is just 
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as appropriate to describe it, as the woman might, as a conflict of two 
loves. How can she answer the legitimate calls of two loves? This 
dilemma is familiar to nurses, teachers, ministers, and many others. 
We can imagine a second example, in accord with Wolfs 
emphasis on non-moral goods, in which a love for one's family 
conflicts with a love for intellectual excellence.I A philosopher, to 
take an obvious example, might describe the conflicting demands 
made by thinking and writing on one hand and children on the other 
as a conflict of two loves. He will want to order them properly, not 
so that he can devote himself entirely to whichever is more 
important, but so that he can give to each love the attention and 
energy it merits at that time in the context of his life as a whole. 
I think this desire to rightly order one's loves is a common, 
though perhaps not often recognized, feature of serious attempts to 
live good lives. It stems from a fundamental desire that a life--
including its emotional side--make sense, that it not be basically 
arbitrary, rigid or chaotic. Standard ethical theories can be read not 
only as prescriptions of the right thing to do, but as ways to 
1 I will ignore, in this discussion, the objection that "love" is wrongly used in 
relation to things. It is, for example, hard to reconcile a "love" for a well-
played sonata or even for the playing of the sonata oneself with the notion I 
approved in chapter two, that agape (defined as accurate vision and 
compassion, Murdoch's "just and loving gaze") is an indispensable ingredient 
in all loves. How does one have fellow-feeling for a thing? 
We could be fastidious, using "like" for our feelings for things and reserving 
"love" for sentient beings. But this would get us nowhere. After all, we do say 
we love sonatas. beautiful paintings, and all the non-moral goods which 
interest Wolf. And, whether we say like or love, we still admire and pursue 
these things; we still have the problem of ordering our loves. How much of my 
limited time and energy should I give to the many varied things I admire? 
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discipline our emotional attachments, to order our loves. The 
utilitarian's highest attachment is to the general welfare, while the 
Kantian's is to rational duty. The good person subordinates all other 
loves to the supreme love. 
Wolfs criticism of moral sainthood serves to criticize utilitarian 
and Kantian theories as ways of ordering loves. The complete victory 
of moral goods over non-moral goods does not seem to lead to what 
we want in a good life. At an even more fundamental level, there is 
something strange in speaking of love for the general welfare or 
rational duty. 
Moreover, there is something odd about the idea of morality 
itself, or moral goodness, serving as the object of a dominant 
passion in the way that a more concrete and specific vision of a 
goal (even a concrete moral goal) might be imagined to serve. 
Morality itself does not seem to be a suitable object of passion. 
Thus, when one reflects, for example, on the Loving Saint easily 
and gladly giving up his fishing trip or his stereo or his hot 
fudge sundae at the drop of the moral hat. one is apt to wonder 
not at how much he loves morality, but at how little he loves 
these other things .... The Rational Saint, on the other hand, 
might retain strong nonmoral and concrete desires--he simply 
denies himself the opportunity to act on them. But this is no 
less troubling. . . .[One suspects the Rational Saint of having] a 
pathological fear of damnation, perhaps, or an extreme form of 
self-hatred that interferes with his ability to enjoy the 
enjoyable in life. (Wolf 424) 
That standard ethical theories can be read as prescriptions for 
ordering loves does not mean they should be read that way. Since 
the main theories of ethics are directed to the non-specific rational 
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being, they necessarily treat emotions as secondary to actions 
(usually understanding them as dispositions to action), because 
emotions are specific and personal while actions are conceived as 
independent of particular agents. For such a theory, rightly ordering 
loves is only important as it increases the odds that right actions will 
be performed. The moral agent would do better to improve his 
ability to calculate utility or recognize duty (and--in both cases--
become more conscientious) than to order his loves. 
If the desire to order loves is as important as its common 
occurence would suggest, we must look elsewhere for clues to how to 
do it. Wolf does not offer any explicit suggestions in this regard, 
since her project was a critical one and focused on goods rather than 
loves. At most, she can be read as suggesting that loves for moral 
goods need not always outrank loves for non-moral goods. We need 
to tum elsewhere to further sharpen the question. 
Maximal Devotion 
Robert Adams, in his response to Wolf entitled "Saints," agrees 
with much that she says. She is right to reject the ideal of a life 
devoted only to moral goodness and to insist on the place of non-
moral goods in a good life. Also, she is right to think that a moral 
theory ought to ". . .contain the seeds of an all-consuming ideal of 
moral sainthood"; that is, we ought to be able to be devoted to 
something. (Adams 401) 
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Adams' criticism of Wolf centers on her definitions of moral 
sainthood. She says, at different points, that a moral saint is 
(1) " .a person whose every action is as morally good as possible" 
(2) " .a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be" and (3) 
"[a person] dominated by a commitment to improving the welfare of 
others or of society as a whole." (Wolf 419, 420) Wolf treats these 
definitions as equivalent, Adams implies, though they are quite 
different. ("Saints" 394) Noting, but not discussing, Wolfs 
controversial limitation of morality to the welfare of others in the 
third definition, Adams concentrates on the confusion between the 
first two definitions. The second, he says, " ... probably comes closest 
to expressing an intuitive idea of moral sainthood in its most general 
form." ("Saints" 396) But Wolf seems to think that to be as morally 
good a person as possible one's every action must be as morally good 
as possible. Against this, Adams says, "The idea that only a morally 
imperfect person would spend half an hour doing something morally 
indifferent, like taking a nap, when she could have done something 
morally praiseworthy instead, like spending the time in moral self-
examination, is at odds with our usual judgments and ought not to be 
assumed at the outset." ("Saints" 394) 
In "Saints," Adams writes to defend the desirability of 
sainthood against Wolfs attack. By confusing her first two 
definitions she has made her argument's premises irrelevant to her 
conclusion. Adams agrees that a life whose every action was as 
morally good as possible (conceived in the narrow sense of 
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promoting the interests/rights of others and not the self) might not 
be a good life. But, since a person whose every action is as morally 
good as possible is not equivalent to a person who is as morally 
worthy as can be, Adams thinks that Wolfs argument does not show 
that sainthood is undesirable. 
Since Wolf goes awry, in Adams' view, through confused 
definitions of saints, he offers his own: "Saints are people in whom 
the holy or divine can be seen." ("Saints" 399) Wolf rejects saints, he 
thinks, because she conceives of moral saints, people devoted to 
morality, whereas real saints are people devoted to divine reality. 
"What interests a saint may have will then depend on what interests 
God has, for sainthood is a participation in God's interests. And God 
. . . is not so limited that His moral concerns could leave Him without 
time or attention or energy for other interests." ("Saints" 399) 
A saint, e.g. Albert Schweitzer, can recognize that humanitarian 
commitments have a higher claim on his life than treasured artistic 
and intellectual pursuits and still find time to play piano while 
serving in a medical mission in Africa. "Very likely that time could 
have been employed in actions that would have been morally 
worthier, but that fact by itself surely has no tendency to disqualify 
Schweitzer from sainthood, in the sense in which people are actually 
counted as saints." ("Saints" 397) 
In Religion and the Foundations of Ethics, Adams notes that 
underlying Wolfs attack on moral sainthood is an acceptance of what 
Thomas Nagel has called "the fragmentation of value." ("Devotion" 1-
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2) She is unable to see how any theory could give a viewpoint from 
which moral and non-moral values could be ordered, so "at some 
point, both in our philosophizing and in our lives, we must be willing 
to raise normative questions from a perspective that is unattached to 
any particular well-ordered system of values." (Wolf 439) Adams 
readily accepts that "we may be faced with hard and painful choices 
about which we are bound to have conflicting feelings." ("Devotion" 
4) But he finds the idea that we may just have to accept fragmented 
values "deeply disturbing." 
Where I have written about ordering loves, Adams speaks of 
integrating a person's motives. If values are fragmented, motives 
will be chaotic rather than integrated. 
To have inner conflicts is not necessarily to be at war with 
oneself; the difference is important, but not easy to explain. 
If I am at war with myself, I will sometimes have no better 
explanation for a decision than to say, 'There was a fight in me, 
and this side won.' The two sides in me will look at each other 
with unsympathetic hostility, and perhaps with a sort of 
incomprehension. For from the perspective of the motives that 
favor one side in the conflict, no value can be seen on the other 
side. · 
If I am at peace with myself, I may still have conflicting 
motives, but they will be related in such a way that each, so to 
speak, can acknowledge the others as good and as belonging to 
the same family .... Few if any of us, I imagine, have fully 
attained such inner harmony, but it seems a desirable part of a 
motivational ideal. 
.. .I need an inclusive perspective; ideally, none of my 
motives would need to be simply suppressed. And if I am not 
to be just a battle-ground on which now one side wins and now 
another, I need a basis for saying what is most important to 
me. . . . There certainly need not be any algorithm or set of 
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rules that would predict my preferences and decisions. But my 
values must form a system at least in the sense that my 
motives have enough kinship among themselves for me to be 
at peace with myself in the way I have indicated. . . . And I 
must be attached enough to the system to have a reasonable 
constancy over time in the pattern of what I care about, and 
how much; otherwise I become again a fluctuating 
battleground, and it will be hard to speak of character or 
integrity in my case. ("Devotion" 5-6) 
We may note here that the "ideal" of which Adams writes 
consists in a harmony, or order, among a person's motives. Such 
harmony would not remove inner conflict in the sense of "hard and 
painful choices," since conflict may arise from sources other than 
disordered motives, e.g. from finitude. 
The heart of this passage is Adam's use of "need" and "must": "I 
need an inclusive perspective. . . I need a basis for saying. . my 
values must form a system. . . I must be attached enough to the 
system." What kind of necessity is proposed here? A practical one: 
"otherwise I become a fluctuating battleground." The persuasiveness 
of Adams' argument rests on his readers feeling a similar practical 
need. Adams assumes that "character" and "integrity" name qualities 
that readers will recognize as part of good lives. He does not give, 
then, a logical refutation of Wolfs position. The "fragmentation of 
values" disturbs Adams because it conflicts with his idea of a good 
life, which includes. stable character and integrity of person. The 
philosopher who disbelieves in any unity of goods, who finds goods 
incommensurable, could avoid the power of Adams' "need/must" by 
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denying that character and integrity figure in good lives in the way 
Adams thinks. In the language of this chapter, Adams sees a 
practical need to order loves to avoid inner chaos and arbitrariness; 
an opponent may, however, see no need to order loves because she 
may not see inner chaos or arbitrariness as inimical to a good life. 
Adams finds his "inclusive perspective" in a sort of religious 
platonism in which "a love for art, an aspiration to intellectual 
honesty, a regard for the welfare of one's neighbor, and all other 
good motives [are] forms of love for God." ("Devotion" 11-12) He 
suggests that loves for these things are loves for God in three ways. 
First, loved things may resemble God. ". . . a pattern of caring about 
goodness makes one a person who cares about what is in fact a sort 
of resemblance to God, whether one knows it or not. God is the focus, 
identified or unidentified, around which such a pattern of motivation 
is organized. This is obviously not an explicit love that involves a 
thought or state of mind that has God as its intentional object." (15) 
Second, we may enjoy God in enjoying something else. As we enjoy 
other people in our experience of their personal characteristics--their 
voices, their touch, their feelings and ideas--so we may enjoy God in 
creation or in our enjoyment of fellow creatures. ( 16-18) Third, we 
may share God's love for something else, e.g. a fellow creature. "The 
most obvious point here is that love for God can be manifested in 
wanting to share God's love for what is good in the creation." {20) 
We should note again, that in offering this "inclusive 
perspective," Adams does not offer a decision procedure for deciding 
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between moral and non-moral loves. Someone who loves both the 
cello and her children may face recurring difficult choices between 
practicing her instrument and being with her children, even if she 
sees both as gifts from God. Nor does Adams think that everyone 
should order loves alike; different people have different vocations. 
Only ultimately do all true loves harmonize; in a penultimate world 
lovers may feel unresolved conflict between the calls of various 
loves. But by seeing all loves for goods as forms of love for God, 
Adams thinks he avoids a fragmentation of values in which the 
competing "sides" of a person stare at each other with 
incomprehension. 
Adams' reader might wonder just what he has gained by an 
ideal of devotion which gives so little aid to agents trying to decide 
between moral and non-moral goods. I think Adams' best response 
would be that he gains just that, an ideal of devotion. If Adams is 
right, it is at least possible to order rightly my loves, even if it is like 
an artistic accomplishment rather than a correct application of a 
decision procedure. 
Wolf, having dethroned moral sainthood as anything to which 
we ought to give maximal devotion, seems willing to have nothing 
take its place. If Wolf is right, it will never be possible to order my 
loves rightly ; any such ordering must necessarily be arbitrary. 
While she insists that "the ideal of moral sainthood should not be 
held as a standard against which any other ideal must be judged or 
justified," she does not condemn the person who aspires to be a 
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moral saint. (Wolf 435-436) "A person may be perfectly wonderful 
without being perfectly moral," Wolf says, but wonderfulness is not 
thereby enthroned as a standard by which morality could be judged. 
Sometimes normative questions should not be answered by 
reference to any ordered system of values, but by "intuition." (Wolf 
439) 
The disagreements between Adams and Wolf suggest two 
questions. First, is Adams' theistic version of an "inclusive 
perspective" the only way to order loves or integrate motives? 
Under the influence of platonism, Christian theology has traditionally 
identified the good with God, though in the process non-moral goods 
have often received little approbation. Adams wants to maintain the 
identification of the good with God, but to recognize and explicate the 
place of non-moral goods in the good which God is. If, like Adams, 
someone wants to avoid an internal battle between mutually 
incomprehesible "sides," need he be, as Adams is, a monotheist? I 
will briefly discuss this first question, but only after considering the 
second. 
Second, is it possible to believe in the incommensurability of 
goods without slipping into moral relativism, and if so, how? Wolf 
says, "Moral sainthood should not be held as a standard against 
which any other ideal must be judged or justified." Suppose again, 
as in chapter six, I were to devote myself to achieving high computer 
game scores. Can trivial items of life become ideals? If so, should 
not such ideals be judged against moral standards? Perhaps by 
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emphasizing "any" I distort Wolfs intent, but philosophers who have 
defended the incommensurability of goods have taken pains to 
defend the idea against such charges of relativism. We will turn to 
two of these next. 
How Pluralism Does Not Imply Relativism 
The contagion of a philosophical idea can spread rapidly and 
broadly in a culture. One might speculate that this indicates 
something deeply human about philosophizing, a notion flattering to 
philosophers. I doubt, however, as I have noted in other 
connections2, that philosophers' ideas infect by virtue of their logical 
power or rightheadedness (as philosophers would like to believe), 
but because they answer a feeling or desire already present in a 
culture. Someone whose anthropological theory emphasized 
communal notions rather than individuality might go so far as so say 
that a culture calls forth certain philosophical ideas, rather than a 
philosopher's ideas changing a society. 
Susan Wolfs attack on moral sainthood, the fragmentation of 
values, the incommensurability of goods, and the plurality of values 
are familiar themes in recent writings on ethical theory. These 
terms, though not synonymous, constitute a cluster of ideas (I shall 
call them the "pluralist cluster") which have received a ready 
acceptance in certain parts of our society. • What Wolf wrote about 
2 Cf. Chapter 1, p 29. 
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the claims she made in "Moral Saints" applies to all of them: "they 
call into question the assumption that it is always better to be 
morally better." (Wolf 438) 
Now, if 1) it is at least sometimes better to do and/or be less 
than the morally better, and 2) there is no ordered system that can 
tell us whether this time is one of those times, but instead we rely on 
intuition, then it seems that 3) no claim of the form, "this is a time 
when it is better not to do/be the morally better thing," can be 
rejected, except as it conflicts with intuition. Since people's moral 
intuitions vary, (3) is a version of moral relativism. I suggest that 
part of the ready acceptance of the pluralist cluster is due to the way 
it can so easily be made to imply moral relativism. 
Several philosophers who advocate one or more elements of 
the pluralist cluster have written to distinguish its claims from 
relativism.3 Bernard Williams, for example, lists four denials which 
the claim that values are incommensurable can be thought to 
involve: 
1. There is no one currency in terms of which each conflict of 
values can be resolved. 
2. It is not true that for each conflict of values, there is some 
value, independent of any of the conflicting values, which can 
be appealed to in order to resolve that conflict. 
3. It is not true that for each conflict of values, there is some 
value which can be appealed to (independent or not) in order 
rationally to resolve that conflict. 
3 While this section focuses on Bernard Williams and John Kekes, cf. also 
Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, pp. 200-203. Nagel thinks that the 
"fragmentation of values," (his own phrase) can be overcome from within a 
moral point of view. 
4. No conflict of values can ever rationally be resolved. 
(Williams 77) 
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Williams thinks that the believer in incommensurability (such 
as himself) will support (1), (2), and (3), but need not accept (4). 
(Williams 77, 80) The obvious quality which differentiates denial (4) 
from the first three characterizes most defenses of the pluralist 
cluster against moral relativism. The first three denials simply mean 
that some conflicts of values are not rationally resolvable, while the 
fourth says that all conflicts of values are conflicts which are not 
rationally resolvable. 
In a later essay in Moral Luck, Williams makes a similar point 
when he tries to say what is "the truth in relativism." He introduces 
a mental machinery which he claims can be applied to all sorts of 
relativism. (Willaims 132) The problems of relativism can only arise, 
he says, if there are two or more "systems of belief" which are in 
some specifiable way "exclusive of one another." (Williams 132-134) 
Williams deals with a number of worries in defining these terms, 
worries which I will pass over, since the basic ideas are clear enough. 
The problems of relativism concern communication and issues of 
preference between conflicting systems of belief. Williams admits 
that a conflict between systems of belief may be hard to define, since 
some systems of belief are so different that they cannot be compared 
at all. (Think of the contrast of the cosmological beliefs of a primitive 
villager with those of a university astronomer.) All that is required, 
Williams says, for systems of belief to be exclusive of each other, is 
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that it be impossible to "live within" both systems of belief, a phrase 
Williams admits to be vague. 
To further set up the problems of relativism, there needs to be 
a "locus" of the exclusivity between the systems of belief. There has 
to be at least one description of some belief or action which the two 
systems will agree is an adequate description of that belief or action, 
but in regard to which the two systems give differing answers. 
(Williams 136) In ethics, for example, two systems of belief might 
agree on the description of an action and disagree whether it is 
morally correct to perform the action. 
With this machinery in place, Williams introduces two 
contrasting concepts: "real confrontations" and "notional 
confrontations." (Williams 138) A real confrontation between two 
systems of belief occurs when some group of people which holds one 
of the belief systems could "go over" to the other, provided that 1) 
they could remain sane, and 2) they could acknowledge the 
transition in the light of a rational comparison of the two systems of 
belief. (Williams 139) Notional confrontations are like real 
confrontations in that some holders of at least one of two systems of 
belief are aware that the systems exclude one another. But in a 
notional confrontation there is no "real option" of going over to the 
other system of belief. An astrophysicist cannot go over to the 
cosmological beliefs of a primitive villager because the transition 
could not be acknowledged as rational; a psychiatrist cannot go over 
to the delusional beliefs of her schizophrenic patient without losing 
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her sanity; and a German businessman cannot go over to the beliefs 
of a medieval Samurai, because there is no way of living the life that 
accompanied them (perhaps he too would be considered insane). Of 
course, confrontations between some systems of belief are notional 
confrontations for some people and real confrontations for others. A 
real confrontathm may become a notional confrontation for the same 
person at a different time, and vice versa. No sharp line divides real 
and notional confrontations; it is a matter of degree. (Williams 139) 
In real confrontations, Williams says, we use a "vocabulary of 
appraisal," i.e., true vs. false, right vs. wrong, acceptable vs. 
unacceptable, etc. (Williams 141) We must use some vocabulary of 
appraisal in real confrontations, because real confrontations present 
us with live choices and we need to be able to think and express our 
feelings about those choices. We can use the vocabulary of appraisal 
in notional confrontations, and, since confrontations form a 
continuum from purely notional ones to purely real ones, we will 
often use a vocabulary of appraisal for confrontations which lie 
somewhere in the middle. But for at least some distantly notional 
confrontations of systems of belief, the language of appraisal is 
inappropriate. Williams writes, "While the vocabulary can no doubt 
be applied without linguistic impropriety, there is so little to this use, 
so little of what gives content to the appraisals in the context of real 
confrontation, that we can say that for a reflective person the 
question of appraisal does not genuinely arise for such a type of 
[system of belief] when it is standing in purely notional 
confrontation." (Williams 141) 
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With all this background, Williams is finally prepared to say 
what the truth of relativism in ethics is, and is not. 
Relativism, with regard to a given type of [system of belief], is 
the view that for one whose [system of belief} stands in purely 
notional confrontation with such [a system of belief], questions 
of appraisal of it do not genuinely arise. This form of 
relativism, unlike most others, is coherent. The truth in 
relativism--which I shall state, not argue for--is that for some 
ethical outlooks at least this standpoint is correct. (Williams 
142) 
Williams claims this formulation of relativism protects two 
truths. First, sometimes, i.e. in a real confrontation, we need to have 
a way to characterize and evaluate a system of belief not our own; 
second, sometimes, i.e. in a notional confrontation, a system of belief 
is so foreign to us that it is inappropriate to apply the language of 
appraisal to it. The problem with "vulgar relativism," the view, 
Williams says, "which combines a relativistic account of the meaning 
or content of ethical terms with a non-relativistic principle of 
toleration," is that it fails to see the difference between real and 
notional confrontations and treats real confrontations as if they were 
only notional. (Williams 142-143) 
Beneath the complex machinery, in "the truth in relativism" we 
again see Williams distinguishing between pluralism, the idea that 
some conflicts of value are past rational discussion and evaluation, 
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and relativism, the idea that all conflicts of value are past rational 
discussion and evaluation. However, while Williams claims that at 
least some value debates are rationally resolvable, he does not say 
much about which he thinks are rationally resolvable, or how. In 
contrast, John Kekes' Facing Evil can be read as an extended 
discussion of how, in one area of moral interest. moral relativism is 
false. 
Kekes offers a particular conception of morality, which he calls 
"character-morality," in contrast and opposition to Kantianism, 
utilitarianism, and other forms of what he labels "choice-morality." 
Character-morality has evil-avoiding and good-producing aspects. In 
Facing Evil, Kekes gives his attention almost entirely to the evil-
avoiding aspect of character-morality, a concern he thinks is greatly 
underexamined by most ethical theories. (Kekes 3) 
Kekes focuses not on all evil, but on what he calls "simple evil." 
Simple evil is the undeserved violation of the minimum 
requirements of human welfare. "The minimum requirements are 
universally human, culturally invariant, and historically constant 
feaLures of human life." (Kekes 51) As examples of the minimum 
requirements Kekes mentions physiological requirements such as 
food, drink, sleep, etc.; psychological requirements related to 
universal human psychological characteristics such as the desire to 
go beyond meeting physical needs by meeting them in ways we 
count as desirable, and our capacities to think, remember, have 
emotions, etc.; and sociological requirements created by the fact that 
we all live in relationships with friends, family members, sexual 
partners, and/or enemies. (Kekes 51-52) 
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Some evil ("complex evil"), Kekes says, derives not just from 
such universal human characteristics as the ones he lists, but also 
from the particular conceptions people have of good lives. For 
example, self-actualization may represent a universal psychological 
need, but a person's pursuit of self-actualization in some particular 
way--through art or music, let us say--is not universal. Some evil 
consists of the undeserved thwarting of such desires, but such evil is 
complex, since it is a frustration not merely of the basic universal 
need, but also of the particular conception of a good life the person 
has. In regard to complex evil, as well as in regard to people's 
various conceptions of goods, Kekes agrees with the pluralists. In 
contrast, simple evil is objective. "Since morality is concerned, 
among other things, with minimizing simple evil, there are some 
objectively true or false moral judgments. They are objective in the 
sense that they concern factual matters, and whether the facts are as 
judged is independent of the moral attitudes of the person judging. 
Let us call this the thesis of the objectivity of simple evil." (Kekes 53-
5 4) 
Kekes gives other theses of character-morality, nine in all. 
(Kekes 155-156) They develop character-morality in a way 
dramatically opposed to "vulgar relativism" as Williams described it. 
If simple evil is the undeserved suffering of harm that violates a 
universal, minimum need, then it is irrelevant whether the agent 
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who caused the evil intended it--Kekes' second thesis. "Whether 
agents choose to cause evil has a bearing on our judgments of the 
agents, but not on whether simple evil has been caused." (Kekes 155) 
Taking his cues from examples and tragic literature, Kekes says that 
people may cause simple evil through their habitual, unreflective 
actions. So simple evil is reflexive--the third thesis. "Vices are 
character traits that regularly issue in evil actions. In evil people, 
vices are dominant character traits resulting in enduring patterns of 
evil-causing actions. .the vices of agents may result in their agents' 
themselves being evil." (Kekes 155) 
Without an exposition or even a listing of all Kekes' theses, the 
reader can see the direction he is heading. Kekes believes in moral 
desert. A clear-eyed look at evil forces us to see that some people, 
whether they choose to or not, habitually cause objective evil. In its 
evil-avoiding aspect, morality should seek to minimize the damage 
done by such people, a project Kekes goes on to theorize about. 
At the end of his book, Kekes relates his study to the pluralist 
cluster and to the relativism that is sometimes read off it. 
It is widely, but by no means unanimously, accepted by those 
who share our sensibility that there is no summum bonum, no 
such thing as a best life for human beings. Let us call this view 
pluralism . ... I think that pluralists are right, although I have 
not discussed the merits of their case here. The reason I 
broach the topic now is that there is a tendency in our 
sensibility to go on from pluralism to relativism, which 
constitutes another obstacle to facing evil. 
Relativists suppose that one consequence of the 
incommensurability of goods is that the lives that aim to 
embody some particular arrangement of goods are also 
incommensurable. . . . 
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However, before we allow ourselves to be swamped by the 
rhetoric [of relativism], we should remember that infanticide, 
child prostitution, suttee, female circumcision and footbinding, 
rampant disease, . . .torture, . . .beating,. .. corruption, and 
political instability are also parts of other forms of life. Is it 
really true that external moral criticism of these evils is always 
illegitimate? . . . 
The reason why the progression from pluralism to relativism 
is illegitimate is that it involves disregarding the objectivity of 
simple evil. . . . There are some things that are harmful for all 
people, always, everywhere; as we have seen, human welfare 
has certain minimum physiological, phychological, and social 
requirements .... Consequently, relativism about simple evil is 
mistaken. (Kekes 232-234) 
Though far more explicit than Williams about how relativism is 
false in regard to some moral judgments, Kekes adopts the same 
basic position as Williams. For both these writers, the pluralist 
cluster is right, but . needs to be distinguished from relativism. While 
some conflicts of values cannot be resolved rationally and some 
conceptions of a good life cannot be appraised from within other 
conceptions of a good life, it does not follow that no actions and forms 
of life cannot be judged as evil, worthy of disrepute and avoidance. 
Obviously, Williams and Kekes do not directly address the 
problem of ordering loves or Adams' similar problem of integrating 
motives. Still, we would be on solid ground to say that in regard to 
the visions of goods which people pursue, both would deny the 
possibility of giving a rule for ordering loves. Loves, like goods, are 
plural and incommensurable. 
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A tension exists between this defense of the pluralist cluster 
and the denial of the possibility of love-ordering rules, a tension 
which points out something wrong in the thesis of the 
incommensurability of goods. We are now ready to see where that 
tension lies. 
Why We Need a Vision of Love to Avoid Simple Evil 
Williams and Kekes defend the pluralist cluster by 
distinguishing it from relativism. In particular, Kekes says that while 
the goods that people pursue are incommensurable, it is objectively 
true that there are some evils which everyone ought to avoid. 
Obviously, this defense of the pluralist cluster depends on the 
possibility of distinguishing between the goods that people may 
pursue and the evils they must avoid. Consider, then, the following 
argument, which assumes Kekes' definition of simple evil. 
1. Every human infant has a need to be loved. 
2. Therefore, if an infant is undeservedly not loved, she 
has suffered simple evil. 
3. There is an enormous number of infants, none of whom 
deserve not to be loved. 
4. Only a very large number of lovers will be able to love 
the infants and prevent them from suffering simple evil. 
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5. Therefore, to avoid simple evil a very large number of 
people need to be lovers. 
6. People need a vision of love to pursue in order to grow 
as lovers. 
7. Therefore, to avoid simple evil a very large number of 
people need a vision of love. 
Comments on the steps in this argument: 
1. I make this as a generalization from empirical studies, which 
provide overwhelming evidence of the detrimental effect of 
emotional deprivation on infants. Kekes, as noted above, explicitly 
includes psychological characteristics among the universal minimum 
requirements of all good lives. 
2. This follows from #1 and Kekes' definitions of simple harm 
(violation of a universal minimum requirement of good lives) and 
simple evil (undeserved simple harm). 
3. Kekes writes, "the only acceptable moral reason for 
overruling the presumption against simple harm being undeserved is 
that by doing so the general concern of morality is better served." 
(Kekes 56-57) And, "What makes individuals deserving is that they 
have certain characters or they have acted in certain ways." (Kekes 
57) I take it, then, that no infants are undeserving of love. 
4. This proposition is a matter of practical, not logical, necessity. 
A defender of the pluralist cluster might suggest that even the 
requirement of a "very large number" of lovers leaves open the 
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possibility that for some other people there is no need to love infants 
and therefore no need for a vision of love. However, similar (though 
more complicated) arguments could be constructed beginning with 
the needs of children, adolescents, adults, or the aged to be loved. 
5. Taken as a group, these arguments (based on the needs of 
infants, children, adolescents, adults and the aged to be loved) make 
it probable that virtually all people need to be lovers, if we are to 
avoid simple evil. 
6. In chapter six, I hoped to have shown, rather than argued, 
that this proposition is true. Moral pilgrims need a goal to admire 
and pursue; would-be lovers need a vision of love. 
7. This proposition follows from the others. 
If this argument is sound, the evil-avoiding and good-
producing aspects of morality cannot be so neatly separated as 
Williams and Kekes seem to think. Interestingly, when Kekes 
considers violations of the minimum requirements of good lives. he 
does so only in regard to what he calls "deep prohibitions." (Kekes 
172-179) He stresses that deep prohibitions, against such things as 
murder, torture, mutilation, and enslavement. represent objective 
moral truth. "For deep prohibitions are of simple evil, and they 
define simple moral situations. The objectivity of our moral 
judgments depends on our ability to identify such situations .. 
Whether a prohibition is deep depends solely on whether it protects 
a minimum requirement of human welfare." (Kekes 177) 
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Kekes seems never to consider the possibility of a "deep 
prescription." Consistent with his description of deep prohibitions, a 
deep prescription would enforce actions necessary to all good lives. 
It would seem that deep prescriptions represent objective moral 
truth as much as deep prohibitions, though in a more complicated 
way. No one can rightly think that a deep prohibition, e.g. "do not 
torture innocent human beings," does not apply to him. However, 
one could recognize a deep prescription, e.g. "give adequate food to 
infants," and rightly think that the prescription should be fulfilled by 
other people and not himself. So, while deep prescriptions represent 
objective moral truth, they do not apply to every person at all times. 
I do not claim that my argument is a refutation of Kekes' and 
Williams' defense of pluralism. If there were a deep prescription 
which applied, as deep prohibitions do, to every person at all times, 
and if that prescription was tied to some particular vision of the 
good, then their defense of pluralism could be refuted. My argument 
does not assume or establish such a prescription.4 I only claim that 
my argument shows that the objective evils which we must avoid 
cannot be so neatly divided from the goods that we may pursue as 
Kekes seems to think. 
Objective, simple evil can occur not only through what people 
do, but through what they fail to do. My argument shows that unless 
a very great many of us pursue love, simple evil will occur. 
4 I think there is such a prescnpuon, the great commandment. However, I 
doubt that . it can be established by argument, and many readers will not agree 
to assume it. 
Therefore, the goods that we pursue are interwoven with the 
avoidance of objective evil. 
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Logically, there is an ambiguity in my argument, but an 
innocent one. Someone could object that "love" is used in two senses 
when I say that all infants need to be loved, and therefore people 
need to be lovers. The love that infants need, it could be claimed, is 
a hard-to-specify group of behaviors by others which produce in the 
child a sense of self-esteem and well-being (and, more basically, 
health, nutrition, safety, etc., but the focus here is on emotional and 
psychological well-being). The love which lovers give or have, on the 
other hand, is a complex of emotions, intentions and beliefs internal 
to the lover. The objector could conclude that it is possible for 
infants to "be loved" in the relevant sense without any, or at most 
few, people "being lovers." This objection may be logically astute (I 
do not say it is), but it is psychological nonsense. 
At this point, philosophers of a certain sort would seek to 
fashion a rule for ordering loves. If the goods that we pursue are 
connected to the evils which we must avoid, then perhaps we can 
create a hierarchy of goods so that the need of infants to be loved 
(and other deep prescriptions, if they are found) will be rightly 
placed above, say, the good of computer game success. 
The reader of chapter six will not expect such a move here. To 
grow as lovers we need a vision of love, not a rule which tells us 
what we are to love. We need to hear again stories which place 
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before us an image of something admirable, which we can pursue. 
We order our loves by pursuing the admirable thing. 
We return, then, to the question put aside earlier. Is a 
monotheistic vision of the good, like Robert Adams', the only way to 
integrate motives or order loves? It is not. Iris Murdoch, for 
instance, offers a non theistic version of a platonic good in The 
Sovereignty of Good. No doubt Buddhist or Hindu thinkers could tell 
stories which would give the moral pilgrim a vision to pursue, the 
pursuit of which would help order his loves. But not all visions of 
the good or of love have equal claim on our attention. If life lived in 
pursuit of some vision of a good neglects the love of infants, then 
that vision of the good is defective when compared to one that 
promotes the love of infants, for the love of infants is a requirement 
of all good lives, including those which pursue a vision which 
neglects the love of infants. In general, at a minimum a vision of the 
good must be rich enough to promote all deep prescriptions. Beyond 
that, we look for a vision of the good rich enough to promote all of 
the many nonmoral goods writers like Wolf and Adams have 
described. Ultimately, there may be one unifying good, and only a 
vision of that good would perfectly harmonize all goods, thus rightly 
ordering all loves. In the less-than-ultimate world that we have, we 
may expect many visions of love (this is what is right about 
pluralism), even though not every story will yield an even minimally 
adequate vision of love (this is what is wrong about pluralism). 
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CHAPTER VIII 
COMMUNITY AND LOVE 
Communities can help people become lovers. 
A mild statement like this defends against the temptation to 
make overbroad assertions. Leave open the possibility that some 
people may have grown significantly as lovers while never being 
part of a healthy community. We are only saying here that healthy 
community can help some; this is enough to motivate an exploration 
of the topic. 
How do communities help would-be lovers? Without claiming 
to exhaust the topic, here are three suggestions. Communities 1) help 
heal the narcissistic wounds which prevent us from seeing each 
other, 2) flesh out the stories through which we are given moral 
vision, and 3) support individuals in their specific projects of love. 
In explaining these assertions I will refer repeatedly to the work of 
the psychiatrist, M. Scott Peck, and the theologian/philosopher, 
Stanley Hauerwas. To a lesser extent, some observations by a poet, 
Robert Bly, will mix into the stew. 
In The Different Drum: Community Making and Peace, Peck 
says, "there is no adequate one-sentence definition of genuine 
community." (Peck 60) He then tries to give his readers an idea of 
his subject by describing various facets of community. According to 
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Dr. Peck, true community is marked by inclusivity, commitment, 
consensus, realism, contemplation, safety, brokenness, gracious 
conflict, and an imprecise something he calls "spirit." Fortunately, he 
supplements this list of somewhat abstract qualities with many 
stories of communities. I will try to imitate this admirable policy of 
illustrating with cases rather than giving a verbal definition of 
community. 
A Home for the Wounded 
We have all suffered narcissistic wounds. While very young, 
we faced the challenges of seperateness, vulnerability and limitation. 
The world was not the perfect oyster it had seemed when we learned 
to walk and mother was God and we were one with mother. Though 
the rapprochement with reality was painful, most of us came through 
those crises, and--unlike the extreme narcissist--we have made a 
fairly realistic adjustment to the world. But the old wounds still 
hurt. We sometimes feel the desire to cover them up and live in a 
false self. To the extent that we do, we are unable to love. 
So far, this just recapitulates the psychoanalytic theory 
presented in chapter one. Note that we need not accept this picture's 
universalizing tone ("We have all suffered ... "), nor its explanation of 
the etiology of narcissism, in order to accept the working description 
it gives of problems faced by would-be lovers. We can see in our 
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own lives and in the lives of friends, that people often live behind 
false selves. We internalize the lie, "I am nothing unless I am united 
with the perfect other," "I am nothing unless I am always and 
completely good," or "I am nothing unless I am succeeding." We need 
to replace the lie with the truth, "I am somebody, and I can get 
better." 
Consider this simple thesis. A community can help a wounded 
person believe that she is somebody, even though she is not 
perfectly good, completely successful, or connected to the perfect 
other. If this is true, then we have a wa.y in which a community can 
help a person learn love. However, not all groups of people, not even 
those which are sometimes called "communities," do this. What 
marks the difference between the community which helps heal 
wounds and the false community which does not? Examples will 
help. 
I spent four unhappy years in a rural high school in 
Washington state. (The school no longer exists, as the school district 
was consolidated into a neighboring district.) I do not mean that I 
was unhappy all the time; away from school, many good things 
happened to me in those years. But virtually every day of my 
attendance at this school was marked by an intense awareness that 
did not fit in. I wanted to be liked by other students at the school, 
but I felt excluded as not quite acceptable. 
As happens sometimes in small country schools (I suppose it 
happens in big schools as well), the student body had united in a 
256 
nearly universal disdain for academic achievement. Study was to be 
endured, not celebrated; if someone applied himself, asked questions. 
and showed interest in school work, he was suspected of currying 
favor with the principal and teachers, the warden and guards of our 
little prison. So I could not win my peers' approval by scholastic 
success. Brought up in a teetotalling religious tradition, I either 
lacked the courage to rebel against my parents' values or was wise 
enough to see the emptiness of teenage drinking parties. So I could 
not win approval b)I joining in a primary social gathering of my 
peers. 
Athletics remained. Perhaps I could be accepted if I was good 
enough in sports. But I failed to rise above mediocrity in football, 
basketball, or track, even though I went out for all three each of my 
high school years. Of course, had I "succeeded" in sports, whatever 
acceptance I would have won thereby would not have eased my 
pain. I would have been trapped in the performance syndrome, in 
which the narcissistic style pushes for ever more success. (Cf. 
"Martin," in chapter one.) We long to be loved for who we are, not 
what we do. In the end, I graduated as valedictorian of a small class, 
still feeling rejected and lonely. 
Two comments should be made at this point. First, I would not 
have said, at the time, that I played sports in order to win approval. 
I was only dimly conscious of how pained I was by exclusion, and I 
was unaware how that pain drove me to sports. Nor did I see that 
my driven desire to be accepted by my peers stemmed from from 
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my own doubts about my worth. Nevertheless, in retrospect this 
analysis seems incontrovertible. 
Second, my high school experience was not unique. Though felt 
most acutely in the teenage years, for many people the need for 
acceptance remains unmet for a lifetime. Sadly, millions can identify 
with the constant fruitless search for the approval of one's peers. 
I remember high school days, basketball and school plays 
And the tension you could feel out in the hall. 
I was searching for my one and only but behind my laughter I 
was lonely, 
And I wanted to go out with you, but I was too afraid to call. 
And won't you tell me that it's different now since I sat in your 
place? 
Won't you tell me there's less loneliness and fear? 
Or is it still the same old story, the groups and the grades and 
the search 
for glory--anything to keep us from dealing with our tears? 
Some of us hid in grades, some hid in athlete's glory, 
Some hid behind a cigarette, some hid inside their clothes. 
We were silently assigned our own social territory 
And some of us found no refuge at all, and I was one of those." 
(Don Eaton "High School Days") 
In 1973, I entered George Fox College in Newberg, Oregon. 
Within months I became aware of a profound change in my life. 
Brad Smith, the Resident Assistant on my floor in the residence hall 
where I lived, worked hard to demonstrate to each of the men on the 
floor that he accepted him without reservation. I met a similar 
attitude of acceptance and approval in nearly everyone on campus. 
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I felt no "tension out in the hall." I could relax. I began to feel like I 
was somebody. I began to deal with my tears. 
College was clearly an emotionally more healthy place for me 
than high school. Why? Obviously, in college I felt much more 
comfortable with the values of the group; academic success was 
honored, the social life did not include alcohol use, etc. But my 
acceptance at college was not merely a matter of natural affinities. 
M. Scott Peck says that true communities are marked by 
inclusivity. (Peck 61) Communities include people just because they 
are people; they do not have to prove their worth. To the contrary, a 
person has to demonstrate his unworthiness or threat to the 
community in order to be excluded. At George Fox, a deliberate and 
concerted effort was made to extend welcome to new students. I 
received the acceptance I always struggled for in high school--and it 
seemed I did not have to do anything to get it. Of course, the 
challenge to a community's inclusiveness comes when an individual 
challenges the group's ways of thinking or acting; perhaps some 
other student, with different needs, would not have experienced 
George Fox as a healing community. Perhaps I benefitted from a 
fortunate fit between my needs and the college milieu. Such things 
are hard to judge, but it was the college's policy to foster an 
accepting community, and at least one student was helped by that 
policy. 
In comparing my high school to my college, it becomes clear 
that real groups only approach the ideal of true community. My high 
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school was not perfectly awful, nor was George Fox perfectly good. 
This need not prevent us from seeing that some communities are far 
more welcoming and productive of self-esteem than others. 
Not all communities are long-lived like a college. Peck tells of 
his experience in a marathon therapy group led by Mac Budgely in 
1967. (Peck 33-41) In one weekend of intense interaction, twelve 
psychiatric professionals experienced the hard work and rewards of 
community. Three incidents of the weekend which Peck relates 
illustrate the inclusive nature of community. 
First, Peck tells of an experience much like that of the ancient 
mariner (cf. chapter two). One of the members of the group disliked 
Peck's East Coast mannerisms and clothing. In return, Peck dispised 
this Midwesterner's ~oorishness and cigars. In the wee hours of the 
morning, the boor fell asleep, snoring obnoxiously. 
. Wa~e upon wave of fury built up in me. The waves 
mtens1fied as I looked at the ashtray next to him with its f sta~e-smelling dead cigars, their chewed ends still wet with 0~~s 
saliva.. My hatred became pure white hot, utterly unforaiving 
and nghteous. "' 
. But ~en a mo~t odd thing happened. Just as I was looking at 
h~m with such disgust, he turned into me. Or did I turn into 
h1m? In any .case, I suddenly saw myself sitting in his chair, 
my head rolling back, the snores coming out of my mouth. 
The waves of fury, disgust, and hatred turned instantly into 
waves of affection and caring. And stayed that way. (Peck 34) 
This chapter intends to explore ways community helps one 
love. It may also be that love makes community possible; this 
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possibility will not be explored in this chapter. Suffice it to say that 
Peck's changed attitude toward the Midwestern psychiatrist 
contributed to the inclusivity of the group as it became a community. 
Second, later in the weekend, after much good feeling 
developed in the group, Peck tells how he began experiencing 
unaccountable depression. When he reported this to the group, most 
of the other members accused him of damaging the wonderful 
process the group was experiencing. If he was depressed at such a 
time, he must be seriously disturbed. Maybe he should leave the 
marathon session. 
One of the group members suggested that Peck was the voice of 
the group's depression. At this, most of group began attacking the 
speaker. Finally, though, group denial broke down and everyone 
began admitting that he was angry, tired, etc. Once it was able to 
express and come to grips with depression, the group returned to 
high spirits. Accepting the unwelcome message of the "misfit" 
enabled the group to be a community. 
Third, near the end of the weekend, a division arose among the 
group members over the significance of what they were 
experiencing. Some of the men expressed their insights in spiritual 
terms, while precisely half of the group rejected all such religious 
talk. Recognizing the problem, though, the group rapidly resolved it, 
not by trying to convert the other side, but by affirming the worth of 
the group in spite of its division. They could accept one another and 
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even reach consensual decisions without making each other conform 
to a particular mode. 
How does the inclusivity of community help a person learn to 
love? Unconditional acceptance undermines the narcissistic lie. A 
person does not have to do or be or have a connection if she is 
already somebody. The style of psychotherapy known as "client 
centered" draws much of its power from the "unconditional positive 
regard" which it offers to each client. For many patients, the 
therapist's actual words or suggestions matter very little; the thing 
that draws them back to the weekly hour of therapy like bees to 
nectar--and the thing that heals them--is the astonishing sense of 
acceptance they get nowhere else. 
Usually, a client sees her therapist once a week or less often. 
Meanwhile, she lives in the "real world," which for many people 
consists of family systems, work groups and social organizations 
which do nothing to counteract the self-devaluing lie of narcissism, 
or worse, add their own excluding and devaluing messages to her 
picture of herself. A healthy community, then, without the 
advantage of the therapist's expertise and in spite of its occasional 
shortcomings, can do what the therapist cannot do. It can bring 
healing into the rest of the week. 
No matter what we call them, non-inclusive groups are not true 
communities. Consider again "Martha's" home church, discussed in 
chapter one. Martha had to earn her acceptance there by being a 
"good" person. she could not dress in certain ways or engage in 
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certain activities, onb of which was sex. Think of a street gang in an 
inner city. Boys and girls can only win acceptance in the group by 
demonstrating they are "bad" people. Initiation may involve wearing 
certain clothes, participating in petty crime, providing sex to gang 
leaders, or assisting in more dangerous gang activities such as drug 
sales or gun fights. In both the unhealthy church and the gang, 
continued acceptance of the individual is dependent on his or her 
continued conformity to group norms." 
As Peck notes, inclusivity is not an unconditioned value in 
communities. (Peck 'pl, 158) An order of monks or nuns might 
welcome non-believers to visit them and worship and study with 
them, but it could not admit them into the order. A much less 
structured weekly support group could accept members (though it 
would not have any official list) from all sorts of religious or political 
persuasions, but even it could not be totally inclusive. An alcoholic, 
for instance, who denied his condition and yet repeatedly showed up 
at group meetings drunk, might need to be excluded for the group to 
survive. Behind the exceptions, though, stands the rule; healthy 
communities accept . people without striving to convert their thinking 
\ 
or control their behavior. 
A false community, whether a street gang, a college fraternity 
or an office steno pool, tries to stamp out individuality by converting 
its members to one way of thinking or controlling them into one way 
of acting. Sometimes, for instance, in some churches and social clubs, 
the veneer of polite "community" (Peck, 86-90, calls it 
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"pseudocommunity") forces individuals to stifle themselves. Mac 
Budgely's marathon therapy group had to overcome its desire to 
exclude Scott Peck in order to admit its own angers and depressions 
and become a genuine community. In a pseudocommunity no one 
feels safe to be who they really are. Again, we should take 
"pseudocommunity" as an ideal type; neither hypocritical churches 
nor criminal gangs are completely devoid of acceptance. 
If someone does not feel safe to be who he is, he covers up 
with a false self which he hopes will win acceptance. Now, it might 
be argued that one of the marks of health in adults is that they have 
the cognitive and emotional resources to sustain long term 
performances, sometimes for good reasons, e.g. to keep a necessary 
job. But too often group pressures to produce a false self only 
reinforce the false ~elves we have from our pasts. Many people 
cannot feel who they are and they have no safe place where they can 
learn to feel who they are. Unfortunately, false selves can only offer 
false love. For such people, a community can help. 
Living Out a Vision 
In chapter six, I maintained that growth in love requires more 
than the ability to pay attention to individual realities, as rare and 
difficult as that skill is. I suggested that lovers need a vision of love, 
something they can admire and pursue, and that such visions of 
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admirable things are best communicated by stories. But how do we 
learn stories? 
Many parents have had the experience, on reading a bedtime 
story to a toddler for the twentieth time (or fortieth, or sixtieth--
children at a certain stage seem to have an insatiable desire for 
repetition), of being corrected by their audience. The word was not 
"jumped;" it was "hopped." The wise pig did not merely deny the 
wolf entrance to his house; he said, "Not by the hair of my chinny-
chin-chin." Precisely. Parents should realize that, while for them 
bedtime stories might be a convenient way of getting the little 
person into bed, for the child the stories are much more than that. 
At the least, besides entertainment, stories nourish children's 
imaginations and shape their understanding of the moral world. 
(Remember this one? The loving mother sheep left her lambs 
at home with the warning not to be taken in by the strategems of the 
wolf. But the wicked and clever wolf dusted his feet with flour and 
thus deceived the lambs. Once the wolf fooled the lambs and entered 
the house, he gobbled all the lambs save one, who hid behind the 
clock. Fortunately, the greedy wolf ate so fast that he did not chew, 
but swallowed the lambs whole. Later, the littlest lamb and the 
mother found the wolf lying gorged and asleep near the river. They 
cut open his stomach, thus freeing the lambs, filled the stomach with 
stones, and sewed it up. When the wolf awoke and tried to stand, he 
fell into the river and drowned. 
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Adults may try but never fully understand what this story 
means to a three year old, combining as it does terror, despair, 
warning, admonition, humor ["'What a tummy-ache I have,' said the 
wolf."], and joyful relief.) 
Obviously, then, we learn stories at our parent's knee. I do not 
want to question the importance of the nuclear family in passing on 
stories and the visions they carry. I want to suggest, though, that 
families--expecially isolated nuclear families--are not enough to 
communicate moral vision. 
A crucial element in individuation is separation from parents. 
A child must psychologically leave home in order to become an adult 
on his own terms. Unless we want to imagine that children can learn 
' 
to be healthy adults apart from their parents all by themselves 
(remember Goldman's Lord of the Flies), a child will need others to 
supply the stories which tell him what it is to be an adult. In his 
book, Iron John, Robert Bly writes that American culture faces a 
particular crisis about boys in this regard. "We know that our society 
produces a plentiful supply of boys, but seems to produce fewer and 
fewer men." (Bly 180) 
Bly quotes the wisdom of tribes in New Guinea. "A boy cannot 
change into a man without the active intervention of the older men." 
(Bly 15, 86, 87) All over the world, traditional cultures have rites of 
passage which help children join the adult community outside their 
nuclear family. Sometimes the men of the village simply appear, 
without warning, at a boy's door. Until now the boy has lived with 
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his mother, in the company of women and children. The older men 
take him away from home. There is no recourse; the mother may 
put up a mock protest, but she cannot interfere with the way of men. 
The older men take the boys of the village away to the forest; there 
they teach them about religion, wisdom, women, courage and dignity. 
They may subject the boy to silence, darkness, solitude or ritual 
wounding. He begins to learn the dances, songs and stories which 
constitute the wisdom of the tribe. When the boy has come through 
initiation, he is a man. Bly is willing to believe that, more often than 
not, traditional initiation not only confers the status of adult, it 
actually helps the boys achieve healthy individuation. (Bly 181-182) 
In contrast, our culture has virtually no initiation, no rituals by 
which the older generation can help boys break free from their 
parents. 
Even worse, boys in our culture do not bond with their fathers. 
Part of the work of the older men is to help the boy individuate from 
the father as well as the mother. But how does one break away from 
what he has never known? 
Traditional cultures still in existence seem to have plenty of 
father. In so-called traditional cultures, many substitute 
fathers work with the young men. Uncles loosen the son up, or 
tell him about women. Grandfathers give him stories. Warrior 
types teach weaponry and discipline, old men teach ritual and 
soul--all of them honorary fathers. (Bly 93) 
By the middle of the twentieth century in Europe and North 
America a massive change had taken place: the father was 
working, but the son could not see him working. 
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Throughout the ancient hunter societies, which apparently 
lasted thousands of years--perhaps hundreds of thousands--
and throughout the hunter-gatherer societies that followed 
them, and the subsequent agricultural and craft societies, 
fathers and sons worked and lived together. As late as 1900 in 
the United States about ninety percent of fathers were engaged 
in agriculture. In all these societies the son characteristically 
saw his father working at all times of the day and all seasons of 
the year. 
When the son no longer sees that, what happens? After thirty 
years of working with young German men, as fatherless in 
their industrial society as young American men today, 
Alexander Mitscherlich . . . developed a metaphor: a hole 
appears in the son's psyche. (Bly 95) 
What is "father" to boys in our culture? Bly says the main 
images of father in our society are the object of ridicule (Dagwood 
Bumstead, Homer Simpson), the dangerous and probably evil 
stranger (Darth Vader--"dark father"), the bad-tempered fool (the 
office worker who comes home unable to teach the son what he does 
all day), and the weak puddle of indecision (the liberated non-
chauvinist who is unable to assert himself because it feels like 
aggression). (Bly 99) To a large and growing number of boys, 
"father" has no content at all; products of single (female) parent 
households and the urban underclass, their world includes no adult 
men. 
Bly thinks our culture needs to recover initiation, but initiation 
cannot be carried out in an isolated nuclear family. Initiation needs 
the "old men." 
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Communities can help replace the missing father in boys' lives, 
and they can help the boys cross over into adulthood, but such 
communities need to be intergenerational entities. l Bly could be 
read as simply suggesting that boys (and probably girls, though that 
is not his interest) need to be connected with older men in order to 
achieve psychological health. I want to add that psychological 
growth makes possible, is made possible by, and sometimes just is 
moral progress. If a boy needs old men to become a man, he will 
need old men to become a lover. 
To grow as lovers, we need a vision of love. We will not hear 
all the stories we need, if we want to have a vision of love, from our 
parents. We need to hear and see the stories in a wider community. 
Perhaps the events in Le Chambon, which I described in chapter six, 
should be traced less to Andre Trocme's preaching than to something 
he found already there when he arrived. Pierre Sauvage quotes 
from a 1934 letter Trocme wrote to a friend. 
Here, the old Huguenot spirit is alive. The humblest peasant 
home has its Bible, and the father reads it every day. So these 
people, who do not read the papers but the Scriptures, do not 
stand on the moving soil of opinion but on the rock of the Word 
of God. (Rittner and Myers, 135) 
1 Perhaps this should be qualified. Peck (160-163) insists that genuine 
communities have different life spans, and that some rightly pass away quite 
quickly. So maybe I should say some communities need to be 
intergenerational entities. Whatever benefits a weekend community building 
experience may have--and I am ready to admit it has many--such short term 
communities can not initiate boys. Only a long term intergenerational 
community has the time for the wisdom of the old men to be passed to its boys. 
269 
The Chambonnais were a community before the Trocmes 
arrived. As Sauvage put it in a televised conversation with Bill 
Moyers, they knew who they were. Their clear identity as 
Huguenots, who had experienced persecution, was distilled in the 
stories passed down from generation to generation.2 The Trocme 
letter suggests that they understood their own stories to be rooted in 
the Biblical story. When Andre Trocme and Eduard Theis preached 
Christian non-violent resistance to evil, they added something to the 
cumulative story-telling of th~ community, but they did not reinvent 
it. 
I said in chapter six that we ought to multiply our stories of 
lovers. A living community does this in the best way. In an 
intergenerational community we not only hear the old stories, we see 
them fleshed out in the lives of others. 
In 1947, Herbert Nicholson asked a young man, Paul 
McCracken, to help him transport goats to Okinawa. For McCracken, 
it was the adventure of a lifetime; he experienced the unseaworthy 
liberty ship Simon Benson (which split open on the succeeding 
voyage), storms at sea, an unfamiliar culture in the Far East, and 
Herbert Nicholson preaching love, hope and reconciliation in Japanese 
and English. Long afterward, in the 1980's, I knew Herbert Nicholson 
I 
as a kindly, leathery old man who walked with a stoop. But Paul 
2 During the war, Roger Darcissac, a schoolteacher and friend of Trocme's, 
collected a book of songs for young people. Included was a song praising and 
mourning a pastor of Le Chambon who had been arrested centuries before 
during the Catholic persecution of Huguenots. Cf. Hallie, p. 26. 
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McCracken, then in:, his late fifties, remembered and told me about 
the man who visited the internment camps and took goats to 
Okinawa. Paul also told me of his own father, who received a 
dishonorable discharge from the Army during World War I because 
he would not train as a rifleman. And I add Paul's stories to the 
stories I tell my sons; they are stories of love, which make a vision of 
love accessible. 
Stanley Hauerwas, in The Peaceable Kingdom, writes, "The 
nature of Christian ethics is determined by the fact that Christian 
convictions take the·. form of a story, or perhaps better, a set of 
stories that constitute a tradition, which in turn creates and forms a 
community." (Hauerwas 24) Hauerwas thinks the project of 
rationalistic ethical theory, which he calls the search for an 
"unqualified ethic," which seeks to define morality in terms of the 
non-specific ahistorical rational being, must be a failure. More 
importantly, to Hauerwas' mind, an unqualified ethic must make 
central Christian beliefs irrelevant to ethics. In an unqualified ethic, 
every person is no less and no more than a rational being. (This is 
the picture of human nature we saw in Kant in chapter four.) But 
this is untrue not only to human nature, but to the stories of the 
tradition. To be a Christian, Hauerwas says, is to "grow into the story 
of Jesus as the form of God's kingdom." (Hauerwas 30) 
Like Iris Murdoch, Hauerwas distrusts the existentialist idea of 
freedom in which I am only free in my present decision if I am free 
of all "decisions" I made in the past which were less than "fully 
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mine." (Hauerwas 36, 37) None of my decisions in the past were 
"fully mine" as the existentialist would like. I can not "identify 
myself with my will," as Murdoch quotes Stuart Hampshire as 
writing. (Murdoch 5) I am a historical creature, engaged in the 
process of pursuing a moral vision, perhaps a good one, perhaps not. 
Hauerwas rejects the idea of the moral agent as pure chooser: ". . .to 
be an agent means I am able to locate my action within an ongoing 
history and within a community of language-users." (Hauerwas 42)3 
Just as communities need not be perfect to give enough 
acceptance to help heal narcissistic wounds, they need not be perfect 
to flesh out a vision of love. Love, like good, is a perfectionistic 
3 This last phrase, "a community of language-users," raises a Pandora's box of 
questions beyond the scope of this book:. In rejecting any unqualified ethic, 
Hauerwas insists that we should speak of qualified ethics; he is most interested 
in a Christian ethic, but others might be interested in a secular ethic or a 
Muslim ethic. In each case Hauerwas would insist on the imponance of the 
qualifier. How, then, do ethicists of each son talk: to each other about 
morality? Do the adherents of a Jewish ethic and a Christian ethic live in the 
same "community of language-users"? The defender of the search for an 
unqualified ethic--an adherent of any of the standard rationalistic theories--
might claim that a happy result of his position is that everybody lives in the 
same moral community. This defender sees rational ethics as a defense against 
relativism. If we allow someone's panicular history, including the tradition in 
which he was nunured, to count in defining and interpreting his moral life, 
are we not then committed to the idea that "right," "good" and other such words 
mean different things to different people? 
Similar questions sometimes arise for philosophers who speak of "forms 
of life" and "language games" when dealing with epistemological questions. 
Wittgenstein tried to imagine conversations between educated twentieth 
century Europeans and tribal people from non-technological cultures. Do 
such people inhabit the same community of language-users? What about 
modem, educated believers in God and modem, educated disbelievers: are their 
seemingly intractable disagreements due to diverse communities of language 
use? 
In spite of the interest of these questions, they must be passed over. In 
this chapter I am interested in community in so far as it incarnates a vision of 
something morally admirable and pursuable. 
272 
concept. A wife may have loved her husband with exquisite joy, and 
yet truthfully say she loves him better three years later. So a 
community, when it lives out a vision of love, points to a love which 
always lies further on, beyond the love which has been enacted in 
the community's history. 
A moral vision tells me who I am by showing me what I can 
become. In this they resemble initiation rites, which integrate 
children into their curtural traditions and let them see what they can 
become. A moral vision and the initiation process are both 
normative; they tell someone what he really is (in spite of 
appearances), and therefore what he can be. 
Interestingly, modern psychology both rejects and accepts the 
normative aspect of initiation and moral vision. On one hand, 
psychology regards itself as a science, interested only in the neutral 
empirical questions of how people behave and think. On the other 
side, psychology tries to be therapeutic. Therapists interest 
themselves at least as much in what people should do and think as 
in what they do and think. In its therapeutic mode psychology 
substitutes for the old men and women of traditional societies who 
intervene to help children grow up and who tell the stories which 
give moral vision. Thus, novelists have recognized the likenesses 
between therapists and shamans. For example, in Murdoch's novel 
The Good Apprentice, Thomas McCaskerville, a psychiatrist, 
repeatedly considers retirement from his practice, not just because of 
age, but because he see himself in the role of magician, carefully 
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arranging meetings and developments in his patients' lives so as to 
make them better, and bis magic has about run out. 
In a society in which family has been reduced to the nuclear 
family or less, in which there is in effect no older generation to 
initiate its young, and in which pseudo-communities abound, we 
should not wonder that people turn to therapists. How else can they 
gain the ability to love? Nor should we be surprised that therapists 
feel like lonely magicians whose magic supply may soon run dry, 
since they are ambivalent about the normative aspects of their 
science. 
A community which accepts an individual for who she is, and 
lives out the stories of a vision of love so that she can see it, may 
greatly help her learn to love. 
t 
Supporting Projects of Love 
No one loves in the abstract, a point well made by Charles 
Schultz when he put the self-contradictory words in Linus' mouth: "I 
love mankind; it's the people I can't stand!" If I want to be a lover, 
at some point I get involved with other people (or beings, if loving 
God is part of my goal). 
I have to lov~ somebody, a person with a history and a 
particular combination of character traits. Love, then, takes the form 
of historically particular projects of love, i.e., friendships, romances, 
mentorings, parentings, etc. Sometimes we exercise a measure of 
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choice or will in entering a project of love (a person agrees to date 
someone, knowing a romantic relationship may result; a couple plans 
a pregnancy, knowing it will lead to parenthood), but often we 
simply find ourselves already engaged in a project of love (a child 
does not choose its parents, yet feels obligated to love them; when a 
monastic order merges two houses, the monks have no choice but to 
try to love their new brothers). Since projects of love are historical 
and particular, they exhibit an ineliminable character of chanciness. 
Lovers know that this relationship will be different from all others; 
past experience cannot guarantee success this time. The chanciness 
of love can influence a person's choices in entering, or not entering, 
projects of love. The commitment-shy playboy is a stock figure of 
fiction and film, but the fear that motivates him--that love carries 
unforseeable risks--affects the choices of real people. 
Diogenes Allen uses a character from Murdoch's An Unofficial 
Rose to illustrate what Soren Kierkegaard called the life of the 
aesthete. (Allen 68-82) Randall feels trapped in his marriage to Ann, 
his respectable, dutiful, boring wife, who symbolizes his whole life, 
encased in his old dreams. The rose nursery garden which they 
built, their children, memories of early romance: none of this touches 
Randall anymore. So, when the chance comes, Randall flees to Rome 
with his mistress, where he realizes that one day she will bore him 
too; this does not matter, since "There are lots of other beautiful 
women." 
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According to the Judge of Kierkegaard's "The Aesthetic Validity 
of Marriage," the aesthete, represented by Randall, does not 
understand what love is. Only in commitment, the bonds of 
marriage, can romance reach its fullest flower. Of course, 
Kierkegaard criticizes this ethical stage, including the commitment it 
requires, too. The Judge recognizes that marriage needs commitment 
for love to grow and develop. But what justifies an unconditional 
commitment? The Judge tends to justify it on the basis of the 
happiness such a marriage may provide. In his Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard indicates this is not enough. The 
Judge's ethical stage needs to be surpassed by a religious stage. 
Allen agrees: ". . .Christians know that the fundamental foundation of 
marriage is the same as the fundamental foundation of life, namely, 
the conviction that our goal and end is beyond every merely human 
state and condition. Our goal is instead the kingdom of God, which is 
only partly realized at present." (Allen 82-83) 
I want to generalize Allen's point about romance to all projects 
of love. Should I give myself as mentor to this student? Should we 
adopt a child into our family? Should I let my acquaintance depend 
on me as a friend? In each case we may quite legitmately worry 
whether the relatio~ship may not bring more pain and evil than 
good. A merely "ethical" response to these worries--that the risk is 
necessary in order to achieve a potential good only available by 
commitment to the project--cannot justify a commitment which 
needs to be unconditional. 
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Some projects of love (not all), as Kierkegaard saw in relation to 
romance, need to be entered with unconditional commitment in 
order to give the conditions in which our hopes for the projects can 
be realized. As examples, consider adoption and marriage. An 
adoptive parent must be able to say to a previously abused child 
who is throwing a tantrum, "I love you. No matter what you do, I 
will keep loving you." A bride or groom promises to love, "for better 
or for worse." Without the unconditional nature of the commitment, 
the child or spouse lives on emotional tenderhooks.4 People have a 
need to be loved for who they are, not what they do --if that is true, 
at least some of us need to love other people unconditionally, on pain 
of a basic human need going unmet. 
But projects of love are historical and particular; they cannot be 
cured of chanciness. Knowing this, how can anyone enter a project of 
love in the right way? How can we make an unconditional 
commitment to a spouse or a child when we are aware of the 
statistics surrounding divorce and disrupted child placements? 
4 Someone might object that this insistence on unconditional commitment is 
out of date, like traditional marriage vows. Marriages last as long as they are 
good for the people in them. Similarly, adoptive parents should make realistic 
commitments to their children; after all, the child may act so outrageously that 
the placement has to be disrupted. Not all children are adoptable. Two 
comments: 
1. These objections miss the force of Kierkegaard's Judge. He knows that life 
is chancy, but he argues that in marriage the best "odds" come to those who 
commit. 
2. In regard to adoption at least, the objection is simply wrong. If the 
"realistic" parent adopts with the attitude that the placement is conditional, the 
child will know it; no one is a good enough actor to hide the truth from the 
child. Then, even if the placement is "successful"--the child lives with the 
parent until its majority--the child will have been pushed into performing for 
acceptance, a recipe for narcissism. 
Agreeing with Kierkegaard, Allen holds that an unconditional 
commitment must be grounded in religious considerations. 
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So the only possible basis for the endurance and continuation 
of the state of marriage is a quite 'arbitrary' element, arbitrary 
from every human point of view, namely, a vow taken before 
the eternal God. From either the aesthetic or ethical point of 
view, a person who undertakes a pledge which binds her 
unconditionally is utterly arbitrary and absurd. It is for this 
reason that the Judge actually slipped over into the religious 
category. (Allen 83) 
I want to use the language of a moral vision to say something 
similar. We take on projects of love in pursuit of some vision of love. 
(Compare Allen's wording. The Christian's "fundamental foundation" 
is a "conviction" about a "goal and end.") Though I am aware of the 
chanciness of marriage or adoption, I make the commitments 
necessary to them, not because of some personal characteristic which 
makes me think I am immune to chance, but because I admire and 
pursue some vision of love.5 
If I am right about this, that it is in pursuit of a moral vision 
that people can make the unconditional commitments needed for at 
least some projects of love, then communities have an important role 
5 I want to leave undecided the question whether this move transfers all the 
talk of moral visions in these last two chapters to a Kierkegaardian religious 
stage. Some readers may think it does. Other readers may see moral vision talk 
as a way of grounding the unconditional commitments of love without 
resoning the division between ethical and religious. 
Naturally, then, I will also bypass discussion of the interesting idea that all 
moral visions, even those which produce evil {e.g. a vision devoted to racial 
purity), belong to the religious stage. 
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in supporting individuals in their projects of love. Communities 
nurture the visions which enable certain commitments. 
Communities can support projects of love in at least two other 
ways, both prosaic and obvious. First, a community listens and 
encourages. Second, community members can hold one another 
accountable to their vision. 
Peck says that genuine community is marked by realism. (Peck 
64-65) In a healthy marriage, two minds working on the same 
problem give much better odds that a good solution will be found 
than one alone; each one sees possibilities and issues that the other 
does not. Larger groups have an even greater advantage, says Peck, 
provided they encourage individuality through acceptance. In a 
community I am free to be myself; I can say what I think and feel. 
The pooled experience and wisdom of a group which shares my 
vision of love becomes available to me when I tell them of the 
struggles (which inevitably come) in my projects of love. The other 
community members listen to me; then, knowing me intimately, they 
can encourage me to keep working at love's projects. 
Some moral philosophers have given attention to "weakness of 
will," wondering why people sometimes know the thing they ought to 
do without doing it. Other thinkers have thought this phenomenon of 
little importance to philosophy, since they envisioned the task of 
moral philosophy as giving rational explanations of right conduct 
rather than practical advice, which they left to moralists. Readers of 
chapters three and four can predict which side I think is right. 
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Obviously, philosophers ought to be interested in possible ways to 
overcome weakness , of will. 
John Wesley discovered--in the sense that no one told him 
' 
though many wise people in many cultures have also known it--a 
simple device which can help overcome weakness of will. If 
someone tells other people whom she trusts what she thinks she 
ought to do, it is far more likely that she will do it than if she kept 
the matter secret. And if she meets with an accepting community on 
a regular basis, she will be even more likely to fulfill the historically 
particular requirements of her projects of love, because the group, by 
its knowledge of her and its desire that she become what she 
envisions, holds her accountable to her projects. So the founder of 
Methodism instructed his followers to hold "class meetings," in which 
believers were. to confess their sins to each other and pray for each 
other on a weekly basis. 
Accountability in a community carries the danger of legalism, 
perhaps especially in religious groups. Remember that, according to 
Peck, a genuine community must be inclusive; it must value people 
for who they are rather than what they do. The ability of a 
community to hold its members accountable to the shared vision is 
mirrored by the pseudocommunity's pressures on individuals to 
conform to group norms and convert to group dogmas. Discerning 
the difference in real life, where no community is perfect, but only 
on the way, requires practical wisdom. Nevertheless, I maintain that 
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a community can help the individual in his projects of love by 
holding him accountable to do the things he knows love demands.6 
The example of Wesley's class meetings shows something 
obvious, to which I will draw attention. Much of this chapter (and 
this whole study, for that matter) has been couched in the language 
of psychology. Further, I suspect that the locutions of popular 
psychology have entered my unconsidered speech at least as much 
as into any other late twentieth century American's.? We must 
resist, though, the idea that healthy communities require the ability 
to speak the language of psychology, at least in the forms we are 
used to. Wesley's followers (think of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century American farm families) confessed their sins to each other, 
prayed for each other, and--if we grant that at least some of the 
thousands of class meetings were healthy communities--helped each 
get better psychologically and morally. They were "vulnerable;" they 
gave "unconditional positive regard;" they "processed feelings;" they 
"held one another accountable;" etc.--without using any such 
psychological locutions. 
The moral pilgrim need not find a group that speaks the 
language of therapists in order to find a community that can heal 
6 Again, do not read this "doing" in behavioristic terms. I may well confess to 
my meeting a need to change an attitude or way of thinking. Later, they may 
ask me how the matter is going. Knowing they may ask, I am more careful to 
"do" what I am supposed to do. Real moral action may be entirely internal. 
1 Consider: "What I hear you saying is ... " "That's not where I'm at.• "She is 
really into ... " "Hey, you're ok" "And then his ~said ... (not another 
person) Etc. I suspect that popular psychology has impacted our language and 
thought as much as Freudian ideas changed the language and thought of 
Europe's intelligensia in the first three decades of this century. 
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hurts, flesh out a vision of love, and support projects of love. For 
example, Peck thinks the most successful community in the country 
is Alcoholics Anonymous. (Peck 77) Some AA groups probably have 
psychologically trained members, but most get along without any 
serious study of psychological theory. AA procedures strongly 
encourage acceptance and honesty in the group, characteristics which 
foster community and health. 
Conclusion 
Perhaps the best way to end this chapter, and the book, is 
simply to indicate the interrelations between the theses made here. 
In this chapter I have suggested that healthy communities aid 
would-be lovers by providing a place in which 1) narcissistic wounds 
can be healed, 2) stories of love told, and 3) projects of love 
supported. The first two of these theses correspond to two of the 
four main positive contentions of the book, i.e., that narcissism 
inhibits love (chapter one) and that we need a vision of the 
good/love to pursue (chapter six). The other main positive ideas of 
the book are that we learn to love by learning to see others 
accurately and with compassion (chapter two) and that healthy 
communities can help us learn to love (the present chapter). 
Thus, the four main theses of the book relate to a simple 
contention, that moral progress--in the sense of learning to love--is 
possible. The rest of the book--chapters three, four, five and seven--
attempt to defend the positive contentions of the study as 
philosophically sayable and important. 
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A comment from chapter one should be repeated here. It is 
possible, though I cannot think how, that all four of the positive 
suggestions of this book are mistaken; that is, none of them is good 
counsel for the would-be lover. But if they are wrong, they are 
wrong because some other way is right. And if they are wrong, it is 
worth philosophers' effort to find the right way, for basic to the 
entire study is the conviction that, as Iris Murdoch wrote, "love is a 
central concept in morals." 
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